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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 EQ 3.3(h)(2)

TOP SECRET SUEDE

22 October 1951

MEMORANDIM FOR MR. ROBERT PACKARD, CI IRMAN USCIB SECURITY	COPLITTEE
SUBJECT: Evaluation of Portuguese Communication Security	
Enclosure: Copy of Par. 85(b) of Instructions for Using TY	TX System
2. a. The new element consists in the fact that the are evidently encountering technical difficulties in the us TYPEX rachines, which were provided by the Pritish to all weents for the transmission of COSMIC or other classified wation.	e of their
b. These difficulties may come from: (1) malfunctions	rr of the

to keep them in proper working order; or from (2) errors made by operating personnel in setting up the keys at either or both ends of the circuit.

3. a. It is not ressible to state to which source either or both


machines, which are old and require more or less continuous maintenance

ot	the	two	instances	mentioned	in	Par.	1 above	belong.	

c. Neither case involves serious damage to security but the juttern for possibly serious violations has been set.

represent definite violations of the instructions for operating the TV TX system, as set forth in Par. 85(b) of "Instructions for the Use and Safe Custody of the TYPEX Machine Mark II with Simplex Settings", a copy of which paragraph is attached. This brings up the question of training in the use of TYPEX are in the maintenance of the machine itself.

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 06-18-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526



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5. The situation as regards training in TYPEX operation and maintenance, as stated by CDR Mark LITTLE, USN, the U.S. member and chairman of the Security Coordinating Committee, NATO, is as follows: (1) the maintenance is performed by the nations which hold the machines, the British providing the necessary spare parts; (2) technicians of the respective nations are trained either in London or in Washington (whichever is closer) and are given a 2-weeks' course in operation techniques and a 6-weeks' course in maintenance. These instructional courses should be adequate for the purpose.

6. Just how the attention of the Portuguese can be directed to security violations of this type and their elimination cannot clearly be seen at this moment. It is suggested that we discuss the problem at an early date with a view to ascertaining whether the proposed approach to the Portuguese, to be made soon by the U.S. Ambassador, can be expanded to include information which might lead to the elimination of this source of insecurity as well as of the others thus far encountered.

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WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN
AFSA Member. USCIB Security Committee

REF ID: A67135



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CHAPTER 6

CHECKS AND REPRETEIONS.

85. Requests for checks and repetitions and replies thereto may be made in plain language if only external details of the original cypher message are quoted but must be in cypher if internal details are referred to.

Examples:

1 74.5

(b) In expher

"Cancel my 2AB237 Repetition follows herewith".

(This must be sent as an entirely fresh message with an unused indicator. The indicator of the message being repeated must not be used again,)

"My 2AF237. Insert order used was C 'R IR F DT.

"Your 2AB237. Repeat words between "Atlantic" and "immediately".

SECRET

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