HANDLE

8 August 1955

POP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Program for the Improvement of Allied (NATO) Communications Subject: Security.

Reference: USCIB 29.3/49

As a result of telephonic approval of the reference by all 1. members action has been taken by the Department of State member to inform the French, through Embassy, Paris, of U.S. approval of agenda items for U.S.-U.K.-French discussions this fall.

The Senior U.K. Liaison Officer, Washington and SUSLO, London 2. have been informed of this decision.

OP SE

Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB

USCIB: 29.3/50

VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY HANDLE

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Declassified and approved for release by VSA on 09-23-2014 pursuant to E.O.

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

3 August 1955

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Program for the Improvement of Allied (NATO) Communications Security.

REPEREA4045873

Reference: USCIB 29.3/47 dated 14 June 1955.

1. Attached is the agenda proposed by the delegates to the US-UK-French technical COMSEC discussions in Paris on 27 and 28 July as a suitable basis for further tripartite COMSEC discussions to be held in Paris from 16 to 26 November 1955. The July conversations were considered satisfactory and a report on them will be forwarded to USCIB at a later date.

2. The Ad Hoc Committee reviewed the agenda and considers the topics to be within the purposes of the program for the improvement of NATO communications security except for Item 6. Mr. Raven and Dr. Stukey, the US technical representatives at the recent talks, stated that the French are interested in protection of any secret French cipher machines which might be used in NATO, that they understand that the problem cannot be discussed conclusively by communications security experts and that they believe this agenda item can be satisfied by a statement of the US views and experience with this problem. Mr. Raven and Dr. Stukey also stated that although discussion of Item 9 could be undertaken without undue exposure of sophisticated US COMSEC and COMINT techniques, it would be necessary for USCIB to consider at a later date what the precise limits of discussion should be. With these explanations the Ad Hoc Committee approved the entire agenda.

3. The Ad Hoc Committee was informed that it was highly desirable to give the French confirmation of US acceptance of the agenda as soon as possible. Mr. Raven and Dr. Stukey also stated that the British have accepted the agenda and will so inform the French on receipt of US concurrence.

4. It is recommended that:

(a) USCIB approve the agenda and proposed dates for the tripartite technical talks;

(b) that USCIB authorize the Acting Executive Secretary to inform the SUKLO of this approval; and

(c) that USCIB authorize the Department of State to inform the French of this approval through Embassy Paris.

USCIB: 29.3/49

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

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TOP SECRET

Subject: Program for the Improvement of Allied (NATO) Communications Security.

TBEBEEREX404

5. It is requested that telephonic concurrence in the above recommendations be given to this office by close of business Friday, 5 August 1955.

A.C. none fo

H. D. JONES Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure a/s

USCIB: 29.3/49

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-SECRE'I

TOP SECRET

1 August 1955

AGENDA FOR TRIPARTITE COMSEC CONFERENCE TO BE HELD 16 TO 26 NOVEMBER 1955

- 1. Synthesis of Previous Meetings as Regards National Communications Security in NATO Countries--Results Obtained and Conclusions to be Drawn.
- 2. Organization and Problems of Communications Security Organisms of the Three Countries.
- 3. Control and Monitoring of Communications.
- 4. General principles of Judgment of Ciphering Systems in Connection With Their Utilization.
- 5. Utilization of the CX-52 Machine.
- 6. Protection of Patents in the Three Countries.
- 7. Production of One-Time Tapes and Keys, and Control of Random.
- 8. Electrical Shortcomings of the On-Line Machines.
- 9. Ciphony and Cifax.


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-TREEECDEA4045873

TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY



SUBJECT NUMBER

USCIB: 29.3/48 Item Not on the Agenda for the 116th Meeting of USCIB, held on 10 June 1955.

Subject: Program for the Improvement of Allied (NATO) Communications Security.

The ACTING CHAIRMAN (General Cabell) asked if Mr. Polyzoides had anything further to report on this subject.

MR. POLYZOIDES stated that the Working Group is, at the moment, awaiting a vote sheet reply from the members.

The CHAIR said that he has just been informed that the Secretary has received approval from all members, and that the Navy member has suggested that Mr. Polyzoides accompany the U.S. technical experts to Paris for the purpose of furnishing them with advice and policy guidance for their discussions with U.K. and French representatives.

MR. POLYZOIDES said that in view of Board approval, the papers can now be sent off for use in the briefings. He added that the British should be ready, since both of their Boards have indicated approval of the papers.

The CHAIR asked if there was objection to the proposal that Mr. Polyzoides accompany the technical experts.

There was no objection.

DECISION: (10 June 1955) USCIB noted the information presented by Mr. Polyzoides, and approved the Navy member's recommendation that Mr. Polyzoides accompany the U.S. technical experts to Paris to provide advice and policy guidance.

The meeting adjourned at 1220.

USCIB: 29.3/48

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USCIB: 29.3/47

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

14 June 1955

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Program for the Improvement of Allied (NATO) Communications Security.

Reference: USCIB 29.3/45, dated 27 May 1955.

1. Vote sheet replies to the reference indicate approval by all members of USCIB.

2. The vote of approval by the Navy member contained a recommendation that the Chairman of the CWG, Mr. T. A. Polyzoides, accompany the U.S. technical experts to Paris for the purpose of furnishing them with advice and policy guidance for their discussions with U.K. and French representatives. This recommendation was presented by the Chairman, USCIB at the 116th meeting, and was approved by the Board.

3. This office has informed the Senior U.K. Liaison Officer of USCIB approval of the CWG proposals contained in the reference.

Dours

Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB

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HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

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TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY

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SUBJECT NUMBER

USCIB: 29.3/46 Item B (Not on Agenda) for the 115th Meeting of USCIB, held on 20 May 1955.

Subject: Allied (NATO) Communications Security (Approach to the French).

The ACTING CHAIRMAN (General Cabell) invited comments by Mr. Polyzoides, Chairman of the U.S.-U.K. Combined Working Group.

MR. POLYZOIDES reported to the members on the general status of the preparations for the next approach to the French, stating that the matter is near the point of presentation to the French Foreign Office. He explained that agreement upon an aide memoire, and general terms of reference for the Ambassador, has been reached on the U.S. side and that formal approval on the British side is now awaited. He suggested that the Board accept this interim report of progress pending final CWG approval of the papers, at which time the Board's approval will be requested.

The CHAIR suggested that the Board express general approval in principle of Mr. Polyzoides' report, and be prepared to act by vote sheet on the final recommendations of the Committee.

It was so agreed.

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TOP SECRET

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APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL

27 May 1955

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Program for the Improvement of Allied (NATO) Communications Security

1. The enclosed memorandum and report from the Chairman of the US/UK Combined Working Group and US Ad Hoc Committee for the Improvement of NATO COMSEC is circulated for vote sheet action.

CREFEGRE A4045

2. It will be remembered that the Chairman of the US Ad Hoc Committee outlined these proposals and obtained approval in principle of them at the 115th meeting of USCIB.

3. It is requested that the attached vote sheet be executed and returned to this office by the close of business Friday, 10 June 1955.

TAYL US L.

Captain, U. B. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL

USCIB: 29.3/45

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REF ID: A4045873 TOP SECRET This document consists of ______ pages No______ of _____ Copies, Series _A____

CODE-WORD MAFERIAL ENCLOSED

25 May 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB

Program for the Improvement of Allied (NATO) SUBJECT : Communications Security

REFERENCE:

(a) USCIB 29.3/40 of 7 February 1955
(b) USCIB 29.3/41 of 7 February 1955
(c) USCIB 29.3/42 of 11 February 1955
(d) USCIB 29.3/43 of 8 March 1955

At its 112th meeting on 11 February 1955 USCIB approved recommendations of the US representatives on the Combined Working Group to continue US-UK efforts to improve French communications security along previous lines and within previous limitations and to do this by an approach to the Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry, M. Massigli, followed by technical talks between US, UK and French experts. In reference (c) LSIB expressed a preference for recommendations proposed by UK representatives but agreed to undertake the US plan.

Accordingly the Combined Working Group has prepared an aide-memoire for presentation to M. Massigli by the US and UK Ambassadors in Paris and has agreed on general terms of reference to govern the ambassadorial approach and the technical discussions. These agreed papers are attached.

The US representatives on the Combined Working Group recommend that:

(a) USCIB approve the specific plan for the approach to the French as set out in the attached papers;

(b) USCIB approve the forwarding of these papers to Ambassador Dillon to initiate this approach; and

(c) the Chairman, USCIB, inform the Chairman, LSIB. of the Board's decision.

Thomas Touperdes

T. Achilles Polyzoides Chairman, U.S. Ad Hoc Committee

OP SECRET

25-082 #24

24 May 1955


AIDE-MEMOIRE

1. In March 1954 the US and UK Governments, believing that the national communications practices of many NATO governments might be such as to create a potential source of highly valuable information to the USSR and that it was in the common interest to take action to bring the situation to the attention of all NATO governments, proposed through their ambassadors in Paris that communications security experts of the US, UK and French Governments hold technical discussions with the object (a) of agreeing upon a memorandum on this subject for issue by the Standing Group to all NATO governments; and (b) of assuring themselves that their own respective communications security practices were satisfactory from the standpoint of the Standing Group Memorandum. On 24 March 1954 an Aide-Memoire on this subject was left with M. Parodi by the US and UK Ambassadors.

2. The French Government concurred in this proposal and in April 1954 discussions were opened in Paris by the communications security experts of the three governments. At that time the French representatives were M. Viala, Captain Muller, Lieutenant Colonel Black and Capitaine de Corvette Rault. They discussed general principles and specific practices in the communications security field. They also agreed on a Memorandum, which subsequently was accepted by the Standing Group as SGM-620-54, and was approved by the NATO Council on 3 November 1954. The technical talks also resulted in the furnishing of a measure of assistance by the US and the UK to the Quai d'Orsay at the request of M. Viala. This assistance included the provision of certain UK cipher machines.

3. The US and UK Governments are still concerned by the potential danger to NATO created by the possible insecurity of the national communications of member nations. The US and UK Governments would like to know whether the French Government does not now consider that the time has come for a renewal of technical discussions among the communications security experts of the three countries. These experts would review the adequacy of steps taken to date in NATO and reassure themselves that their own communications security practices meet the desired standards. At the same time the US and UK

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- 2 -

Governments would like to know whether there is any further assistance which the French authorities themselves would desire. Specifically, the UK authorities would be grateful for confirmation that a further fifty TYPEX 22 machines which had been offered to M. Viala are not now required by any French cipher-using authority.

4. If the French Government considers renewed technical discussions to be desirable, the US and UK Governments would be prepared each to designate two or three communications security experts to meet in Paris with experts similarly designated by the French Government at a mutually convenient time. The US and UK Governments would be pleased to receive French suggestions for the date of these talks and the specific topics to be covered in them and, naturally, would be prepared in reply to suggest similar topics to the French Government.

24 May 1955

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR AMBASSADORS BRIEFING

1. The briefs for the Ambassadors shall cover the following items:

a. The Combined Working Group Memorandum of 7 February 1955.

b. The Aide Memoire handed to M. Parodi on 24 March 1954.

c. SGM-620-54.

d. The Aide Memoire prepared for the approach to M. Massigli.

2. If questioned on the subject, the general justification for the approach to Massigli is that it is a follow-up to the 1954 discussions.

4. The technical discussions of April-May 1954 were without agenda and covered a wide range of topics. It is desirable that any talks which result from the present approach to Massigli should deal with specific topics. The French have, accordingly, been invited in the Aide Memoire to make their own proposals for such specific topics. These proposals should be passed to the US and UK Ambassadors as soon as possible. The US and UK for their part have expressed willingness to submit in reply their proposed topics through the same channels.

5. In the approach to Massigli the security check provided by the TSWG phase in 1954 appears to the US and the UK to be unnecessary because we expect that one or more of the same technicians in each team will take part in the proposed discussions and can vouch for new representatives.

6. The briefs may also include whatever additional matters are considered necessary for the individual Ambassadors as determined respectively by the Department of State and the Foreign Office.

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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24 May 1955

GENERAL TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR TECHNICAL TALKS

The US and UK will discuss the following general topics for technical discussions with the French:

a. Developments from Standing Group Memorandum.

b. Need for strong central COMSEC organizations, and advice on organizing.

c. Enforcement of COMSEC regulations and surveillance.

d. Radiation of plain text or usable signal.

e. Further discussions on security of cryptosystems.

Other topics, such as the French crypto-program, details of procurement of equipment, etc., may arise which will be helpful to discuss. The French may also suggest additional subjects.

Details of the topics listed above will be worked out by US and UK technical representatives in conversations in London before the technical talks with the French.

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TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY



SUBJECT NUMBER

USCIB: 29.3/44 Item C (not on agenda) discussed at the 113th Meeting of USCIB, held on 11 March 1955.

Subject:

French Communications Security.

MR. ARMSTRONG reported briefly on discussions which were scheduled to be held recently between Mr. Eden and Mr. Dulles in Bangkok. He said that apparently the U.K. Foreign Office had a change of mind after receiving the CWG report and instead of Mr. Eden broaching the subject, Sir Harold Case is approached Mr. MacArthur with the suggestion that instead of pressing, for action on a disclosure basis at this time the U.K. would accept the plan for a discussion with M. Massigli if arrangements could be made to go ahead forthwith and such an approach were to be followed by a joint review of the situation not later than 1 August. In response to this Mr. MacArthur suggested that the CWG be designated to plan the approach to Massigli but was unable to agree to a hard and fast date of 1 August for the review, suggesting instead (by later correspondence) that the review be undertaken approximately six months after the approach to Massigli thus giving time for reaction by Massigli and for possible introduction into use by the French of the TYPEX machines already provided to them by the U.K. He concluded by stating that the Board might now consider authorizing the U.S. element of the CWG to proceed with their U.K. colleagues in planning an approach to Massigli.

