EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

> DGC/1687 1st May, 1951

Coordinator, U.S. C.I.B.


I have been requested by the Joint Intelligence Committee to write to you in connection with the attached memorandum which is shortly to be tabled by the security Coordinating Committee of the standing Group of the Borth Atlantic Council.

This attached memorandum recommends that certain stops should be taken to prevent the leakage of N.A.T.O. infor-mation through insecure telegraphic arrangements by N.A.T.O. powers. The underlying reasons for producing this neutrandum include knowledge from Comint that at least some of the Deputies on the North Atlantic Council have not been making use of Typex Mark II when transmitting highly secret matters conserning the work of the council.

Tho of the Becurity Coordinating Committee are both indoctrinated and are being informed of these underlying reasons. The J.I.C. considered that, if possible, the United States member of the Security Coordinating Committee should have those underlying reasons for the production of this memorandum fully explained to him, in order that the memorandum should be fully understood.

They therefore suggested that I should explain this situation to you and ask that, if possible, you should arrange for the indoctrination of the United States member of the Security Coordinating Committee (if he is not already indoctrinated) and for him to be briefed accordingly.

I should be grateful for your assistance in this matter.





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## TRATT

Representative to the Representative to the Recurity Co-ordinating Committee of the Standing Group, on the Leaka-r of NATO Information through inscours telegraphic arrangements.

#### PROBLEM

The decision to be taken is whether the Standing Group should take further steps to prevent the leakage of NATO Informs tion through the interseption of telegraphic material.

- (a) By ensuring that there is no delay in equipping all appropriate W.A.T. agencies with unbreakable syphor machinery (Typex Mark II), and
  - (b) by issuing further guidance on the type of material which should be sent by the approved cypher system.

#### DISCUSSION

A. Faragraph 17 of Appendix B to SG. 7/34 reads:-

The special cryptographic arrangements which have been provided will enable national delegates or their national diplomatic representatives at the sent of all MATO bedies to communicate with their Governments and will allow inter-communication between all MATO secretariats. Similar arrangements will be made to allow Supremo Commanders to communicate with Maval, Military and Air Gommanders and Service Ministries. The only cryptographic system to be used for the present time at these levels for COSMIC Communications of all security classifications and MATO communications alassified Top Secret or Secret is Typex Mark II with simplex settings.

As far as we are aware, the provisions of the paragraph quoted above have been or are being implemented in the military agencies of MATO. If \$0.7/23 is approved by the Standing Group, and is to be fully observed, however, Typex Mark II Machines should be used by the Deputies to conduct their telegraphic correspondence with their Fereign Ministers and also by the Deputies' Secretariat and the Secretariats of other NATO hodies in London and Paris. At present, we believe that although there may have been a full issue of Typex Mark II machines they may not have been brought into use. The latest information we have about the allocation of machines is in SGM-200-50 of 20th July, 1951.

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A. The Deputies' discussions range over every field of MATO activity except the purely military. Even in the military field the Standing Group make available to them Top Secret information. Individual Deputies frequently require instructions from their Governments at short notice and it is inevitable that they should seek these instructions by telegraph. If cypher systems other than the approved secure system are used, there are grave possibilities that Soviet intelligence will be able to intercept many telegrams and from these piece together a fairly accurate day-to-day picture of N.A.T. planning.

5.	From tie	es to time	the Deputie	e also disque	s political	matters of a
highly s	morat ne	sture white	th if disalos	ed to the		could have
grave po	listical	and strat	egio emecqu	ences (one su	igh recent ex	ample was the
discuss:	ion of M	NTO policy	r towards			

- The present definition of Commis material (DECH 185-50 of lat Hovember, 1950) covers only "papers tabled at meetings of any body or committee set up under NATO". If the instruction that only Cosmic material of all elssifications and MATO top secret and secret material is to be sent by the approved dryptographic system is strictly observed, it would seem that there may well still be a risk of leakages through insecure sypher systems even when Typex machines have been installed in the appropriate R.A.T. agencies. Under the definition of Cosmic purely national papers which might contain highly scoret material related to N.A.T. matters need not be marked "Gosmie". In the absence of this marking nations are quite justified in ensyphering in their own, perhaps insecure, expher systems telegrams bases on these papers which might contain highly secret material (unless they are expected to mark much telegrams "NATO" but this is not clear). It is even possible for a text which is encyphered in this way on one day to require special protection on the following day owing to its having been tabled in a N.A.T. committe . and thereby redeiving the Cossie marking, and consequently qualifying for transmission by Typox Mark II.
- 7. Thus there is a twofold danger to MATO security (owing to the presence of the Deputies in London the danger is particularly serious there).
  - (a) In some cases NATO telegraphic procedure can not be enforced because the prescribed apparatus may not be available, or have been brought into use.
  - (b) In other cases MATO information whose disclosure might be dangerous is not subject to MATO telegraphic procedure.
- 27 8. It is submitted that the following action is necessary:-
  - (a) To ensure that when Typex Mark II machines have been issued, they are brought into use with the least posssible delay.
  - (b) Since the Council of Deputies was set up after the allocation of Typex Mark II machines, (SCH-200-50 of 20th July, 1950), to draw the Council of Deputies attention to the regulations regarding cryptographic chamble in order to determine whether the allocation appuritual parties their requirements.

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(e) To issue further guidance to MATO agencies, making it clear that telegraphic traffic involving not only "Cosmic" interests but also other communications related to Morth Atlantic Treaty interests must be sent by the approved sypher system.

### RECOMMENDATI H

9. That action should be taken along the lines of paragraph & above. 1

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