THP SECRET CANO SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET CANOE - SECURITY INFORMATION

DRAFT/1 July 1953

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

SUMMARY OF POINTS

- 1. Change in title of Report. Orginally, conference was called for purpose of considering primarily French insecurity and secondarily, insecurity of certain other NATO countries.
- 2. Report has following sections after Statement of Problem.
 - I. Assumptions as to the COMINT capability of the USSR.
 - II. Value to the USSR of COMINT derived from the communications of NATO countries.
 - a. Although US and UK views differ as to current value, both agree that it may be high or critical at any time.
 - b. Value varies with individual countries. Latter considered under five groupings (p. 3).
 - c. War-time value to USSR of diplomatic COMINT would be greatly increased.
 EO 3.3(h)(2)
 - d. Armed forces COMSEC (para. 5, p. 4).

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III.	Value	to	the	USSR	\mathbf{of}	intelligence	derived	from	non-COMINT	sources.

IV.		
		Both agree value to
	USSR greater than potential value to US ar	nd UK.

- V. Security and intelligence factors affecting action to be taken.

 Four points to be considered. (para. 10, p. 8)
- VI. Technical factors affecting action to be taken.

 Four main points. (para. 11, 12, 13, 14, p. 9)
- VII. Outline of the proposed action.

Three points. (paras. 15, 16, 17, p. 10)

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VIII. The detailed approach and subsequent action.

Seven main points. (paras. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, on pp. 10-13)

IX. Conclusions.

- .a. Three general points. (paras. 25, 26, 27, p. 13)
 - b. Action should be taken immediately. (para. 28, p. 14)
 - c. Intelligence and security considerations forbid direct disclosure of COMINT success.
 - d. Technical factors and general considerations dictate nature of action to be taken:

 Six points here. (para. 30 a-f, p. 14)
 - e. Course of action outlined. Paras. 18-24 meets foregoing.
 - f. Preliminary steps to be taken on approval of Report:

 Five points. (para. 32a-e)
 - g. Examination of NATO Comsec to continue and present
 BRUSA liaison arrangements are adequate.

X. Recommendations.

- a. Approve conclusions these to supersede 1951.
- b. Program in paras. 18-24 be undertaken and in particular steps in para. 32 be undertaken immediately.