CAPTAIN TAYLOR commented that LSIB has also responded to USCIB's comment on the recent CWG report. He said that LSIB has agreed to the U.S. view (in the interests of harmony) and we are therefore obliged to implement that portion of the CWG recommendations now jointly agreed between LSIB and USCIB.

It was so agreed.

The meeting adjourned at 1410.

USCIB: 29.3/44

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TOP SECRET

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APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL

8 March 1955

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

20

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Program to <u>Improve</u> the Communications Security of NATO Countries

TOREFEGRETA404

References: (a) USCIB 29.3/42 of 11 February 1955 (Minutes of Item 2 of the Agenda for the 112th Meeting of USCIB).
(b) USCIB 29.3/41 of 7 February 1955.

1. By action of reference (a), reference (b) was approved and the message included as enclosure 2 therewith sent, with minor non-substantive corrections approved in advance by the decision recorded in reference (a).

2. LSIB's reply to the above-mentioned message has now been received and is circulated herewith as enclosure 1. Enclosure 2 is the final version of USCIB's message as sent and is circulated herewith for completion of the record.

3. Attention is invited to paragraph 4(c) of enclosure 1. It will therefore be expected that, unless directed otherwise, the Chairman, Combined Working Group will regard this memorandum as notification to proceed with planning along the lines agreed.

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Laptain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosures a/s

APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS

USCIB: 29.3/43

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Comments of the Boards are as follows:

- 1. They note with satisfaction the wide measure of technical agreement.
- 2. They welcome the general agreement reached on the following points:
 - (a)
 - (b) Further action is necessary;
 - (c) The will not reach a suitable standard of security without Anglo-American assistance.

3. They note that UK and US members of the Combined Working Group were not agreed on the best course of action to take with the

- 4. LSIB and LCSB conclude as follows:
 - (a) They endorse the agreed recommendations of the Combined Working Group.
 - (b) Where the UK and US recommendations differ on the question of the nature of the action to be taken with the ______ they fully support the conclusions of the UK delegates. Noting, however, that the US views diverge from those of the UK in a field where mutual agreement is essential, the Boards agree to waive the UK proposal for action with the
 - (c) (i) They agree that an approach should be made to M. Massigli on the lines of that to M. Parodi in 1954, the details and timing to be worked out and agreed between the responsible UK and US authorities.
 - (ii) They consider that if this approach does not produce satisfactory results, the UK and US should together consider more drastic action.

5. As already notified, the same security precautions for the handling of the Combined Working Group report are being adopted in the UK as those outlined in USCIB's memorandum."

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/43 dtd 8 Mar 1955.

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EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

12Ø41ØZ (12 FEB 1955)

"WL 130 USCIB Executive Secretary sends. Please convey the following from the Chairman USCIB to the Chairman LSIB:

'1. USCIB has noted with great interest the report of the Combined Working Group of our two Boards concerning efforts to improve __________ communications security.

'2. USCIB is gratified by the large area of agreement reached on the technical aspects of the problem and in the conclusions and recommendations which have drawn from them. At the same time USCIB notes that the US and UK representatives have not agreed on several of the conclusions and recommendations.

'3. USCIB has considered fully and carefully the conclusions and recommendations and has given particular attention to the UK views as expressed therein where they diverge from US views. USCIB fully concurs in those of the conclusions and recommendations jointly agreed by the CWG but after extended study is persuaded that it must endorse the separate conclusions and recommendations of the US element in the belief that the facts and conclusions as agreed by the entire Combined Working Group do not justify a

'4. USCIB has also noted the extent of technical detail contained in the CWG report and for its part has directed that its members observe the following additional precautions in the handling of this document as a whole:

A. Restrict access to the barest minimum feasible.

B. Require that it be hand carried by and between the individuals who will have access.

C. Provide that custody be assigned to one individual who will handle these documents in the same manner as a registered publication obtaining a custody receipt each time the documents pass out of his control.

D. Forbid transport by aircraft any place unless automatic destruction can be assured (except initial transport of necessary copies to the U.K.)

E. Forbid transport beyond the continental limits of the U.S. except insofar as it may be necessary to transport the report to the U.K.

'5. USCIB would be grateful for your views and comment.'"

Enclosure 2 with USCIB 29.3/43 dtd 8 Mar 1955.

TREFECEE 4045873

TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY

SUBJECT NUMBER

FINAL

ÉO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

USCIB: 29.3/42 Item 2 of the Agenda for the ll2th Meeting of USCIB, held on ll February 1955.

Subject: Program to Improve the Communications Security of NATO Countries

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (General Cabell) invited attention to the report of the Chairman of the Combined Working Group and asked if Mr. Polyzoides wished to comment.

MR. POLYZOIDES said that he was prepared to present to the Committee his interpretation of the thinking which had gone into the CWG recommendations. He then offered to help clarify any portion of the report that the members might have questions on.

CAPTAIN TAYLOR pointed out a minor correction to be made in TAB 7, paragraph 10b, third line: Change "March 1953" to "March 1954".

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN asked if there were any comments on the proposed message from the Chairman, USCIB to the Chairman, LSIB which had been circulated as enclosure 2 with USCIB 29.3/41 of 7 February 1955.

CAPTAIN TAYLOR explained that he had drafted the message referred to by the Chairman; that the message had not been coordinated with the Ad Hoc Committee and time had not permitted circulation of a suggested change submitted by the Department of Defense member. Captain Taylor read the suggested change which was thereupon adopted.

MR. ARMSTRONG indicated that he had drafted some changes of an editorial nature which could, in his opinion, be incorporated in the message without affecting its substance.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN suggested approval of the proposed message, as amended, subject to non-substantive changes to be suggested by the State Department member and which the Executive Secretary would be empowered to make. $EO^{-3}-3(h)(2)$

EC 3.3(n)(2) PL 86-36750 USC 3605

It was so agreed.

The members then approved the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee (enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/41) and the recommendations of the Executive Secretary on security precautions for handling the report of the Chairman of the Combined Working Group.

USCIB: 29.3/42

- 4 -

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY

USCIB: 29.3/42

DECISION: (11 February 1955) USCIB approved:

(a) Subject to the one change mentioned above, the report of the Chairman of the Combined Working Group (enclosure with USCIB 29.3/40).

ID:A4045

(b) The recommendations of the U.S. representatives on the CWG (enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/41).

(c) The proposed message from the Chairman, USCIB to the Chairman, LSIB, as amended in the foregoing discussion, subject to non-substantive changes to be made by the Executive Secretary (enclosure 2 with USCIB 29.3/41).

(d) The recommendations of the Executive Secretary concerning security precautions for handling the report.

USCIB: 29.3/42

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TOP SECRET



HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

ÈO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 - APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS - CODEWORD - MATERIAL

7 February 1955

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject:	Program to Improve NATO COMSEC
Reference:	USCIB 29.3/40 of 3 February 1955.

1. With regard to the reference, enclosure 1 herewith sets forth the recommendations of the USCIB Ad Hoc Committee for subject problem.

2. Enclosure 2 is a proposed message to be sent by the Executive Secretary to SUSLO, London conveying to LSIB the views of USCIB on the referenced CWG report in the event that USCIB should approve the recommendations of the U.S. Ad Hoc Committee.

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Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosures a/s

> APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS-CODEWORD MATERIAL

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

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USCIB: 29.3/41

7 February 1955

TOP SECRET EIDER

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB

SUBJECT: Communications Security

REFERENCE: (a

(a) USCIB 29.3/36
(b) USCIB 29.3/37
(c) USCIB 29.3/38
(d) USCIB 29.3/39.
(e) USCIB 29.3/40/

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) the US-UK Combined Working Group for the Improvement of Allied (NATO) <u>Communications Security</u> (CWG) has reviewed the status of the A copy of the CWG report was forwarded with reference (e).

TOREACTOLATION

2. The US representatives on the CWG recommend that:

(a) USCIB approve the joint recommendations of the US and UK representatives.

(b) USCIB approve the recommendations made by the US representatives alone.

(c) USCIB disapprove the recommendations made by the UK representatives alone.

(d) USCIB approve the forwarding of this report for use in briefing the Secretary of State on this problem and

(e) The Chairman, USCIB, inform the Chairman, LSIB, of its decision on this matter.

(SIGNED) T. Achilles Polyzoides Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/41

TOP SECRET EIDER

FROM: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB

TO: SUSLO, LONDON

ÈO_3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

INFO: DIRNSA

PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING FROM THE CHAIRMAN USCIB TO THE CHAIRMAN LSIB: "1. USCIB HAS NOTED WITH GREAT INTEREST THE REPORT OF THE COMBINED

WORKING GROUP OF OUR TWO BOARDS CONCERNING EFFORTS TO

"2. USCIB IS GRATIFIED BY THE LARGE AREA OF AGREEMENT REACHED ON THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM AND IN THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN DRAWN FROM THEM. AT THE SAME TIME USCIB NOTES THAT THE US AND UK REPRESENTATIVES HAVE NOT AGREED ON SEVERAL OF THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

"3. USCIB HAS CONSIDERED FULLY AND CAREFULLY THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE DIVERGENT VIEWS EXPRESSED THEREIN. USCIE FULLY CONCURS IN THOSE OF THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDA-TIONS JOINTLY AGREED BY THE CWG BUT FEELS CONSTRAINED TO ENDORSE THE SEPARATE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE U.S. ELEMENT IN THE BELIEF THAT THE FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS AS AGREED BY THE ENTIRE COMBINED WORKING GROUP DO NOT DEMONSTRATE A SITUATION OF SUCH SERIOUSNESS AS TO REQUIRE THE SHOCK TREATMENT OF DIRECT DISCLOSURE AND ALL THAT THAT ENTAILS.

"4. USCIB HAS ALSO NOTED THE EXTENT OF TECHNICAL DETAIL CONTAINED IN THE CWG REPORT AND FOR ITS PART HAS DIRECTED THAT ITS MEMBERS OBSERVE THE

Enclosure 2 with USCIB 29.3/41

TOP SECRET EIDER

FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL PRECAUTIONS IN THE HANDLING OF THIS DOCUMENT AS A WHOLE:

TOP SECRET E40458

a. RESTRICT ACCESS TO THE BAREST MINIMUM FEASIBLE.

b. REQUIRE THAT IT BE HAND CARRIED BY AND BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUALS WHO WILL HAVE ACCESS.

c. PROVIDE THAT CUSTODY BE ASSIGNED TO ONE INDIVIDUAL WHO WILL HANDLE THESE DOCUMENTS IN THE SAME MANNER AS A REGISTERED PUBLICATION OBTAINING A CUSTODY RECEIPT EACH TIME THE DOCUMENTS PASS OUT OF HIS CONTROL.

d. FORBID TRANSPORT BY AIRCRAFT ANY PLACE UNLESS AUTOMATIC DESTRUCTION CAN BE ASSURED (EXCEPT INITIAL TRANSPORT OF NECESSARY COPIES TO THE U.K.)

e. FORBID TRANSPORT BEYOND THE CONTINENTAL LIMITS OF THE U.S. EXCEPT INSOFAR AS IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO TRANSPORT THE REPORT TO THE U.K.

"5. USCIB WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS AND COMMENT."

- 2 -

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EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

1127H UBCIB MERTING

Iten 2 (cont'd)

a. USCIB approve the joint recommendations of the U.S. and U.K. representatives (1.e., some further action was necessary to get the Prench to make and quatain improvements in their communications scaurity).

c. USCID disapprove the recommendations made by the U.K. representatives alone (1.e., the "School treatment").

d. USCIB approve the forwarding of this report for use in briefing the Secretary of State on this problem and,

e. The Chairman, USCIB, inform the Chairman, LSIB, of its decision on this matter. (A suggested Graft measage is inclosed).

HECOMPENDATION

4

It is recommended that USCIB accept the recommendations of its Ad Hoc Committee as set forth in paragraph 16 above.

TOP SECRET REF^{SECRET}1D:A40458

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APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL

24

7 February 1955

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Program to Improve the Communications Security of NATO Countries

References: (a) USCIB 23/65 of 30 June 1953. (b) USCIB 29.1/26 of 28 June 1954. (c) USCIB 29.1/1 of 21 September 1953.

(d) USCIB 29.3/38 of 23 December 1954.

(e) USCIB 29.3/39 of 5 January 1955.

1. The members will recall that as a result of approval of reference (a) (the recommendations of the US/UK Conference on NATO COMSEC held in early June 1953) the tripartite technical discussions reported in reference (b) were held in late April 1954.

2. Since the above-mentioned tripartite technical discussions, the Combined Working Group (CWG) set up by reference (c) has continued its surveillance of the problem with particular regard to observing the effect upon _______ of those tripartite discussions. The U.S. element of the CWG, which constitutes USCIB's ad hoc committee for this matter, had not, until receipt of the information in reference (d), found cause to recommend any drastic change in the program for the improvement of

3. Pursuant to USCIB's decision on reference (d), reference (e) was sent to LSIB and the CWG immediately commenced to formulate its recommendations in the light of the new suggestions presented to the U.S. Secretary of State by the U.K. Foreign Minister. At the insistence of the U.K. representatives, the CWG agreed to present its recommendations in time to permit a discussion of the problem by the U.S. Secretary of State and the U.K. Foreign Minister at the forthcoming Bangkok Conference to be held in late February rather than completing its report by 1 March 1955 as suggested in reference (e). In this connection, no reply from LSIB to the message circulated under cover of reference (e) has yet been received.

> APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL

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USCIB: 29.3/40

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4. The report of the Chairman of the Combined Working Group is therefore enclosed herewith for consideration at the 112th meeting of USCIB on 11 February 1955.

5. Owing to the wealth of technical information on the U.S. COMINT effort contained in the enclosed report only two copies per member are being distributed. In addition it is recommended that the following security precautions be applied to it:

- a. Restrict access to the barest minimum feasible.
- b. Require that it be hand carried by and between the individuals who will have access.
- c. Provide that custody be assigned to one individual who will handle these documents in the same manner as a TOP SECRET registered publication obtaining a custody receipt each time the documents pass out of his control.
- d. Forbid transport by aircraft any place unless automatic destruction can be assured (except initial transport of necessary copies to the U.K.).
- e. Forbid transport beyond the continental limits of the U.S. except insofar as it may be necessary to transport the report to the U.K.

6. It is further recommended that USCIB approve the security precautions described in paragraph 5 above and include mention of them in whatever comment it makes to LSIB so as to encourage similar treatment of this report by the U.K.

CATOR US'I aptain, I.S. Navy

Captain, U.S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure a/s

USCIB: 29.3/40

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
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


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





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





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
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
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


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



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
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





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



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
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5 January 1955

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EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject:

Communications Security.

REF ID A40458

Reference: USCIB 29.3/38, dated 23 December/1954.

1. Telephonic replies to the reference indicate approval by all members of the proposals contained therein.

2. Pursuant to this decision the following message has been sent to the Chairman, LSIB:

"AS YOU KNOW, ON 17 DECEMBER FOR MIN EDEN WROTE TO SECRETARY DULLES SUGGESTING THAT US AND UK EXPERTS REVIEW THE _______ AND REPORT WITHIN TWO MONTHS. ON 22 DECEMBER SECRETARY DULLES, ACCEPTING THIS PROPOSAL, STATED THAT HE CONSIDERED THE EXISTING US-UK COMBINED WORKING GROUP THE APPROPRIATE BODY TO PREPARE THIS REPORT. ACCORDINGLY, ON 29 DECEMBER USCIB GAVE ITS APPROVAL TO THE PREPARATION BY 1 MARCH 1955 OF A REPORT BY THE CWG ON THE STATUS OF THE _______ TOGETHER WITH RECOMMENDATIONS AS NECESSARY FOR FUTURE ACTION AND ASKED ME TO INFORM YOU OF THIS DECISION."

Captain, U.S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

USCIB: 29.3/39

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23 December 1954

TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: French Communications Security.

References: (a) USCIB 29.3/36, dated 15 December 1954. (b) USCIB 29.3/37, dated 17 December 1954.

1. The enclosure, further to the references, is forwarded for consideration with a request that your views be telephoned to the Executive Secretariat at your early convenience, preferably by 1200, Wednesday, 29 December 1954.


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2. Early action is requested to permit USCIB's stand in this matter to be made known to LSIB as promptly as possible.

Deputy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure Dept. of State Memo dtd 23 Dec 1954

USCIB: 29.3/38



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
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December 23, 1954

Enclosure with USCIB 29.3/38 dtd 23 Dec 1954.

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17 December 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject:

Communications Security.

FLID:A404587

Reference: / USCIB 29.3/36 of 15 December 1954.

1. Fonecon responses to the proposal contained in the reference constitute approval by all members with comment as indicated below from two of them:

NAVY:

Approved as a stopgap measure. However, the Navy believes, as it has indicated in the past, that a direct and frank statement would be the best solution.

CIA:

Approved as an immediate expedient. A statement from the NSA as to the present situation with regard to _______ communications security must be obtained. It is assumed that such a statement will be available to, and will be included in the deliberations of, the CWG.

2. The above information has been furnished to the office of the State Department member and the Chairman of the U.S. Ad Hoc Committee by telephone.

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

in.

Captain, U.S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

USCIB: 29.3/37

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15 December 1954

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EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject:

Security.

1. The enclosed proposal by the Department of State Member is forwarded for consideration as a matter of urgency.

2. It is requested that your views on the recommendations contained herein be telephoned to the Executive Secretary at your earliest convenience, preferably by 1600, Thursday, 16 December 1954.

U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure a/s

USCIB: 29.3/36

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SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB


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SUBJECT: Program for the Improvement of Allied (NATO) Communications Security

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
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(Signed)

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

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USCIB: 29.3/35

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6 July 1954

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Disclosure of Circuit Mercury to the

References: (a) USCIB 29.3/24 dated 1 March 1954. (b) USCIB 29.3/27 dated 1 April 1954. (c) USCIB 29.3/28 dated 14 April 1954.


The enclosure is circulated for information and file in connection with references.

TAYL

Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure UKLO(BJSM) Memo for Dir., NSA, Pl/794, dtd 22 June 1954.

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APPENDED DOCUMENTS CONTAIN CODE WORD MATERIAL

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21 May 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject:

The enclosure is circulated for information regarding action taken pursuant to the decision rendered at the 103rd Meeting of USCIB with regard to subject.

Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure CIB # 000157 dtd 20 May 54.

> APPENDED DOCUMENTS CONTAIN CODE WORD MATERIAL

USCIB: 29.3/33

TOP SECRET



UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD Washington 25, D.C. OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

CIB # 000157

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

20 May 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

(Signed) ALLEN W. DULLES

Enclosure with USCIB 29.3/33 dtd 21 May 54.

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Chairman

12 May 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Communication Security.

1. At the request of the member representing the Department of State an additional item (Item No. 5), subject as above, has been approved by the Chairman for addition to the Agenda for the 103rd Meeting of USCIB. Remaining items should be renumbered accordingly.

2. The details of the item will be presented orally at the meeting.

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

6 L. TAYLOR

Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

USCIB: 29.3/32



10 May 1954

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: French Request for COMSEC Equipments.

Reference: USCIB 29.3/23 of 19 Feb 1954.

1. The enclosure is circulated for information in connection with the reference.

2. By copy of this memorandum the Department of State Member is requested to take such action as may be deemed appropriate with regard to paragraph 3 of the enclosure.

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RUFUS L. TALLOR

Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure NSA ser 0002375 dtd 6 May 54.

USCIB: 29.3/31

TCKEEFLAN

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Serial: 000237S

6 May 1954

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB

SUBJECT: French Request for COMSEC Equipments

1. Reference is made to USCIB 29.3/23 dated 19 February 1954, subject as above.

2. This is to inform you that the five ASAM 2-1 cryptographic machines, together with associated material necessary for their operation, were delivered to the French Consulate in Washington on 26 April 1954.

3. It is requested that this information be made available to the Chairman of the Combined Working Group for Improvement of Allied (NATO) Communications Security.

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(Signed) D.M. AGNEW Captain, US Navy NSA Member, USCIBEC

Enclosure with USCIB 29.3/31 dtd 10 May 54.



EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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FINAL

SUBJECT NUMBER

USCIB: 29.3/30

Item 2 of the Agenda for the 102nd Meeting of USCIB, held on 9 April 1954.

Subject: Disclosure of U.K. "Circuit Mercury" to the French (USCIB 29.3/27).

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (Lt. General Cabell) informed the members that he had directed the Executive Secretary to place this item on the agenda in view of the urgent and rather authoritative aspects of the British request.

General Canine was then asked if he had any comments.

GENERAL CANINE recalled that he had previously recommended turning down the British, basing his recommendation on two fundamental reasons: (1) "Mercury" is too good to give away and (2) He wanted assurance that the He continued by saying that the British, in this instance, propose to simply make a visual demonstration of "Circuit Mercury" to the French members of the Standing Group without furnishing circuit diagrams or maintenance manuals. U.K. representatives, he said, think the French will accept the visual explanation, thus greatly enhancing chances of success at the forthcoming conference. My people, he continued, are solidly against giving the French a machine or diagram because of the possibility of it getting into Communist hands. Since the French will not be given circuit diagrams and drawings, the danger of compromise will be considerably lessened. To have the theory is, of course, important, he concluded, but to actually build and put the machine into use is most difficult and would take considerable time.

MR. FRIEDMAN, at the request of the Director, NSA, pointed out some technical aspects of "Circuit Mercury". He discussed the principles of operation, the possibility of solution and how it compared with other machines, pointing out that "Circuit Mercury" is the best high-grade machine known. Mr. Friedman concluded with the opinion that it would take the experts, even after the proposed visual demonstration, about five (5) years to build a similar machine provided they did not get the "Circuit Mercury" drawings.

A general discussion followed relative to future relations with the French, possible British courses of action and whether or not the "Circuit Mercury" crypto-principle is available to the French through commercial sources.

USCIB: 29.3/30

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USCIB: 29.3/30

A recommendation was made by the Department of the Army Member to the effect that action be postponed until after the Geneva Conference. This discussion culminated with general agreement that: (1) such a delay would in reality amount to a refusal as far as current COMSEC negotiations with the French are concerned; (2) unless the U.K. can get along without using "Circuit Mercury", they will be unable to give a convincing explanation of failure to go through with the visual explanation; (3) the "Mercury" crypto-principle is available to the French through commercial sources. The makers of the Hagelin, Gretener, and Atheneum machines understand the principle, the Hagelin and Gretener have published it in their magazines.

("In order to clear up possible misunderstandings on cryptoprinciples with regard to the discussions on Circuit Mercury, Item 2 at the 102nd meeting, the Director, NSA, has requested that the Executive Secretary circulate the following statement:

'In the discussions of Circuit Mercury, the term "cryptoprinciple" was used in two different ways and the distinctions between the two may not have been made completely clear. In a broad sense, there is the <u>general</u> cryptoprinciple of electrically controlled stepping. Within the general cryptoprinciple of electrically controlled stepping, there are <u>specific</u> applications of electrically controlled stepping, and one of these is the specific cryptoprinciple of Circuit Mercury. The general cryptoprinciple, electrically controlled stepping, is commercially known. The specific cryptoprinciple of Circuit Mercury is, as far as the Director, NSA, is aware, known only to the UK and US and is not incorporated in commercially available cryptographic equipments.'")

GENERAL TRUDEAU continued the discussion by stating he would be willing to go further than delaying action until after the Geneva Conference. He said he would go along with a flat turndown.

MR. ARMSTRONG pointed out the effect this might have on the French Group during current negotiations. They might consider such an act an indication of bad faith on the part of the British.

GENERAL TRUDEAU then asked if the British had the right to disclose details of "Circuit Mercury" to the French.

MR. ARMSTRONG replied that the U.S. had agreed on disclosure up to a certain point, however, the French had said, "No, we want to actually see it."

GENERAL CANINE recalled that he had voiced his misgivings on acceding to this British request over a long period of time. Now he said he felt





TOP SECRET FROTH - U.S. FYES ONLY

USCIB: 29.3/30

he could be persuaded to agree to further revelations under conditions limiting the disclosure to visual demonstration. He continued by saying that nothing could be more serious than to give the Russians the opportunity of making a "Chinese" copy of a machine such as "Mercury".

MR. FRIEDMAN said that some of the members might be wondering if we would be hurt very much if the Russians did copy "Mercury". He added that we can see daylight in their present things but if they should get "Mercury", we would be in the dark again.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN, after a general discussion concerning the availability and security of a substitute machine for the British to pass COSMIC traffic on, asked if refusal of the British request would be fatal to the negotiations. The consensus was that refusal could have an adverse effect but would not necessarily be fatal.

MR. ARMSTRONG stated that the limitations proposed by General Canine would minimize the risk.

GENERAL CANINE replied that he also felt that that might minimize the risk to an acceptable degree. He added his opinion that the longrange program of the U.S. is more important than present negotiations. He continued by recommending that since the Board couldn't agree to say "Yes", it say "No", but not "Maybe".

> EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36750 USC 3605

GENERAL CANINE stated that the only substitute the U.K. might have would be the ROCKEX machine.


MR. KEAY pointed out that the British had taken the position that they could not use ROCKEX as a replacement.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN stated that under those conditions the answer would be the same in one week or six weeks, consequently there would be no point in delaying action on the British request.

USCIB: 29.3/30

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USCIB: 29.3/30

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GENERAL CANINE then assured the Board that should the Soviets get "Circuit Mercury" the U.S. would be out of the COMINT business, except for some T/A.

MR. SHELDON suggested that a flat turndown might result in some additional information.

After a discussion of the procedure the British or U.S. representatives would use in refusing a request for a copy of "Circuit Mercury", Mr. Friedman offered his opinion that the Russians are not inventors. They are great copyists, and should the Russians get a "Chinese" copy of "Mercury" they would be able to build the machine in a much shorter period.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN then asked each member if he accepted the recommendation of the Director, NSA that no further details of "Circuit Mercury" be given the French.

The members unanimously agreed.

DECISION: (9 April 1954) USCIB, after careful consideration of the message from the Director General to Mr. Dulles (enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/27 dated 1 April 1954), reaffirmed its previous decision that it could not concur in disclosure of further details of "Circuit Mercury" to the French and that the Executive Secretary should notify the proper British representatives of the USCIB decision without further explanations of the reasons for it.

