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EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REPORT ON

INFORMATION

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

SECURITY

SECRET SUEDE

IN REGARD TO ORGANIZATION, METHODS, AND ARRANGEMENTS

FOR

PROCESSING PLAIN-TEXT TRAFFIC FOR THE PRODUCTION OF COMINT

AND A FEW COMMENTS THEREON

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See also Public Law 513, 81 Congress second session

By: WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN Date: 31 March 1952

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<u>Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 10-15-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526</u>



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1. a. The term Communications Intelligence (COMINT) designates the information and technical material resulting from the interception and study of intercepted communications.¹

b. The term traffic analysis (T/A) designates the operations involved in the study of the "externals" and characteristics of intercepted communications (procedure signals, message headings, call signs, etc., D/F bearings, ______, and other technical aids) for the purpose of obtaining information² concerning the organization and operation of the communication system or networks on which the communications are passing.

c. The term traffic intelligence (T/I) is that COMINT which is produced by drawing inferences or deductions from the information obtained by T/A operations defined above.

d. The term plain text (P/T) includes communications of two sorts:

(1) Category 1 - Plain-language communications passed on internal radio links of the country involved.

(2) Category 2 - Plain-language and

e. The term processing refers to the steps and operations performed on intercepted communications, up to and including their translation. It does not include the preparation of reports, appreciations, digests, etc., based upon the information constituting the end-product of the COMINT, T/A and T/I operations; that is, the term does not include the preparation of so-called finished "intelligence."

2. a. The principal differences organizations and arrangements for the processing of plain-text are as follows:

(1) The COMINT establishment is currently organized on a centralized functional basis, that is, the structure as a whole


- 1. This and the following definitions apply to the terms as specifically used in this report.
- 2. This information is used (1) as a guide to efficient intercept control and operation, (2) as an aid to cryptanalysis, and (3) as a basis for what is defined in 1c.
- 3. Commercial code is included in this category because such codes are available and are intended for economy, not secrecy.


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






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In addition the end-product is probably of better quality, since small bits of information that turn up in processing are likely to be unknown to purely "intelligence" producing personnel who are merely recipients of translations. It is familiarity with all the bits and pieces that makes for better quality of the end product.

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c. As to the second suggestion, I feel sure that regardless of which type of P/L processing is preferable (centralized or decentralized) the contact between the personnel processing P/L and those processing encrypted messages (including the T/A and T/I phases) must be exceptionally

d. As to the third suggestion, I think I have said enough in the foregoing comments to indicate my conviction that while of course almost anything is possible and that the P/L processing could be put in one package and lifted out of AFSA, to do so would be a bad mistake. It would reduce efficiency in the processing of both P/L and encrypted communications.

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e. Finally, as to the fourth suggestion, it is hardly necessary to point out the administrative and other problems of having personnel who do not belong to you work in your quarters but not under your administrative or operational control. There are enough cases of this sort of thing already - where the necessity for them is much more evident than in the case under consideration.

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