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APPENDIX B

ANNEXURE BL

THE ASSIGNMENT OF COMINT

TO CATEGORIES AND SUB - CATEGORIES

1. This Annexure delineates the basis for (a) the establishment of Sub-Categories, (b) the assignment of COMDFT to Categories and Sub-Categories, (c) the classification of COMINT assigned to Category I and (d) the application of codewords to designate Sub-Categories, as provided in paragraphs 5c, 5-E, 14 and 15 of Appendix B respectively. This Annexure is not intended to specify or accomplish the detailed categorization of all COMINT. However, along with the criteria described in paragraphs 9 and 10 of Appendix B, it governs the preparation and maintenance of current, mutually agreed lists, which are required under paragraph 11 of Appendix B, to indicate the precise assignment of all COMINT to ^Categories and Sub-Categories.

- 2. Category I shall contain:
 - a. Traffic intelligence relating to D/F mission assignments, bearing reports and fix reports (i.e.: target frequencies, call-signs, "piped signals", other signal information, bearings and fixes), provided that no interpretations of complex changing call-sign systems are included. This material shall normally be classified CONFIDENTIAL.
 - b. Plain-text tactical or operational traffic provided that no interpretations of complex changing call-sign systems, enciphered map references, or results of advanced traffic analysis are included. This material shall include local procedural and local grid and zone systems used for artillery direction, tactical control and novement of front line units, early warning and exercise of tactical combat control of aircraft. This

waterial shall normally be classified CONFIDE:TIAL.

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- c. Traffic Intelligence or Crypt Intelligence from analysis of radar tracking reports and visual observation reports as found in tactical or operational traffic, provided that enciphered aircraft type designations or interpretations of complex changing call sign systems are not included. Inclusion of local grid or zone references, local procedural codes used for brevity and plain-text interspersed with cover words is permissible. This material shall normally be classified CONFIDEFTIAL.
- d. Crypt Intelligence from naval tactical maneuvering codes, when used as such, and from jargon codes. This material shall normally be classified CONFIDENTIAL.

3. Category II shall contain

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a. Traffic Intelligence (including freely available privacy and brevity systems except where specifically assigned to other Categories. Category II plaintext which qualifies for exceptional handling under paragraph 35g of Appendix B shall include only such of the following as is not assigned to Category III under subparagraphs 4d and 4e below:

b. Crypt Intelligence specifically assigned on the basis of crypto-systems. USCIE and LSIB shall have supplementary lists of all cryptosystems mutually adjudged suitable for inclusion in this Category kept jointly in current status by their respective technical groups. These lists shall be based upon the criteria in sub-paragraphs 9a, b, c, and d, and

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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19 March 1953 paragraph 10 of Appendix B. Either Farty may, after consideration of advantages and risks as provided in subparagraph 9e of Appendix B, assign any crypto-system currently so listed to Category II. The other Farty shall then be notified immediately through the technical channel used in maintaining the joint lists, and shall similarly assign the crypto-system involved.

- 4. Category III shall contain:
 - a. Crypt Intelligence except where specifically assigned to other Categories.
 - b. Traffic Intelligence involving call-signs or message headings encrypted in codes or ciphers of high security grading.
 - c. Traffic Intelligence involving such combination ("fusion") of separate Traffic Intelligence or other Category II sources as produces information whose value is so great that security of content becomes the overriding consideration.

d.

c. Material involving sensitive collection procedures or the revelation of success against unusual, sensitive or complex transmission procedures and devices.

EO 3.3b(3) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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APPENDIX B

ANNEXURE B2

SECURITY PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF COMINT ACTIVITIES IN

EXPOSED AREAS

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

It is recognized that effective interception of foreign communications and effective support of field commanders may require the establishment of COMINT activities in locations which may suddenly fall under unfriendly control with consequent loss of COMINT personnel and/or associated classified materials. It is agreed that, in addition to the pertinent, general provisions of Appendix B, the specific provisions which follow shall govern the conduct of COMINT activities in such locations.

2. DEFINITIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

Exposed areas are those which are susceptible of being quickly overrun by enemy forces or those wherein the local political or military situation is such as to pose a distinct threat to the security of COMINT activities conducted therein. At present they comprise primarily countries under and areas adjacent to these countries which are beyond defense lines expected to be tenable. In proportion to the

risk of loss of COMINT personnel and/or classified material located therein, such areas involve three situations:

- a. <u>Protected situations</u>, i.e.: those in which there is no reasonable expectation of such a loss.
- b. <u>Risky situations</u>, i.e.: those in which it is likely that complete evacuation of COMINT personnel and removal or effective destruction of classified material will be accomplished.
- c. <u>Dangerous situations</u>, i.e.: those in which it is unlikely that complete evacuation of COMINT personnel and removal or effective destruction of classified material will

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3. EVALUATION OF SITUATIONS IN EXPOSED AREAS

The decision whether a given situation is protected, risky or dangerous shall be made by USCIB or ISIB, or by such other authorities as are responsible for the security of the COMINT activities concerned, and shall be made in the light of the political, military, and other factors affecting the safety of the COMINT personnel and materials involved.

4. FACTORS AFFECTING DECISIONS TO CONDUCT COMINT ACTIVITIES IN RISKY OR DANGEROUS SITUATIONS

COMINT activities shall be conducted in risky or dangerous situations only after due consideration of the COMINT losses which may result if the area concerned is suddenly attacked, and of the probable effect of such losses upon the conduct of COMINT activities elsewhere.

5. SAFEGUARDS FOR RISKY SITUATIONS

In the case of COMINT activities established in risky situations, the following safeguards shall be applied save as exceptions to them are specifically approved by USCIB or ISIB:

- a. Only intercept, analytic and reporting tasks which cannot be performed satisfactorily in safe or protected situations shall be assigned.
- b. No Category III COMINT or related documents and technical material shall be held except those essential to the assigned task and of current application thereto, and the latter shall be maintained in such condition as to insure immediate destruction, if necessary, upon sudden threat of seizure.
- c. No person in Group D, as defined in sub-paragraph 30d of Appendix R, shall be assigned, unless required by technical considerations.
- d. Facilities shall be provided with which of the complement can be expected to destroy effectively, if necessary, all classified COMINT materials within a time limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit personnel shall be skilled in the use of these facilities.

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e. Appropriate steps shall be taken to insure that adequate arrangements are made for safe evacuation of all personnel whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.

6. SAFEGUARDS FOR DANGEROUS SITUATIONS

In the case of COMINT units established in dangerous situations the following safeguards shall be applied save as exceptions to them are specifically approved by USCIB or ISIB:

- a. Only unique intercept tasks which cannot be accomplished elsewhere shall be assigned, and only such analysis as is locally required to support these tasks and permit essential technical reporting shall be performed.
- b. Only COMINT documents or technical aids essential and of current application to these tasks shall be held.
- c. No Category III COMINT or related documents and technical material shall be held.
- d. Personnel technically informed in COMINT of a higher level or broader scope than is required for the limited mission of the unit should not be assigned if avoidable.
- e. No person in Group C as defined in sub-paragraph 30c of Appendix B shall be assigned unless his presence is vital for the effective functioning of the unit.
- f. No person in Group D as defined in sub-paragraph 30d of Appendix B shall be assigned in any circumstances.

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- g. Facilities shall be provided with which the minimum number of persons on duty at any one time can be expected to destroy effectively, if necessary, all classified COMINT materials within a time limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit personnel shall be skilled in the use of these facilities.
- h. Appropriate steps shall be taken to insure that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.

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