This item to be dropped from the agenda.

USCIB: 29.3/30

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USCIB:	29.3/29	(ltem held	4 of on 9	the Apri	Agenda 1 1954	for	the	102nd	Meet	ing of	USCIB

The members noted the information presented.

This item to be dropped from the agenda.

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

USCIB: 29.3/29

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- 17 -

TOP SECRET

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24

USCIB: 29.3/28

14 April 1954

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Disclosure of the British Cipher Machine "Circuit Mercury" to the French.

AREFFED ****40458

Reference: USCIB 29.3/27 date 1 April 1954.

As a result of the decision reached by USCIB at its 102nd Meeting on Friday, 9 April 1954, with regard to subject item, the enclosure hereto has been delivered to the U.K. Liaison Officer in Washington in order to provide a reply to the enclosure with the reference.

TOP SECRET

Captain, U.S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure Copy of CIB # 000125 dtd 13 Apr 54.

USCIB: 29.3/28

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CIB #000125 . 13 April 1954

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SENIOR U.K. LIAISON OFFICER, WASHINGTON:

Subject: Release of Circuit Mercury.

The Chairman, USCIB has directed that I transmit to you the following response to your Director General's message contained in MOP.3715 dated 26 March 1954. I would be grateful to you if you would undertake to transmit this by means you deem appropriate to the intended addressee.

"To Sinclair from Dulles

"1. I very much regret to have to inform you that after prolonged and thorough consideration USCIB has reiterated its view that further details of 'Circuit Mercury' should not be made available to the French.

"2. This decision was taken in full realization of the difficulties it may create for you as well as for ourselves. Although fully sympathetic with your position in this matter, I did not and do not now feel that I can in all good conscience attempt further to persuade the Members of the Board to agree to release of any further details of 'Mercury'."

> (Signed) RUFUS L. TAYLOR Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure with USCIB 29.3/28 dtd 14 Apr 54.

TOP SECRET

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102nA USCIB Meeting

Item 2

DISCLOSURE OF UK "CIRCUIT MERCURY" TO THE FRENCH

REE ID:A4045873

BACKGROUND

1. USCIB 29.3/15 circulated a U.K. request for U.S. approval of disclosure of the full details of "Circuit MERNER" to the French

2. Director, NNA recommended against approval of the U.K. request on the grounds that "revelation of such a strong crypto principle to other countries will eventually endanger the U.S. COMINT effort because of difficulty in controlling further dissemination of this information."

3. USCIB supported the position of Director, NSA, on 10 February 1954 and the U.K. were advised of the U.S. decision by the Director, NSA. (USCIB 29.3/17, 21 and 24.)

CURRENT CONSIDERATION

4. The U.K. have now requested reconsideration of this decision through the medium of a personal message from the Director General to Chairman USCIB (USCIB 29.3/27). Receipt of the message was acknowledged with a statement that USCIB would reconsider the matter on 9 April.

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

6. Chairman, LSIB holds that the above factors outweigh the possible rick to COMINT of revealing MERCURY to the French. He points out that it has been agreed to release AFSAM-7 not only to the French but to all MATO members and adds that this system has been accepted as secure for the next ten to twenty years.

7. Chairman, ISTB feels that disclosure of adequate details of MERCHEN in the near future, perhaps at the Paris discussions, would create the best possible atmosphere for the success of the talks.

REF ID:A4045873

TOP SECRET

8. The U. S. has agreed with the British that the AFSAM-7 will be made available for NATO military use. We are in agreement with the British that the AFSAM-7 provides long-term top level cryptosecurity, essentially immune to cryptanalytic attack, and that the capture of an AFSAM-7 will not impair its future use.

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9. The crypto-principles of the AFSAM-7 are different from those of the U.S. top level ECM which also affords top level security, and the details of which are to be retained on a U.S.-U.K. eyes only basis. The ECM will not advertently be used for encipherement of COSMIC information.

10. Circuit MERCURY, which operates on a principle very similar to ECM but affords even greater security would, if disclosed to the French (or to the Russians), not materially affect U.S. communications security.

11. If a machine essentially similar to any of those mentioned above were put into use by COMINT target nations, the cryptanalytic solution of any individual message could not be expected in less than 10 to 20 years, and the solution of any group of messages would not result in a breakdown of the cryptosystem involved.

12. If the AFSAM-7 were to be employed by COMINT target countries, cryptenalytic attack employing RAM of greater speeds than presently available but probably feasible to develop could be justified. If we now knew the Soviets were using machines of security comparable to Circuit MERCURY, without development of new techniques and new machines, any attempted cryptanalytic attack appears to be hopeless.

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RECORDENDATIONS

13. Despite the above facto, if it is the considered opinion of the Board to accede to the British request, notvithstanding the potential serious jeopardy to our COMENT effort, I will agree reluctantly. I feel that we should, however, state clearly our extreme reluctance and the reasons therefor. If the Board so decides, I recommend we inform the British substantially as follows: DRAFT

REF ID:A4045873

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TO: DIRECTOR GENERAL

USCIB HAS RECONSIDERED YOUR REQUEST TO DISCLOSE FURTHER DETAILS OF CIRCUIT MERCURY TO THE FRENCH. AS YOU ARE AWARE, USCIB HAS BEEN EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO TAKE ACTION WHICH COULD RESULT IN PLACING IN SOVIET HANDS KNOWLEDGE OF SOPHISTICATED AND SUPERIOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS THAT COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE UK-US COMINT EFFORT. NEVERTHELESS, IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE YOUR VIEW THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH WHICH WE EXPECT TO LEAD TO A GENERAL IMPROVEMENT OF NATO SECURITY SHOULD NOT BE JEOPARDIZED, USCIB HAS AGREED TO APPROVE MERELY DEMONSTRATION OF CIRCUIT MERCURY TO THE FRENCH ACCOMPANIED BY ORAL EXPLANATION OF BASIC CRYPTO CIRCUITRY. USCIB DOES NOT GONCUR IN LEAVING THE MACHINE IN POSSESSION OF THE FRENCH NOR IN MAKING DETAILED CIRCUIT DIAGRAMS AVAILABLE TO THEM

EO 3.3(h)(2)

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Disclosure of the British Cipher Machine "Circuit Mercury" to France.

TCREFFID: A40

Reference:

(a) USCIB 29.3/15 dated 4 January 1954.
(b) USCIB 29.3/17 dated 29 January 1954.
(c) USCIB 29.3/21 dated 11 February 1954.
(d) USCIB 29.3/24 dated 1 March 1954.

(e) USCIB 29.3/20 dated 11 February 1954.

(f) USCIB 29.3/16 dated 15 January 1954.

1. Reference (a) circulated a U.K. request for U.S. approval of disclosure of the full details of "Circuit Mercury" to the French

2. In paragraph 5 of the enclosure with reference (a) the Director, National Security Agency recommended against acceding to this U.K. request on the grounds that "revelation of such a strong crypto principle to other countries will eventually endanger the U.S. COMINT effort because of difficulty in controlling further dissemination of this information".

3. Reference (b) supported the position of the Director, NSA in this regard and was approved by USCIB on 10 February 1954 (see reference (c)). Accordingly, the U.K. were advised of the U.S. decision by the Director, NSA (see reference (d)).

4. The U.K. have now requested reconsideration of this decision through the medium of a personal message from the Director General of the British intelligence services to the Chairman of USCIB, a copy of which is included herewith as enclosure 1 and which sets forth the British argument in favor of their proposal. A preliminary response to enclosure 1 is also attached hereto as enclosure 2.

5. Attention is invited to references (e) and (f). It appears that Circuit Mercury is a British cipher machine of high security incorporating crypto principles similar to those used in the U.S. ECM. It also appears to be the case that compromise of Mercury would not endanger the ECM or any other U.S. crypto device and that U.S. COMSEC

USCIB: 29.3/27



1 April 1954

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1 April 1954

TOP SECRET

Subject: Disclosure of the British Cipher Machine "Circuit Mercury" to France.

is not involved. Thus the question to be resolved appears to be one of whether the disadvantages of such danger to U.S. COMINT as may be attendant upon release of further details of Circuit Mercury to the French is outweighed by the advantages argued by the U.K.

Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosures

- 1. Copy of MOP.3715 dtd 26 Mar 1954.
- 2. Copy of CIB #000114 dtd 1 Apr 1954.



- 2 -

TOP SECRET

BRITISH JOINT SERVICES MISSION MAIN NAVY BUILDING WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

TOP SECRET

MOP.3715.

26th March, 1954.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB.

ÉO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Subject: Circuit Mercury.

Will you please pass the following message to the Chairman of your Board from the Chairman of LSIB.

" DULLES from DIRECTOR GENERAL.

 I am concerned at the situation which has arisen as a result of your Board's inability to agree to further disclosure of MERCURY (DIRNSA's letter 00078 of 24th February refers).
 The original requirement for this system to be approved for NATO still stands (viz: the present inability of the RAF to pass NATO traffic classified Secret and above without super encryption over existing links equipped with Mercury). I am now anxious lest continued unexplained refusal to give the

3. As Chairman of CPB and of LSIB I have carefully considered both Comsec and Comint aspects. It seems to me that the above factors outweigh the possible risk to Comint of revealing Mercury to the French. In this connection it might be mentioned that we have already agreed to release AFSAM-7 not only to the French but to all members of NATO for widespread use and this system has been accepted as secure for the next ten to twenty years.

4. Disclosure of adequate details of Mercury in the very near future, perhaps actually in the course of the Paris discussions, would create the best possible atmosphere for the latter's success, to which I know that you as well as I attach great importance. I should accordingly be grateful if you would give the matter further consideration in your Board. "

> /s/ John H. Tiltman John H. Tiltman, Brigadier.

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/27 dtd 1 Apr 1954.

TOP SECRET

UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD WASHINGTON 25, D. C. OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

CIB # 000114

1 April 1954

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SENIOR U.K. LIAISON OFFICER, WASHINGTON:

Subject: Circuit Mercury.

In reply to your MOP.3715 of 26 March 1954 the Acting Chairman, USCIB, has instructed me to ask you to convey the following reply to the Director General's message on this subject:

"To the Chairman, LSIB from the Acting Chairman, USCIB:

"I have taken steps to have the question of release of further details of Circuit Mercury to France reconsidered by USCIB at its next meeting on 9 April and shall see to it that Mr. Dulles is personally informed of your views at the earliest convenient date."

> (Signed) RUFUS L. TAYLOR Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure 2 with USCIB 29.3/27 dtd 1 Apr 1954.



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
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MEROPANICAN FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCID

SUBJECT: Circuit HERCURY

Reference: CIB \$000104, dated 29 March 1954

The Director concurs in your recommendation that the Chairman, USCIE, acknowledge receipt of the latest communication from the Chairman, LSIE, with respect to Circuit MERCURY with a statement that the matter will be reconsidered by USCIE at the next regular meeting on 9 April 1954.

FUR THE DIRECTOR:

of D.M. RENEW

D. M. AGNEW Captain, US Navy Deputy Chief of Staff

cc: AG C/S C/SEC S/ASST (L)

13. TEF

M/R: On 24 Feb 54, Director, NSA, informed the British Cypher Policy Board (CPB) that USCIB could not concur in a British request for release of Circuit MERCURY to the French. On 26 Mar Chairman, CPB and LSIB, requested reconsideration of this item in a cable to Chairman, USCIB. Instant correspondence informs the Executive Secretary, USCIB that Director, NSA, has no objection to acknowleding receipt of the cable with a statement that it will be reconsidered by USCIB on 9 April 54. M/R prepared 30 Mar 54.

LCDR Karl, P/P, 60548/ban

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USCIB: 29.3/26	Item 3 of the Agenda for the held on 12 March 1954.	the 101st Meeting of USCIB,

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EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

USCIB: 29.3/26

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This item to be dropped from the agenda.

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TORE CIDEA4045873

USCIB: 29.3/25 EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 3 March 1954 <u>TOP_SECRET</u> MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: Reference: (a) USCIB 29.3/4 of 2 Oct 1953. (b) USCIB 29.3/8 of 13 Oct 1953 (Item 1 of Minutes of 92nd USCIB Meeting). (c) USCIB 29.3/6 of 20 Oct 1953.

3. The enclosure hereto is submitted for discussion by the Director, NSA in connection with item 3 of the agenda for the lolst Meeting of USCIB.

4. THIS DOCUMENT AND ITS ENCLOSURES CONTAIN COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT.

US L TATIOR

Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure NSA ser 00092-S dtd 8 Mar 54.

APPENDED DOCIMENT ODE WORD MATERIAL.

USCIB: 29.3/25

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8 MAR 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB

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MOP. 3654. EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

15th February, 1954.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

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/s/ John H. Tiltman John H. Tiltman, Brigadier

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- TOREFEIDRA4045823

USCIB: 29.3/24

1 March 1954

31

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Disclosure of "Circuit MERCURY" to the French. Reference: USCIB 29.3/21 dtd 11 February 1954.

1. The enclosure is circulated for information on action taken pursuant to the reference.

2. THE ENCLOSURE TO THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT.

Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure NSA ser 00078S dtd 24 Feb 1954.



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TOREFEIDRA4045873

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Serial: 00078S

24 Feb 1954

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, CYPHER POLICY BOARD

SUBJECT: Further Disclosure of Circuit MERCURY to the French

1. Reference is made to my memorandum, Serial 000599-S, dated 27 November 1953, in which I stated I was unable to concur in your proposal to divulge the details of Circuit MERCUR^v to the French. I indicated, however, that I would present the question to the cognizant U.S. authorities for final decision.

