

~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~~~TOP SECRET CANOE SECURITY INFORMATION~~FSC53/P/M(1) FINAL
001UK-US CONFERENCE ON THE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY OF
NATO COUNTRIESMinutes of the Plenary Session held at
1000 hours, 5 June, 1953

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

In the Chair: Lt. Gen. R. J. Canine

U. K. DelegatesMr.
Brig. John H. TiltmanMr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr. U. S. DelegatesMr. William F. Friedman
Mr. Victor P. Keay
Mr. Frank B. Rowlett
Mr. Robert F. Packard
Mr. William H. Godel
Capt. Gifford Grange, USN
Col. M. L. Sherburn, USA
Lt. Col. John M. Anderson, USAF
Lt. K. B. Monypeny, Jr., USN (Secretary)Distinguished GuestsMr. W. Park Armstrong
Maj. Gen. Harry Reichelderfer, USA
RADM. J. N. Wenger, USN
Capt. L. S. Howeth, USN (for RADM. W. B. Ammon)
Capt. J. A. Morrison, USN
Col. James Corr, USA (for Maj. Gen. G. I. Back)
Col. John G. Ondrick, USA (for Brig. Gen. E. H. Porter)
Capt. J. S. Harper, USN
Col. A. R. Marcy, USA
Col. Robert E. Schukraft, USA
Col. George P. Sampson, USA
Cdr. W. L. Thomas, USN
Mr. T. Achilles Polyzoides
Mr. F. A. Raven1. Opening of Conference by Director, NSA

In welcoming the members of the UK delegation, Lt. General Canine stated that he was becoming an expert on opening these conferences. He explained that he had been requested by Mr. Dulles, Chairman of the United States Communications Intelligence Board to express his regrets that he could not be present and to extend a welcome for himself on behalf of the Board to the United Kingdom Delegation.

General Canine noted that the problem which this conference was to consider was a recurring one. He said that this was not the first time the two teams had sat down with this problem and added that he suspected it would not be the last time we would do so. He pointed out that it was not an easy problem to solve and that some people had rather positive ideas concerning it. To reach a solution to such a problem, he said, becomes geometrically increasingly difficult.

Problems that lend themselves to exact measurement were usually fairly simple to solve. Problems that evolve into an "educated guess" engendered their own difficulties in solution. He stated that if the delegates entered the conference with the idea that more is accomplished by evolution than revolution the conference would come up with some constructive recommendations to the two Boards.

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-08-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~

He concluded by offering the facilities of the National Security Agency and the Secretary of the Board to the visiting delegations. He expressed the hope that they would take advantage of the entertainment facilities in the Washington area, and that this visit would be an exceedingly pleasant one.

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

2. Remarks by Head of British Delegation

Mr. [] replied on behalf of the British delegation and expressed his thanks to General Canine for the warm and hearty welcome extended. He expressed his appreciation for the arrangements and accommodation made available and said that he hoped the UK delegates could find time aside from the conference work to enjoy the entertainment provided by Washington.

He continued by explaining that as the UK viewed the situation there were two facets to the problem. First, there was the question of compelling NATO nations to comply with the regulations on use of NATO ciphers for documents which are properly graded NATO and COSMIC. Secondly, aside from compelling them to use NATO ciphers, it was necessary to face the fact that it was not enough to have just NATO, US, and UK ciphers secure; insecure national ciphers of NATO countries constituted a dangerous source of intelligence to our potential enemies.

He stated that if we were to take positive action to improve the cryptographic security of NATO nations we should []

[] he continued, we could expect the Russians to get the essential lines of the picture which perhaps otherwise they would not get at all. If they did obtain it by other forms of intelligence, they would not get the information so quickly, so reliably, or so authentically.

He said that in time of shock and crisis the value [] would increase. In time of war there would be a greatly diminished flow of intelligence when other agencies had increased difficulty getting information out of the country. In wartime, the Russians would no longer be able to use their embassies as a cloak to carry intelligence.

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Mr. [] then suggested that the UK and US should plan a tri-partite meeting with the French. He stated that we should tell the French that we had certain information about their national ciphers, and that we should not omit to give them an opportunity to say if they had any information about our ciphers and communications practices. Having had these sessions with the French we could then put on the table our ideas of the extent to which we felt that the security of our various communications systems was a matter of common concern. Having put the French in a satisfactory position--which might take some time--we should then proceed with them to tackle the problems of such other countries as may be decided at this conference.

On the question of timeliness, he said that it was his belief that this problem was one that could not wait, not only because it was dangerous to continue as we have in this dangerous world in which we live but also because the problem could not stand still. He said that if the UK and US did not take the lead in this matter, if we continued to refuse to discuss COMSEC with NATO nations we should find that they would get advice and help from elsewhere and it might pass out of our hands entirely, since it was known that commercial firms were developing much more sophisticated cryptographic equipment than before.

He said he would advocate saying in effect to NATO nations, "Look what you are doing. Think what you are doing. If you don't like it, then we will propose a remedy." We could stop the leaks without allowing the discussion to diverge into cryptanalytical education.

If on the other hand we stood pat and allowed them to get help elsewhere, if we allowed them to make commitments for large expenditures on machines, we would then have a more difficult task convincing them that their machines, with which they wished to remedy the situation, were unsatisfactory. We might then have to educate them cryptanalytically far more than we would have to if we set to work to put matters right now.

3. Selection of Chairman of the Conference

General Canine invited [] to assume chairmanship of the Conference. [] expressed his warm appreciation for the offer but stated that he would much prefer to see a US chairman of the conference. He requested that, with General Canine's permission, he be excused from the offer. General Canine then proposed that Mr. Friedman, Head of the US Delegation, serve as Chairman. This proposal was accepted by the conference.

4. Remarks by Chairman of the Conference

Mr. Friedman thanked General Canine and expressed his appreciation for the honor. He stated that he considered the Chairmanship represented a rather hazardous mission and added that it was also hazardous for the members of the UK delegation as well as for the US delegation. He explained that the hazard exists because all the delegates were going to run the risk of becoming exposed to a very dangerous occupational disease which he termed "cryptologic schizophrenia."



EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

[Redacted]

He noted this conflict in aim would doubtless cause psychic conflicts and he cautioned that the delegates would have to be very careful to realize on which side they were arguing at any given moment.

He stated that the delegates had gathered to discuss two papers: one paper representing a fixed formal position of the UK; the other paper representing a tentative US position which the UK delegation might help to firm up. The two courses contained therein, he pointed out, were not very different. The aim was the same and the ultimate goal was the same.

The Chairman said that he intended to do everything possible to facilitate the conduct of business and advised the UK delegates he had already served notice to the US delegation to be prepared to work all day on Saturday.

He concluded by saying that he had received word from the Director, GCHQ, indicating that the extension of the agenda to include a review of the conclusions reached in the 1951 conference in the present consideration of the problem was implied in the consideration of the problem and was agreeable, based upon the UK and the US documents.

5. Time and place of first meeting.

Mr. Friedman informed the delegates of the physical arrangements for the conference. He proposed that the first meeting of the delegates be at 1100 in the conference headquarters. It was agreed.

6. There being no further business, General Canine declared the opening session closed at 1050.

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

[Redacted]

/s/ K. B. Monypeny, Jr.
K.B. Monypeny, Jr.