USCIB: 4.2/47

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16 May 1955

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject:

Promulgation of USCIB Directive No. 7 (New).

References:

- (a) USCIB 4.2/43 dated 18 April 1955.
- (b) USCIB 4.2/45 dated 3 May 1955.
- 1. The objections raised during the prescribed interregnum having been satisfactorily reconciled, the enclosure with reference (a) as amended by reference (b) is considered approved by USCIB as of 12 May 1955.
- 2. In regard to paragraph 3 of reference (b) it was agreed that the Offshore Islands of Formosa should be stated specifically as Quemoy and Matsu Islands.
- 3. A revised Annex A and page 1 of Annex B which together incorporate the above mentioned emendations are enclosed herewith for insertion in place of the present Annex A and page 1 of Annex B.
- 4. CIBD #7 (Revised as of 25 October 1950) and CIBD #14 dated 14 June 1954 are hereby cancelled. The latter will remain an open number. The enclosure with reference (a), after substitution of the two new pages, should be appropriately labeled as USCIB Directive #7 and stamped with the date 12 May 1955 in the spaces provided.
- 5. Additional copies of this directive are obtainable from this office on request.
- 6. Copies will be forwarded to the SUSLOs (London and Ottawa) for information and distribution to the authorities to which they are accredited.

Captain J. S. Navy ecutive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosures a/s

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ANNEX A

TO

USCIB DIRECTIVE NO. 7

CURRENT EXAMPLES OF

SPECIFIC AREAS INVOLVING UNACCEPTABLE OR UNDUE RISK

TO INDIVIDUALS HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF CURRENT VALUE ABOUT COMINT

- 1. Areas involving unacceptable risk:
 - a. Iron Curtain countries -
 - (1) USSR
 - (2) Korean Democratic Peoples Republic (North Korea)
 - (3) Chinese Peoples Republic (China)
 - (4) Tibet
 - (5) Outer Mongolia
 - (6) Estonia
 - (7) Latvia
 - (3) Lithuania
 - (9) Poland
 - (10) Czechoslovakia
 - (11) German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
 - (12) Hungary
 - (13) Rumania
 - (14) Bulgaria
 - (15) Albania
 - (16) North Viet Nam
 - b. Communist dominated zones -
 - (1) Porkkala Area of Finland
 - (2) Soviet Sector of Berlin
 - (3) Soviet Sector of Vienna
 - (4) Soviet Zone of Austria
 - .c. Other areas None
- 2. Areas involving undue risk:
 - a. U.S., British and French Sectors of Berlin
 - b. U.S., British, French and International Sectors of Vienna
 - c. Yugoslavia
 - d. Macao
 - e. The Associated States (Indo China)
 - f. Quemoy and Matsu Islands
- 3. SECCOM shall review this list not less than semi-annually with a view to recommending appropriate revisions.

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ANNEX B

<u>TO</u>

USCIB DIRECTIVE NO. 7

GUIDE TO UNIFORM ASSIGNMENT TO GROUPS UNDER SECTION II

- 1. It is considered at present that any person who has been indoctrinated for Category II or III COMMNT and who has been exposed to the end products of, or processing within these categories, may have "knowledge of current value" and becomes a candidate for assignment to at least Groups B and C respectively. In addition, possession of the following related information would warrant assignment to Group C:
- a. Knowledge of the overall distribution of the U.S.-U.K. COMINT effort including the size, location and purpose of advanced processing units and intercept establishments. (The intent here is that the knowledge should be both broad and deep.)
- b. Knowledge of programming techniques of general purpose computer equipments for cryptanalytic problems.
- c. Knowledge of U.S. capability to intercept radio transmissions where the equipments and techniques required go significantly beyond equipments and techniques in general use in the art. This may include, for example, special equipments and techniques necessitated by very high or low frequencies encountered, new multiplex transmissions, ciphory, cifax, ultra-speed, noise type communications, etc.
- 2. In articipation of the assignment of Groups B and C personnel to hazardous activities, any USCIB member should, whenever he considers advisable, in view of special circumstances affecting the degree of

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