2. Accordingly, the problem was referred to the United States Communications Intelligence Board because of the COMINT security aspects involved. This is in line with the understanding reached in November 1952 by the U.S. and the U.K. Chiefs of Staff whereby both communication security and the special interests of communications intelligence should be considered when proposing release of cryptographic systems to other nations. The Board took the view that revelation to other countries of such a strong crypto-principle as is embodied in Circuit MERCURY would eventually endanger the COMINT effort because of the difficulty in controlling further dissemination of this information.

3. In consequence, USCIB advised me that it could not concur in your request for disclosure of full details of Circuit MERCURY to the French.

(sgd) Ralph J. Canine

RALPH J. CANINE Lieutenant General, US Army Director

Copy furnished: Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure with USCIB 29.3/24 dtd 1 Mar 54.

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BRITISH JOINT SERVICES MISSION

MAIN NAVY BUILDING

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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MOP. 3668. EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

25th February, 1954.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

/s/ John H. Tiltman John H. Tiltman, Brigadier TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMBER 54-591(C) COPY 31 OF 44 COPIES PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1 SECRET FRO

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19 February 1954

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: French request for COMSEC equipments.

Reference: (a) USCIB 29.3/19 dtd 1 Feb 1954. (b) USCIB 29.1/6 dtd 15 Dec 1953 (revised 4 Feb 1954).

OREPLID: A40458

1. USCIB at its 100th Meeting on 11 February 1954 proposed to provide certain COMSEC equipments in response to the request contained in reference (a) and to obtain through the Combined Working Group LSIB views on this proposal as a matter related to reference (b).


2. In implementation of this proposal the enclosure was delivered to the Combined Working Group on 16 February 1954. The CWG was informed by its NSA members that the proposal included the intention of providing cryptosystem DAPHNE.

3. On 18 February 1954 the Executive Secretary was officially informed of CWG and LSIB concurrence in the USCIB proposal to provide the equipments in question.

Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure CIB⁺# 00046 dtd 16 Feb 54.

54-234



CIB # 00046

16 February 1954

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, COMBINED WORKING GROUP FOR IMPROVEMENT OF NATO COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY:

Subject: French Request for COMSEC Equipments.

1. At its recent meeting on 11 February 1954, the United States Communications Intelligence Board considered the recent and urgent request of the French SDECE representative in Washington for up to 5 teletype security equipments.

3. USCIB are of the opinion that the explanations that would necessarily be supplied with such equipments would provide a useful background for the technical discussions that are planned by your Committee as part of the scheme for improvement of French communications security and believe that it would in addition provide a ready explanation for at least some of the shortcomings we will have mentioned at Cabinet level.

4. USCIB therefore desires that your Committee through its U.K. membership convey this information to LSIB and inform USCIB of LSIB's views together with those of your Committee on this matter at the earliest practicable date.

> EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

(Signed) RUFUS L. TAYLOR Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Copy to: Director, NSA.

Enclosure with USCIB 29.3/23 dtd 19 Feb 54.

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USCIB: 29.3/21

11 February 1954

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Disclosure of the British Cipher Machine "Circuit Mercury" to France.

Reference: USCIB 29.3/17 dtd 29 Jan 1954.


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1. No objection having been received to the reference by 10 ° February 1954, the USCIBEC Decision reported therein has USCIB approval.

2. Accordingly, USCIB supports the position of the Director, NSA, as set forth in paragraph 5 of the enclosure with USCIB 29.3/15, and authorizes the Director, NSA, to prepare and forward what he deems to be an appropriate reply to U.K. authorities in the premises.

Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

TOP SECRET



11 February 1954

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Disclosure of Circuit MERCURY to the French.

The enclosure is circulated for purposes of record.

TAYLOR US L.

Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure NSA ser 000595 dtd 8 Feb 1954.



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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

Serial: 00059S

8 Feb 1954

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB

SUBJECT: Disclosure of Circuit MERCURY to the French

References: (a) USCIB 29.3/15, dtd 4 Jan 54 (b) USCIB 29.3/16, dtd 15 Jan 54

1. Reference (a) circulated for vote sheet action a recommendation by the Director, NSA, that USCIB support his view that the British should not disclose full details of Circuit MERCURY to the French.

2. Reference (b) circulated the comments of several members and the Executive Secretary with regard to the Director's recommendation and indicated that the matter would be placed on the Agenda for the Tenth Meeting of USCIBEC.

3. During discussion of the item at the Tenth Meeting, the NSA member explained that neither NSA nor GCHQ had intended that MERCURY be made available for NATO use. Rather, he said, GCHQ was attempting to obtain NATO clearance for use of MERCURY in handling COSMIC traffic on British circuits and for that reason had to submit the cryptographic principles of the machine to the third member of the Standing Group, i.e. France, for approval.

4. The Executive Secretary invited attention to paragraph 3 of reference (b) in which the following recommendation of the US-UK 1952 Communications Security Conference is quoted:

"That, subject to final UK-US security acceptance, ROLLICK I, MERCURY, 5UCO, SIGTOT, and ROCKEX be offered for NATO adoption and use to the extent that they become available."

The members engaged in considerable discussion concerning the intent of this recommendation without reaching any definite conclusions. The NSA member offered to do some research on the problem with a view to determining whether the files contain any further information on this recommendation. He said he would forward any new data to the Executive Secretary.

5. A search of the files at NSA revealed that the British and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, a few months after the March 1952 Conference, agreed upon an interpretation of the recommendation in question.

Enclosure with USCIB 29.3/20 dtd 11 Feb 1954.

6. In October 1952, the following was received from London regarding the Report of the UK/US Communications Security Conference 1952:

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"In accepting the report, the British Chiefs of Staff interpret the words 'subject to final UK/US security acceptance' in recommendation c and d of paragraph 9, to relate both to the technical cryptographic security of the devices and to the special interests of the signal intelligence agencies of the two countries."

7. In November 1952, the following statement was included in the U.S. reply to the British letter:

"The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the British Chiefs of Staff that both communication security and the special interests of communications intelligence should be considered when proposing release of cryptographic systems to other nations."

8. It is believed that the information in paragraphs 6 and 7, above, will be of interest in any future discussion of the problem.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

(Signed) D. M. AGNEW Captain, US Navy Deputy Chief of Staff Plans and Operations

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TOP SECRET

1 February 1954

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TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: French Communications Security.

Reference: USCIB 29.3/18 of 1 February 1954.

The enclosed memorandum of conversation between the French representative of the SDECE and a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency is circulated for information in connection with the reference.

US L

Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure a/s

54-160

TOP SEC

TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY

1 February 1954

"SUBJECT: Machines for Quai d'Orsay

"1. At the conclusion of a long conversation devoted to other matters on 27 January 1954, Mr. DeVOSJOLI again brought up this subject. He asked me if there was no possibility of obtaining up to five (5) machines. He explained that the list of other possible sources provided him was already thoroughly familiar to the Quai d'Orsay and was of no use, because machines of the type desired by the Quai d'Orsay are manufactured only in the United States and in the Soviet Zone of Germany. He remarked that the French were so desperate that they were even considering how they might obtain some of the machines manufactured under Soviet control.

"2. I told DeVOSJOLI that I was not hopeful, because I was sure that all possibilities here had been thoroughly explored, but that I was willing to reopen the question. I stated, finally, that 'our people' had done everything possible to meet his request, but that other agencies' demands were so extensive as to absorb the total scheduled production in this country."

Enclosure with USCIB 29.3/19 dtd 1 Feb 1954.

TOP SECRET

1 February 1954

TOP SECRETU. S. EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: French Communications Security.

Reference:

- (a) USCIB 29.3/11 of 30 October 1953.
- (b) USCIB 29.3/12 of 12 November 1953.
- (c) USCIB 29.3/13 of 13 November 1953.

1. In accordance with the decision set forth in reference (a) and further to the notification contained in reference (c), the Combined Working Group was notified of the French request for assistance and the U.S. Ad Hoc Committee acting thru the NSA member thereof informed the Director, National Security Agency of its views as set forth in enclosure 1 hereto.

2. After due consideration of this matter, the French SDECE representative was informed by the Central Intelligence Agency of the fact that the U.S. while sympathetic, is unable to render the assistance desired. Enclosure 2 hereto is a verbatim copy of the Aide Memoire given to the French SDECE representative in Washington on 21 January 1954. It is understood that this reply was received with chagrin.

3. Owing to the nature of the approach to the French now being planned by the Combined Working Group in implementation of the June 1953 US/UK Conference Report on NATO COMSEC, and in view of the interest in this matter of the USCIB Ad Hoc Committee for the improvement of NATO COMSEC, copies of enclosure 2 have been furnished to the Chairman of that Committee (Mr. T.A. Polyzoides) for information in connection with the planning being done by the Combined Working Group, the U.S. element of which is the above mentioned Ad Hoc Committee.

Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosures

- 1. Memo for the Record.
- 2. Aide Memoire on the subject of Crypto Assistance to the French Foreign Office.

USCIB: 29.3/18

54-152

-TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

TOP SECRET

Subject: Treatment of French Request for Cipher Machines.

1. After the initial approach by the French, conversations were held between M. de Vosjoli and representatives of NSA on 5 November 1953 at which time M. de Vosjoli was told that the US would look into the matter of supplying cipher machines. The US Ad Hoc Committee for the Improvement of Allied Communications Security believes that it would not be proper to delay all further response to this request until after the joint US-UK Ambassadorial approach in early December.

2. The Committee also believes that the French should not receive the impression that the US cannot or will not assist them or be told anything inconsistent with the joint US-UK proposal to hold tripartite meetings. At the same time it is essential that the SDECE have no knowledge of the impending approach.

3. The NSA members of the Committee have therefore, been informed (a) that the Committee accepts the necessity of some answer to M. de Vosjoli before 1 December but desires this to be as delayed as possible; (b) that the answer should be along the following lines:

- (1) The US facilities are heavily committed to NATO requirements at the present time.
- (2) The US believes that it may be possible to adjust these commitments to take care of at least some of the French needs.
- (3) Such readjustment will be a lengthy process, if it is possible.
- (4) The US believes it may be able to offer more immediate assistance by way of spare parts for the present French equipment and would like a statement of the French requirements in this respect;

and (c) that after the US and UK have received French acceptance of their proposal, M. de Vosjoli should be informed that the joint approach had been made.

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/18 dtd 29 Jan 54.

TOP SECRET

AIDE MEMOIRE ON THE SUBJECT OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC ASSISTANCE

TOFFELD: A40458

<u>TO·THE</u>

FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE

When your requirements for communications security equipment were described to us some time ago, we examined those requirements very carefully, studying them in the light of and in connection with similar requirements of our own. We have reported to the Director of Central Intelligence on our findings and he has asked that they be given to you.

First, we examined the crypto-equipment requirements of various U.S. Agencies in order to ascertain the similarity between their requirements and yours, and the means by which those requirements are to be met. Then we examined the development and production schedules to discover in what way and when the requirements would be met. We asked these Agencies to study carefully what changes might be made in the production schedules of equipment in production, to see if some equipments destined for them could be diverted to meet requirements of the French Foreign Office.

Unfortunately, in those cases where equipments might be suitable for your needs, we have found that commitments to meet requirements are quite firm, and that it does not now appear that equipments can be diverted to meet your requirements in less than 30 to 36 months, and we cannot now give you any assurance even of this. Since new equipments which might meet your requirements will not be available for quite some time, we looked at older equipments still in use to see if any of these equipments could be made available. Here again we found that, although in most cases the equipments were old, all are in use. Furthermore, there is an actual need for additional equipments of this type which even we ourselves do not have. These are the results of our earnest study of ways and means to assist you and, unhappily, it appears that they are of a negative character.

In exploring the problem, various U.S. Agencies have suggested that you might wish to examine commercial sources, the existence of which you may know, but in order to make this certain, we feel it advisable to mention them.

For example, there is the firm of Dr. Edgar Gretner, Elektromeckanik und Licht-tecknik, Zurich, Switzerland. Although we are not familiar with the product of this firm, we think it might merit your investigation if you are not already acquainted with it.

- 1 -

Enclosure 2 with USCIB 29.3/18 dtd 29 Jan 54.

TOP SECRET



We wonder if you have explored the possibility of using one-timetapes - a system which NATO uses, and which has been found generally satisfactory. If you decide to use tapes, you will need not only the tapes themselves, but also the "mixing" mechanism to permit their use with teletype equipment.

As a source for this mechanism, you might consider the Norwegian Post and Telegraph, which is now manufacturing equipment for the SHAPE Signal Division. We also understand that a firm known as Atheneum Stiftung, of Frankfurt, Germany, has developed a similar mechanism.

As for the production of tapes themselves, we understand that Mr. Boris Hagelin of the firm Crypto A. G. in Zug, Switzerland, is taking orders for a machine to produce one-time tapes. Also the Atheneum Stiftung is known to manufacture a similar machine. Finally, although the U.S. is unable to furnish you with either the "mixing" mechanism or with a tape-making machine, we can, if you so desire, supply you with a limited quantity of tapes.

If you have any technical questions with regard to the above suggestion, we will be glad to arrange another meeting for you with our experts in this field who can fill in the details. You are, of course, at liberty to discuss this question with the Director of Central Intelligence, if you so desire.

- 2 -

TOP SECRET



19

29 January 1954

TOP SECRET

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Disclosure of the British Cipher Machine "Circuit Mercury" to France.

