CONFIDENTIAL TOP DECURITY INFORMATION

Investigation of Security Violation.

SEC/C

Chief, UC Group

15 Sep 52

- 1. At 0930, 4 September 1952, Lieutenant Tefft of this office, reported to me that two papers of a classified nature (Inclosures 1 and 2) had been found in a supposedly empty burn bag in this office by the Security Watch Officer on the evening of 3 September 1952. These papers and the report of the Security Watch Officer (Inclosure 3) were handed to me at that time.
- 2. A security violation has occurred. These papers were not under proper safeguards from the time of closing of the office until discovery at 1800.
- 3. It has been the practice in this office to place burn bags in the waste basket at each desk or other working position into which are placed all papers of a classified nature for which disposal is desired. Because the volume of such papers is small as compared to the capacity of the bag, all bags are emptied into one bag daily. That bag is then sealed and turned in for burning. All emptied bags are reinserted in the waste basket in an upside down position.
- 4. On 3 September, Diver, D.E., CT2, USN, emptied the bags (see his statement, Inclosure 4) but does not recall inspecting the particular bag in which the papers were found. This bag is at the desk occupied by 1st Lt. G.V. Tefft, USAF, His statement is appended as Inclosure 5.
- 5. Other occupants of this office have been questioned and their replies are as indicated:
 - M/Sgt. J. F. Piller Checked his desk and waste basket, windows, safes, typewriter, and trays. Did not notice Lt. Tefft's waste basket. Left office at 1635.
 - CTC C.H. Stubblefield Checked his desk, safes, and floors. Left office at 1628 to catch bus. Does not remember checking Lt. Tefft's waste basket.
 - Mr. H. D. Jones Checked his desk and waste basket, left office at 1630.
- 6. In this small office, physical security has been a responsibility of each individual with final inspection by all hands at closing time. In this case the unemptied burn bag escaped notice by everyone. Therefore, while Diver's failure to empty that bag constitutes responsibility for this violation, the failure of Lt. Tefft to insure that his desk was secure is a contributing factor to the violation.
- 7. In the opinion of this officer the exposure of highly classified material to compromise is a serious matter and minimization of the seriousness of the violation is not intended. All of the personnel involved in this matter are impressed deeply by an occurrence of the very lapse that they have conscientiously attempted

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Subject: Investigation of Security Violation.

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to avoid. For this reason, it is recommended that no further disciplinary action be taken against any person or persons in this office.

- 8. In order to aid in prevention of a recurrence of this violation the following steps have been taken:
 - a. Issuance of an office order on security.
 - b. Provision of a check-off sheet to be initialled by the person made responsible for the checking of items listed.

While practical means are served by the consolidation of all burn bags into one, there will always remain the possibility of papers adhering to the bag and of escaping notice that such has occurred. Any method of responsibility fixing will not guarantee a recurrence. Assistance of the Security Control Division in devising a system which will provide a more nearly automatic system for dealing with burn material is requested.

- 9. The vigilance and thoroughness of the inspection by the Security Watch Officer, lat Lt. M. W. Meadows, in discovering this breach of security, is commendable.
 - 10. Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL when Inclosure 1 is removed.

J. A. WILLIAMS Captain, U.S. Navy Chief, Coordinator's Group

Inclosures - 5
As stated.
(Less Inclosures 1,2, & 3)

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4 September 1952

3

Statement Re Security Violation

of 3 September 1952

At approximately 1605 on the day of the above security violation I made the rounds of room 19-240, NavSecSta, as is my daily procedure, collecting the contents of the burn bags in the room, consolidating them into one, and replacing each empty burn bag, upside down, in the wastebasket from which it was taken.

My normal procedure in emptying the burn bags is to take each of the bags in order, proceeding around the room in a clockwise manner. Each bag is inspected, after emptying, to insure that all paper has been removed.

Accordingly, I can offer no explanation for the violation in question. To the best of my knowledge the procedure outlined above was followed on the date in question, though I must state that I do not positively recall emptying the specific burn bag in which the classified information was found by the Security Officer.

Donald E. Diver CT2, U.S. Navy

Inclosure 4 with UC Gp D/F to SEC/C dated 15 September 1952.

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SECURITY VIOLATION

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12 September 1952

At the close of each working day(1630) I make a security check of Room 19-240. This check means a survey of the entire space used as the office of the Coordinator Group. It includes all safes, cabinets, desks, Cleradesks, typewriters, waste baskets, burn bags, fans, windows, walls, floor, and lights.

On 3 September I made the usual check and noticed nothing unusual nor irregular. I knew that CT2 Diver had emptied the burn bags, which he usually does between 1600 and 1610, because I had seen him making his way around the office as usual and I had signed the chit authorizing destruction of the contents.

At approximately 1745 the Patrolman on Post No. 4, while making his tour of building 19, found two documents in the burn bag behind and to the left of my desk. M/Sgt. Piller, who sits directly behind me, has talked with the patrolman since the reported violation occurred. The patrolman stated that the papers were found stuck in the burn bag which apparently had been emptied and turned upside down in the waste basket.

Obviously I should have turned the bag over and examined it before leaving the office. The fact that I did not do so indicates a degree of negligence on my part. I accept responsibility for the reported violation.

Steps have been taken to make certain that there will be no recurrence.

GEORGE V. TEFFT 1st Lt., USAF

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