Reference: (a) USCIB 29.3/15 dated 4 January 1954. (b) USCIB 29.3/16 dated 15 January 1954.

1. Reference (a) was submitted to USCIB members for vote sheet action on 4 January 1954. In view of vote sheet replies, summarized in reference (b), this problem was considered by USCIBEC at its Tenth Meeting on 27 January 1954.

2. Members of USCIBEC discussed this matter at length, and ultimately agreed to recommend to USCIB that the position of the Director, NSA, as set forth in paragraph 5 of the enclosure with USCIB 29.3/15, be supported. It was further agreed that the Director, NSA, should be authorized to prepare and forward what he deems to be an appropriate reply in the premises.

3. This decision is forwarded pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 11 of USCIB Directive No. 1. In the absence of objection by any member prior to 1700, 10 February 1954, the above decision will be considered approved.

TAYLOR

Executive Secretary, USCIB

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TOP SECRET



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15 January 1954

TOP SECRET FROTH - U.S. EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC:

Subject: Disclosure of the British Cipher Machine "Circuit Mercury" to France.

Reference: USCIB 29.3/15 of 4 January 1954.

1. The following comments have been received in response to vote sheet action on the reference:

<u>NAVY</u> "This office concurs with DIRNSA that disclosure of full details of "Circuit MERCURY" should not be made to the French.

"However, this concurrence does not extend to the content of paragraph 5 of the enclosure to the reference.

<u>STATE</u> "This vote sheet is in approval of General Canine's recommendation that the request of the Cypher Policy Board be refused.

> "In view of certain incorrect remarks contained in the statement by the Secretary of the Cypher Policy Board, it is recommended that the reply to the British include the following comments:



USCIB: 29.3/16

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TOP SECRET FROTH - U.S. EYES ONLY

"With regard to the second and third paragraphs of the statement by the Secretary of the Cypher Policy Board, under the U.S. plan for approaching the French with regard to their communications security which has been presented to the British members of the Combined Working Group, it is <u>not</u> conceived that it is prerequisite to technical discussions with the French that the French make a full disclosure of all the crypto systems and practices which they use or that the U.S. and U.K. disclose the full details of their most important crypto principles."

<u>CIA</u> "Desire paper be considered at next regular meeting of USCIBEC."

2. From the comments received and in consideration of the reference itself it is thought that a little more background would be helpful to the members in arriving at a decision on this matter.

3. Included amongst the recommendations of the US-UK Communications Security Conference held in Washington in May and June 1952 was the following:

"That, subject to final UK-US security acceptance, ROLLICK I, <u>MERCURY</u>,* 5 UCO, SIGTOT, and ROCKEX be offered for NATO adoption and use to the extent that they become available."*


In forwarding the Conference recommendation to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. COMSEC Authorities concerned suggested an additional caveat as follows:

"In all cases where crypto equipments are to be made available to NATO, the revelation of crypto principles involved should be restricted to general summaries and descriptions, and should not include specific wiring details, drawings, etc. <u>until after the equipment is in</u> <u>production."</u>*

At the same time the U.S. COMSEC Authorities recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the U.S. ECM (CSP 888/889 version) be released to the British for Combined communications. In support of these recommendations certain arguments pertinent to the problem presented in the the reference were advanced. These were:

TOP SECRET FROTH

*Underlining added.



TOP SECRET FROTH - U.S. EYES ONLY

With regard to circuit Mercury.

"a. "Mercury", a British-invented device, contains cryptoprinciples so similar to those of the CSP 2900 that to offer the former to NATO amounts to giving away those principles which the US has retained for its own use in the past.

"b. Loss to an enemy of the "Mercury" would in no way endanger the security of US communications enciphered in the CSP 2900, since, although similar in principle. Mercury and the CSP 2900 differ in detail.

"c. Complete revelation to other NATO nations of the minute details of any cryptoprinciple prior to its embodiment in a manufactured version is a practice to be avoided, since such detail would permit a nation to produce its own embodiments even though the final US equipment might be officially rejected for NATO use."

With regard to the ECM.

"<u>a</u>. The CCM currently in use for Combined as well as NATO traffic is outmoded and inadquate, particularly for highest-level and intelligence traffic.

"b. The appearance of the principles of the CSP 2900 in "Mercury" makes it obvious that the cryptographers of the UK are thoroughly familiar with the broad principles of the CSP 2900. This does not mean, however, that the UK is familiar with the details of application of the principles within the CSP 2900.

"c. The CSP 2900 includes the same basic principles as does the ECM, its predecessor, but again differs sufficiently in detail to mean that revelation of the principles of the ECM would not provide exact knowledge of the CSP 2900. Cryptanalytic attack with high speed analogues requires knowledge of specific details; therefore, even should knowledge of the details of the ECM become known to an enemy cryptanalyst, he could not use that knowledge to direct intelligently a high speed analogue attack on the CSP 2900.

"d. Release of the ECM to the UK would permit use of a very strong machine for some Combined communications and would still permit compliance with paragraph 30813e of Joint Action of the Armed Forces, which requires retention for exclusive US use of our most secure cryptographic system. Such release would not jeopardize the security of US communications.

USCIB: 29.3/16

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"e. There are not sufficient quantities of either CSP 2900 or ECM in existence to permit the offer of any large quantity to the UK. They are sufficient, however, to meet some of the more urgent high command and special requirements. The UK, if such an offer were to be made, should have a voice in determining the uses to which the quantity which could be offered might best be put."

4. In November 1952, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the two recommendations discussed above.

5. While the paper before us does not directly concern the action taken to release the ECM to the British, the arguments advanced for that action are pertinent to the question of release of Circuit Mercury to the French. In this case it has already been argued and agreed by competent U.S. authorities that even though the ECM principle should fall into enemy hands our best embodiment of it (CSP 2900) would not be endangered thereby. It was also argued and agreed that release of specific details of a given embodiment might endanger the system using that particular embodiment. Insofar as NATO is concerned such danger is by indirection. Yet that is still not a matter under the cognizance of USCIB which is primarily concerned with the COMINT implications. In this instance it appears that the two fundamental questions to decide (1) Does USCIB consider that, in placing the details of a strong are: crypto-system in NATO hands, there is risk through them of leaks to other nations and commercial interests before NATO security itself can be improved by the immediate supply of adequate quantities of the device; and, if so, is USCIB willing to assume this risk? (2) Does USCIB consider it likely that, through release of a device such as Mercury to NATO Nations before it can be supplied in quantity,

Executive Secretary, USCIB

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

USCIB: 29.3/16

4 January 1954

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FOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM, FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Disclosure of the British Cipher Machine "Circuit MERCURY" to France.

1. The enclosure is forwarded for consideration at the request of the Director, NSA.

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2. It is requested that your views on General Canine's recommendation (paragraphs 5 and 6 of the enclosure) be indicated on the attached vote sheet, which should be returned to this office by 1700, 13 January 1954.

3. THE ENCLOSURE WITH THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT.

SECRE

UFUS L. SAYLOR

Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure DIENSA Seria

DIRNSA Serial 000625-S dtd 22 Dec 1953.

USCIB: 29.3/15

54-43

0113



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENC WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Serial: 000625-S 22 Dec 53

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB

SUBJECT: Disclosure of the British Cipher Machine "Circuit MERCURY" to France

1. The British have developed an on-line COMSEC equipment called "Circuit MERCURY" which uses crypto-principles similar to the U. S. cipher machine commonly called the ECM (Electric Cipher Machine). "Circuit MERCURY" is intended for intra-British use and is not to be made available to other NATO countries, except the U. S. and Canada. Certain British Headquarters adjacent to various NATO Headquarters in Europe have expressed a requirement to use "Circuit MERCURY" for online encryption of NATO traffic. Before this can be done, the NATO Standing Group (S.G.) must approve national cryptographic systems used for encryption of NATO SECRET, TOP SECRET, and COSMIC traffic.

2. Before taking the action of submitting "Circuit MERCURY" to the S.G. for approval, the Cypher Policy Board, London, consulted me on the extent of disclosure of the "Circuit MERCURY" crypto-principles which could be made. I stated that in the interests of limiting disclosure of "Circuit MERCURY" as much as possible, only the broad principles of "Circuit MERCURY" should be revealed. The French are represented on the S.G. and its cognizant committee, the Communications-Electronics Coordination Section (CECS), hence any revelation of crypto-principles to the CECS necessary in seeking approval of a national crypto-system would automatically become available to the French.

3. The British proceeded to submit to the S.G., through the CECS, a request to approve "Circuit MERCURY" for British use in encryption of COSMIC and NATO material. The description of "Circuit MERCURY" that was furnished to the CECS did not disclose the crypto-principles of "Circuit MERCURY." The French member of the CECS, after review of the brief des scription, stated that French authorities could not give their approval to use "Circuit MERCURY" if they did not know the details of its operation, and that it was considered necessary that the opportunity to examine the machine be given to a limited number of French cryptographic experts.

4. In view of the request by the French member of the CECS, the Secretary of the Cypher Policy Board has forwarded the following statement to me:

CONTROL NUMBER 53-3831 (A) COPY 40 OF COPIES 2 PAGE OF PAGES



TOP SECRET

Serial:000625-S

"It is believed that when you requested in January 1953, that disclosure of Circuit MERCURY to the French should be confined to a description outlining the general principles, you were prompted by a reluctance to strengthen the security of French communications. Since then, however, the June Conference in Washington resulted in agreement that the French should be encouraged to improve the security of their communications and to this end it was agreed to seek the agreement of the French to technical discussions on cryptography.

"The success or failure of these discussions depends on the willingness of the French to make a full disclosure of all the cryptosystems and practices which they use. It is very unlikely that the French would speak freely and make the full disclosure if the U.K. had refused the French request for a fuller description of Circuit MERCURY. If they do not, the security of only part of their communications will be improved, the remainder will continue insecure and the discussions might prove not merely valueless but harmful to our common interests.

"It is therefore requested that, if you agree, you approach the cognizant U.S. authorities and request their concurrence to the disclosure of full details of Circuit MERCURY to the French in view of the change of policy agreed upon at the June Conference and the great importance of allowing nothing to prejudice the coming discussions.

"The U.K. would prefer to make this further disclosure during the proposed discussions with the French. It is possible, however, that, at any rate to begin with, the French may wish to keep these discussions rigidly 'compartmentized' with the result that the findings regarding Circuit MERCURY reached by the French experts at the discussions might not be passed to the French M.O.D. who have to take action on the C.E.C.S. paper."

5. "Circuit MERCURY" utilizes a crypto-principle similar to the cryptoprinciple used in the most important U.S. cipher machines, the ECM and CSP 2900, and is more secure than either of these machines. I believe that

I cannot therefore recommend concurrence in the request by the Cypher Policy Board for disclosure of full details of "Circuit MERCURY" to the French.

6. I recommend that the members of USCIB support this view.

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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COPY 20 OF 40

53-3831**(A)**

RALPH'J. CANINE Lieutenant General, US Army Director

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TREBECTION ACTION

USCIB: 29.3/14

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

10 December 1953

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TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject:

1. The enclosure is forwarded for purposes of information and record.

2. THE ENCLOSURE TO THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT.

Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure CIB #000240 dtd 10 Dec 1953.

TOD

USCIB: 29.3/14



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UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

CIB # 000240

It was

10 December 1953

TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2. U.S. ARMY:

Subject:

Reference: (a) U

(a) USCIB 2/36 dated 22 July 1953.
(b) USCIB 2/37 dated 31 July 1953.

(c) USCIB 2/38 dated 24 August 1953.

(d) USCIB 29.3/4 dated 2 October 1953.

(e) USCIB 29.3/8 dated 13 October 1953.

(e) USUIB 29.3/8 dated 15 October 1995

1. In accordance with the decision taken as a result of reference (a) and notified to you by reference (b), you were appointed Executive Agent of the Board to act for it in

The Terms of Reference for this mission were contained in reference (c).

2. A change in the arrangements as originally invisaged was proposed by the ______and circulated as an enclosure to reference (d). At its 92nd (Special Meeting held on 13 October 1953), reference (e), USCIB approved the new arrangement mentioned above.

assumed that this list would be substantially the same as that included in reference (c).

3. As a result of the above mentioned decision set forth in reference (e), the Central Intelligence Agency has assumed that it is now responsible for providing material and equipment in question and has notified me by letter of 9 December 1953 as follows:

The accordance with USCIB decisions governing the the first installment of the

Enclosure with USCIB 29.3/14 dtd 10 Dec 1953.


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EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

CIB, # 000240

10 December 1953



TREPETE A4045

Security Information

5. This notification to you will be circulated to the Members of USCIB for information.

6. THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT.

> (Signed) RUFUS'L. TAYLOR Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

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SUBJECT NUMBER

USCIB: 29.3/13

Item C (not on Agenda) for the 94th Meeting of USCIB, held on 13 November 1953.

40458

FINAL

Subject:

French Communications Security.

GENERAL CANINE recalled that the discussions between NSA technicians and French representatives had been held and said that the matter was now under the cognizance of the Combined Working Group, which would make recommendations to USCIB. He said that he was interested in having the Board members understand that the matter was now out of his hands, at least temporarily.

The members noted the above information.

USCIB: 29.3/13

FOP SECRET

USCIB: 29.3/12

12 November 1953

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TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM' FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: French Communications Security.

The enclosure is forwarded for information at the request of the Director, National Security Agency.

Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure NSA Ser 000581-S dtd 10 Nov 1953.

USCIB: 29.3/12



Serial: 000581-S

10 Nov 1953

TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB

SUBJECT: French Communication Security

1. As agreed by USCIB in its 93rd Meeting, my representatives met with M. de Vosjoli (Washington representative of the SDECE) and M. Doussot, cryptographic expert assigned to the French Embassy, for the purpose of determining the type and number of COMSEC equipments France desires to purchase from the U. S. for use by the Foreign Office.

2. M. de Vosjoli stated that it is the desire of the French Foreign Office to modernize its communication security techniques, and to increase the number of posts which can use teletype encryption equipment. The French believe that the U. S. might have COMSEC equipments produced in quantity, which, if made available to France, could be purchased at a considerable savings to them as compared to the cost of producing a limited number of equipments for their own use.

3. As had been mentioned earlier (USCIB: 29.3/9), M. de Vosjoli again pointed out that the German machines now being used for teletype encryption were wearing out, that no spare parts are available except by cannibalization, and that new machines are not obtainable. Anticipating a need for replacing these machines, the Foreign Office hopes to obtain teletype encryption equipments of high security that can be used among their main Foreign Office posts.

4. The quantity desired is 200, but 150 machines would be sufficient. If the total quantity of machines could not be made available simultaneously, about 50 machines would be needed for instituting the replacement program at 10 major posts.

5. In addition to the foregoing requirement, M. de Vosjoli stated that an off-line (literal) cipher machine was also desired. This machine would generally be used at posts not served by the teletype cipher machine and in locations where teletype (commercial or French National) facilities are not available, or where on-line operation is not practicable.

6. To meet the latter requirement, up to approximately 500 machines are needed.

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TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

Serial: 000581-S 10 Nov 53

7. In order of priority, on-line equipment is wanted first, primarily for replacement of the German machine now used, and to provide the capability for handling large volumes of traffic. M. de Vosjoli stated that this requirement was not urgent but they hoped to establish firm plans in the near future. The literal machines are of lesser priority and would be used to replace encrypted codes now generally used.

8. M. de Vosjoli mentioned in passing that in some remote posts of the Foreign Office more powerful radio transmitters were needed. Present equipments were considered not to have sufficient power for working regularly under poor conditions.

9. I will examine the availability of equipments, including U.S. owned, commercial, and foreign machines, which might be suitable for the French requirements and will inform USCIB of these findings.

Lieutenant/General, US Army Director

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TOP SECRET - SECUR	ITY INFORMATION - U.S. EYES ONLY	TENTATIVE
SUBJECT NUMBER		· · ·
USCIB: 29.3/11	Item 1 considered at the 93rd (Special) USCIB, held on 30 October 1953.	Meeting of
Subject:	French Communications Security. (USCIB 29.3/9)	·

The CHAIRMAN informed the members that this special meeting had been called to consider a request made of him by M. de Vosjoli, Washington representative of the SDECE in Paris. He explained that the request represented, basically, an effort to elicit the assistance of the Director of Central Intelligence in purchasing new cipher machines for use by the French Foreign Office. He added that additional details of the request were contained in the enclosure with USCIB 29.3/9, which had been distributed to all members. He said that he had told the French representative, after their discussion, that he would give the matter some thought, and suggested that it might be well for a technical representative of M. de Vosjoli to discuss the matter with U.S. technicians.

CAPTAIN TAYLOR said that information concerning the technical representative had been obtained from the FBI member, indicating that his name was M. Doussot, that he was chief of the code room at the French Embassy, and that he held the title of Consul. He was born in 1913, now resides at 1118 N. Aberdeen Street, Arlington, Va., and nothing adverse is known concerning him.


The CHAIRMAN invited comments. He said that if there was no particular comment he would call M. de Vosjoli and suggest that U.S. and French technical representatives confer.

GENERAL CANINE agreed that it was obviously a job for technicians, and suggested that the problem would properly be under the cognizance of the COMSEC Board if that body were now "in business". He commented that he was somewhat surprised at the timing of the request, suggesting that it may have been prompted by outside influences.

The CHAIRMAN stated that the French believed that they were dealing with CIA alone in this matter, and suggested that it would be best to have the matter handled on that basis for the time being. He agreed to statements by General Canine and Mr. Armstrong that this request, though submitted through intelligence channels, was properly one of concern to the new COMSEC Board, but suggested that it continue to be handled by USCIB since the new COMSEC Board was not yet completely organized.

USCIB: 29.3/11

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TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - U.S. EYES ONLY

USCIB: 29.3/11

The members discussed this point further. While it was generally agreed that this was primarily a COMSEC problem, there was sufficient reason to deal with it in USCIB in that it could be considered a subordinate issue to the larger problem of improving French and other NATO nations' COMSEC.

As a result of further discussion it was agreed that one or two technical representatives of NSA would meet with a French representative at CIA under the auspices of the DCI preferably on Tuesday, 3 November 1953, to discuss details of the French request.

Mr. Armstrong suggested that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the NATO approach, headed by Mr. Polyzoides, be kept informed of developments in this matter. This was agreed.

The CHAIRMAN raised the question of notification to the British, suggesting that they be informed.

GENERAL CANINE proposed that he send a message to SUSLO, asking him to inform appropriate authorities. He also suggested that he inform Mr. Friedman, now in London, of the nature of the information being sent to the British.

It was agreed that the Executive Secretary in collaboration with Captain Agnew, NSA, would prepare and send the message to SUSLO, and that General Canine would notify Mr. Friedman of its content.

DECISION: (30 October 1953) USCIB considered the request presented in USCIB 29.3/9 and agreed:

- (1) That the matter would be retained in COMINT channels for the time being, and that NSA technical personnel would meet with French representatives at an early date under the auspices of the DCI (preferably at CIA on Tuesday, 3 November 1953) to obtain further details on the French requirements.
- (2) That the Ad Hoc Working Group on the NATO approach would be kept informed of developments.
- (3) That a message would be prepared and sent to SUSLO, directing that he inform British authorities of the French request and action being taken with regard thereto; also, that Mr. Friedman, NSA, now in London, would be similarly informed by the Director, NSA.

USCIB: 29.3/11

-TREFECTIONA40458 Security Information

USCIB: 29.3/10

10 November 1953

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TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Allied (NATO) Communications Security (Approach to the French).

1. Pursuant to a decision reached at the 93rd (Special) Meeting of USCIB, the enclosed message was transmitted to the Chairman, LSIB, on 30 October 1953. A copy of the reply has just been received and is forwarded herewith for information.

2. THE ENCLOSURES WITH THIS DOCUMENT CONTAIN COMMUNICA-TIONS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT.

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TAY

Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure 1. Exec. Secy. MSG 302126Z to SUSLO.

2. MOP.3555 dtd 9 Nov 1953.

USCIB: 29.3/10

ROUTINE 3Ø2126Z

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FROM: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB

SUSLO, LONDON (CRYPTO NSA PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO SUSLO, LONDON) TO: INFO: DIRNSA

ny Informatio

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY USCIB SENDS. PLEASE PASS WL

FOLLOWING TO CHAIRMAN LSIB. WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE SDECE ACTING AS REPRESENTATIVE OF FRENCH INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON CIPHERS 86-36/50 USC 3605 HAS APPROACHED DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE REQUESTING UNCLE SUGAR ASSISTANCE IN PURCHASING NEW CIPHER MACHINES FOR USE BY FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE. USCIB HAS AGREED TO BRING NSA TECHNICIANS INTO CONTACT WITH LOCAL FRENCH EMBASSY CRYPTO EXPERTS ON TUESDAY - THREE NOVEMBER TO DETERMINE PRECISE NATURE AND SCOPE OF FRENCH

REQUEST.

NO COMMITMENTS

1(2)

HAVE BEEN MADE. LSIB VIEW REQUESTED.

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/10 dtd 10 Nov 1953.

OP SECRET

BRITISH JOINT SERVICES MISSION MAIN NAVY BUILDING WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Security Information

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MOP.3555.

9th November, 1953.

The Executive Secretary, U.S.C.I.B.

I have been instructed to pass the following signal to you for the Chairman of U.S.C.I.B. :-

For Chairman, U.S.C.I.B. from Chairman, L.S.I.B.
I have noted with interest USCIB's message concerning "the French Government's approach to the U.S. Government "on Communications Security.

" 2. The matter was discussed at a meeting of LSIB on "November 3rd. The Board considered that the fact of "this French approach has in no way invalidated the "conclusions and recommendations of the UK/US Conference "of June 1953 (FSC.53/EK/R/Oll) and that in particular "the proposed approach by the U.K. and U.S. Ambassadors "to the French Government was still necessary and should "be made without further delay to ensure backing at the "highest level for French cooperation.

" 3. I am agreeable that the matter should be discussed "by the Combined Working Group and Brigadier Tiltman has "been instructed accordingly. He has been urged to do all "in his power to secure an early conclusion."

> (Signed) John H. Tiltman, Brigadier

Enclosure 2 with USCIB 29.3/10 dtd 10 Nov 1953.

27 October 1953

TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - U.S. EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: French Communications Security.

References: <u>a</u>. USCIB 29.1/1 of <u>2</u>1 September 1953. <u>b</u>. USCIB 23/65 of <u>3</u>0 June 1953.

1. The enclosure is circulated for information and discussion at a Special Meeting of USCIB to be held Friday, 30 October 1953 at 1430 in the Projection Room, Administration Building, CIA.

Security Information

2. The information set forth below is submitted in order to bring the members up to date on the related matter of implementation of the references.

3. The Combined Working Group (CWG) provided for in paragraph 4 of reference <u>a</u> has been meeting under the chairmanship of Mr. T. A. Polyzoides, Department of State, who is also chairman of the USCIB Ad Hoc Committee which constitutes the U.S. element of this Combined Working Group. Progress to date in the CWG includes agreement to use of paragraphs 5 and 6 of reference <u>a</u> as a basis for working out the initial approach to the French. Although there was some initial reluctance on the part of the U.K. to the use of the Tripartite Security Working Group to select the COMSEC authorities who will represent their respective governments in this matter, the U.K. have now agreed in principle to this U.S. proposal (see paragraph 6b of reference <u>a</u>) and it remains only to work out the details in a manner mutually satisfactory to the U.S. and the U.K.

Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure Memo from CIA to Ex/Secy, USCIB dtd 27 Oct 53 with attached memorandum for record, subject: French Request for Cipher Machines.

USCIB: 29.3/9

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Washington 25, D. C.

27 October 1953

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF USCIB

SUBJECT: French Request for Cipher Machines

1. The attached memorandum for the record sets forth a conversation which took place on 26 October between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Washington representative of the French SDECE.

2. In view of the present negotiations between USCIB and LSIB on this subject, the advice of the members of the Board is requested as to what reply the Director should make to Mr. deVosjoli, and it is requested that a special meeting of the Board be held at an early date to discuss this matter.

HUNTINGTON D. SHELDON Assistant Director, Current Intelligence

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Security

FEGT A40458

Information

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Washington 25, D. C.

27 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: French Request for Cipher Machines

1. On Monday, 26 October, M. deVosjoli, Washington representative of the SDECE called on the Director, Central Intelligence, to request on behalf of the Quai D'Orsay the Director's assistance in purchasing new cipher machines for use by the French Foreign Office.

2. M. deVosjoli stated that after World War II the Quai D'Orsay had acquired certain German cipher machines and further explained that about 80 of these machines are now in use. These machines are in very poor condition; the German factory which manufactured this equipment is located within the Soviet Zone of Germany; and the French are certain that this company is now producing machines for the USSR. He also mentioned the fact that the French had been surprised at the alacrity recently shown by the Soviet Foreign Office in according the French the right to install a direct wire connection for these cipher machines between the French Embassy in Moscow and the Quai D'Orsay. M. deVosjoli gave the impression that these facts had influenced the French in making their present request for American cipher machines, which they felt would be far superior and more modern.

3. M. deVosjoli provided the information that this approach to the U.S. is being made under the cognizance of the "Interdepartmental Committee on Ciphers," which consists of representatives of all French Government offices using cryptographic material. This committee, which is chaired by M. Mons (who is "Chef de l'etat Major Permanent de la Defense Nationale"), is composed of representatives of the Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry for Overseas France, and the SDECE. This committee was created some three years ago and the responsibility of the SDECE, which is represented on the committee by Colonel Black, is to ensure the security of French cipher systems. It is because of this responsibility of the SDECE that the approach was made by M. deVosjoli to the Director, Central Intelligence.

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Security Information

REFECTO A40458

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Washington 25, D. C.

4. M. deVosjoli explained that his mission is to arrange for a French expert, M. Dousseau, to consult with a CIA expert concerning the number and type of machines desired by the French. He stated that M. Dousseau is permanently assigned to the French Embassy in Washington to advise on cryptographic security, and as a part of his duties had installed the cipher machines for use on French Embassy links with the French elements of the Standing Group and of the United Nations.

5. M. deVosjoli pointed out that the French would be quite content to purchase even obsolete machines, provided they were in good condition, particularly because newer models might be much more expensive.

6. The Director of Central Intelligence informed M. deVosjoli that this was a request to which he could not furnish an immediate reply, but that he would explore the matter and inform M. deVosjoli as soon as possible regarding what arrangements could be made.

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SUBJECT NUMBER

USCIB: 29.3/8

Item 1 of the Agenda for the 92nd (Special) Meeting of USCIB, held on 13 October 1953.

Subject:

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

FINAL

The ACTING CHAIRMAN (General Cabell) stated that the purpose of the meeting was to consider the views and recommendations of the Security Committee on the He recalled that the Board, at its 91st Meeting, had asked that the Security Committee consider the problem as a matter of priority. He invited comments by Captain Taylor.

CAPTAIN TAYLOR informed the members that he had served as Chairman of the Security Committee during its deliberations in view of the fact that the regular Chairman of the Committee had not been present at the previous USCIB meeting. He explained that the Committee, augmented by the members of the negotiating team, had met and discussed the agreement in detail, in light of the terms of reference provided to the negotiators, and the original arrangements approved by the Board. He said that the members, as a result of their study, and after listening to the statements of the negotiators as to the very clear understanding with the regarding the agreement, were satisfied that the arrangements were within USCIB policy. On the subject of security safeguards, he stated the opinion of the Committee that the imposition of additional restrictions at this juncture would imply (to the) that we had uncovered something new and alarming since the conclusion of the original agreement. and the Committee, therefore, recommended against the establishment of additional security safeguards.

CAPTAIN TAYLOR continued by saying that certain other issues raised in the Committee discussions were not contained in the report now before the Board; however, a record of these would appear in the SECCOM minutes. He stated that he had received outstanding cooperation from the SECCOM members and members of the negotiating team in this matter, and expressed the hope that the Committee report would be acceptable to the Board.

MR. ARMSTRONG commended the Executive Secretary and the Committee for turning out an excellent piece of work on a very complex problem in such a short time. He said that he considered the Committee paper a valuable and important addition to our understanding of the agreement, and added that he was satisfied, on the basis of the report, that the agreement did not exceed the limitations imposed by the Appendices to the BRUSA Agreement. He made specific mention of improvement in the wording of the

USCIB: 29.3/8

- 2 -

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USCIB: 29.3/8

communications to be sent to the British and to Mr. Boursicot, and concluded by informing those present that his Department was prepared to accept the Committee report without further changes.

GENERAL CANINE commented upon the position he had taken at the last meeting and said that he did not like the agreement any more now than he did then, however he was prepared to vote for approval. His primary objection, he said, was to being placed in the position of having to make a "Hobson's Choice". He thought it possible that something worthwhile would be obtained as a result of this agreement, but was not of the opinion that the information received would substantially alter the consumers' daily briefings.

MR. SHELDON referred to the draft memorandum for the Director, GCHQ, and suggested that the last sentence of paragraph 5, or possibly the whole paragraph, might well be deleted.

The members considered this suggestion and agreed to the deletion of the whole paragraph.

DECISION: (13 October 1953) USCIB considered and approved the Security Committee Report contained in USCIB 29.3/5, with one amendment, namely, the deletion of paragraph 5 of the draft memorandum for the Director, GCHQ (enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/5).

It was agreed that the memoranda for the Director General, SDECE, and the Director, GCHQ, would be prepared in final form and forwarded without delay.

This item to be dropped from the agenda.

The meeting adjourned at 1440.

USCIB: 29.3/8

- 3 -

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TOP SECRET FROTH -	SECURITY INFORMATION U.S. EYES ONLY	
SUBJECT NUMBER		FINAL
USCIB: 29.3/7	Item 4 of the Agenda for the 91st Mee held on 9 October 1953.	ting of USCIB,
Subject:	(USCIB)	29.3/3, 29.3/4)
before the Board w Peterson, based up the members note a sideration of the The members a MR. SHELDON s	AIRMAN (General Cabell) explained that where (1) the report prepared by Colonel on the negotiations by his mod accept the Peterson report and proce Exchange Agreement. Agreed to this procedure. Agreed to this procedure. Agreed that he had drafted a memorandum are, to accompany a signed copy of the	A. C.
		- -

The ACTING CHAIRMAN pointed out that this memorandum imposed no condition upon acceptance of the agreement, but rather, asked for additional assurance security-wise.

There followed a lengthy discussion of the terms of the agreement, including consideration of possible limitations on U.S. analysis activity in the field, the precise nature and scope of information to be exchanged, understandings reached with the _____ which were not necessarily implicit in the terms of the agreement, the need for expeditious action to avoid embarrassment to concerned U.S. agencies, and the matter of notification to U.K. authorities.

USCIB: 29.3/7



TOP SECRET FROTH - SECURITY INFORMATION U.S. EYES ONLY

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

USCIB: 29.3/7

GENERAL ACKERMAN suggested further detailed study of the agreement to insure that field analysis in, for example, the Philippines would be permissible if deemed expedient at a future date.

On the subject of security practices, Mr. Sheldon expressed his opinion that the agreement required greater precautions by the than were normally prescribed by SHAPE in the handling of "Y" material.

GENERAL CANINE said that he was prepared to accept the agreement, but that he did not particularly like it.

MR. ARMSTRONG, expressing his views prior to a vote on the agreement, said that the terms would require further study by his Department. He added that he had serious misgivings, for example, as to whether the entire agreement did not involve codeword material which would extend it beyond the provisions of Appendix "P". In view of this point, and others, he suggested that the Executive Secretary and the Security Committee go over the agreement in detail with the negotiators and come back to this Board at a special meeting with their views and recommendations as to its implications in terms of the applicable BRUSA provisions.

As a result of the foregoing discussion it was agreed that the Security Committee, augmented by members of the negotiating team, would meet to make the required study.

CAPTAIN TAYLOR assured the members that a report by the augmented Security Committee could be made available in time for consideration at a special meeting of the Board to be held on Tuesday, 13 October 1953.


All members agreed to this proposal.

<u>DECISION</u>: (9 October 1953) USCIB noted and accepted the report prepared and submitted by Colonel A. C. Peterson, based upon the negotiations by his

USCIB agreed that the Security Committee, augmented by members of the negotiating team would meet at the earliest possible date to make a detailed study of the _______ in light of BRUSA provisions and the foregoing comments, and, based upon such a study, to recommend appropriate action to USCIB, such recommendations to be considered by the Board at a special meeting to be held at 1430 on Tuesday, 13 October 1953.

This item to remain on the agenda.

USCIB: 29.3/7



F DEC

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON '25, D. C.

Security Information

-TREFERENDERA40458

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

13 OCT 1953

ÊO 3.3(h)(2)

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TOP SECRET

I am happy to forward herewith a signed copy of the agreement which was entered into on my behalf ______ c September 10, 1953.

In view of the highly sensitive nature of this agreement and the materials exchanged thereunder, I take this opportunity to reaffirm to you that this matter will be handled by us in accordance with our strictest security measures, and that knowledge of it will be limited to the absolute minimum. In return, I would greatly appreciate your assurances that similar security precautions will continue to be taken by you and that the materials will be handled in accordance with the most secure practices employed by your service.

OP SECRET

With renewed assurances of my esteem,

Sincerely,

(Signed) Allen W. Dulles Director

Enclosure

Enclosure with USCIB 29.3/6 dtd 20 Oct 1953.





WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Serial: 000542-S 14 October 1953

TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

 y_i :

RALPH J. CANINE

Lieutenant General, US Army Director

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EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

19.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject:

OGA

Reference: USCIB 29.3/4 dated 1 October 1953.

1. In accordance with the decision rendered by USCIB at its 91st meeting, the USCIB Security Committee augmented by members of the U.S. negotiating team, namely, Mr. Frank Rowlett of CIA, Mr. Frank Raven of NSA, ______CIA and Colonel Arthur C. Peterson of ASA, serving as ad hoc members for the purpose of the present discussion, met at 0900, 10 October 1953 to make recommendations with regard to the working agreement included as an enclosure to the reference.

2. The Committee examined the terms of reference under which the U.S. team negotiated the above mentioned agreement. (These terms of reference are contained in USCIB 23/34 dated 12 October 1951 and in USCIB 2/38 dated 24 August 1953.)

3. The Committee next examined the terms of the agreement itself. With regard to the provisions of paragraph 2a of Section II of the agreement concerning "sole beneficiaries", the Committee agreed that from the facts presented by the members of the U.S. negotiating team it appears clear that it was not the intention of the ______ to limit in any way the disposition of the results of the analysis of the material to be exchanged, and that there will be no misunderstanding if the agreement is implemented in this manner. The members of the U.S. negotiating team were unanimous in agreement on this point and explained that the ______ quite plainly pointed out that the disposition of end products is not a matter involved in this agreement.

4. In regard to the provisions of paragraph 2b of Section II of the agreement providing that operations conducted by the U.S. in analyzing this exchanged material be conducted in U.S. territory, the <u>members of the U.S. negotiating team were unanimous in stating that the</u> made it clear that, if it should become operationally necessary to process outside of U.S. territory the material provided by the rapid agreement could be obtained so long as such processing does not take place in _______uless U.S. Armed Forces are involved there.

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USCIB: 29.3/5



USCIB: 29.3/5	12 October 1953
TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION	
Subject:	EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3609
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the unanimous statements of the U the Committee is of the opinion t their terms of reference and that released to the falls comp paragraphs 4 and 5 of Appendix "P that in discussing with to be exchanged, it was made clea in the information that can be re	g all other terms of the agreement and U.S. negotiating team with regard thereto, that the U.S. negotiators did not exceed the U.S. information and material to be letely within the criteria enunciated in to BRUSA. The U.S. negotiators state the precise information and material r to that the U.S. is restricted leased. The U.S. negotiators have con- t as a result of these discussions the
Inced the Security Committee that	t as a result of these discussions the

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TOP SECRET



USCIB: 29.3/5	12 October 1953
<u>TOP_SECRETSECURITY_INFORMATIONU.</u>	EO 3.3(h)(2)
Subject:	/
a previous working agreement for which have already been made and for which r enclosure 2 hereto. Therefore, it is acceptance of the security assurances be a prerequisite to U.S. acceptance of	considered that prior considered that prior contained in enclosure 2 need not of the agreement. In fact it was
generally conceded by the members of t such assurances as a prerequisite migh	
an opportunity to impose further and p	perhaps embarrassing restrictions
to which the U.S. would then be unable	to agree. In this connection,

the Committee took note of the assurances of the U.S. team of the extremely security conscious attitude of the COMINT people with whom they dealt, and of the fact that the _____authorities represented in SACEUR's Command have accepted the U.S./U.K. imposed limitations on the handling of tactical COMINT end products in SACEUR's "Y" structure (see Annex "B" to the enclosure to USCIB 32/15). PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

In view of the above, the USCIB Security Committee, augmented 10. by the U.S. members of the negotiating team named in paragraph 1 above, unanimously recommends that USCIB approve the agreement with understandings set forth above and authorize the Director of Central Intelligence to sign on behalf of the U.S. and forward it with the letter included herewith as enclosure 2. In addition, it is recommended that the Director, NSA sign and forward the notification to GCHQ included herewith as enclosure 1.

ptain, S. Navy

Executive Secretary, USCIB

USCIB: 29.3/5

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EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, GCHQ

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/5 dated 12 October 1953

-TOP SECRET

INFORMATION - OF CARE JF MT E 11-1-1 RALPH -Copies furnished! SBLO(+eg) Executive Secretary, USCIBtero cop) Director, National Security Agency M/R: Text of this correspondence, approved at the 92 ml (Special) Meeting of USCIB, held 13 Oct 53. Otherwise self-explanatory ce: ACc/s DCS/P P/P EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 1/uphy Enclosure-1_with_USCIB-29.3/5-dated-12-October 1953

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TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - U.S. EYES ONLY

DRAFT

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

I am happy to forward herewith a signed copy of the agreement which was entered into on my behalf by my______ on September 10, 1953.

In view of the highly sensitive nature of this agreement and the materials exchanged thereunder, I take this opportunity to reaffirm to you that this matter will be handled by us in accordance with our strictest security measures, and that knowledge of it will be limited to the absolute minimum. In return, I would greatly appreciate your assurances that similar security precautions will continue to be taken by you and that the materials will be handled in accordance with the most secure practices employed by your service.

With renewed assurances of my esteem, I am

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure 2 with USCIB 29.3/5 dated 12 October 1953.

TOP SECRET

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

2 October 1953

TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - U.S. EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject:

Reference: USCIB 29.3/3, dated 1 October 1953.

1. The enclosure is circulated with a view to consideration at the next regular meeting of USCIB, 9 October 1953, in connection with the reference.

2. The enclosure includes the English translation of the text of the agreement mentioned in paragraph 2 of the reference and is being given limited distribution of one copy to members only.

3. THE ENCLOSURE WITH THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT.

Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure CIA Memo dtd 1 Oct 1953, with enclosures thereto; subject as above.

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PER-MISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.

USCIB: 29.3/4

TOP SECRET

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EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

1 October 1953

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TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - U.S. EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject:

Reference:

(a) USCIB 2/38 dtd 24 August 1953.
(b) USCIB 30/34 dtd 10 August 1953.

2. It will be noted that Appendix D has been withdrawn from this report. This Appendix, containing the text of the agreement reached, will be given limited distribution (one copy per Board Member) at the earliest possible date.

3. THE ENCLOSURE WITH THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS COMMUNICATIONS INTEL-LIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT.

in, U. S. Navy ve Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure Conference Report of (17661, cy 20

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USCIB: 29.3/3

TOP SECRET



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10 September 1953

TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - U.S. EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject:

Reference: / USCIB 30/38 dated 21 August 1953.

1. The decision of USCIBEC reported in the reference has been approved by USCIB.

2. The effect of this decision is to refer the problem presented in USCIB 30/34 to the CIA and NSA members for resolution.

3. THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT.

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Captain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

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USCIB: 29.3/1

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