

# SECURITY INFURMATION

GOOF TO STREET THE CONTACTION

17 January 1952

TOP	RECEPT	CHIPOP
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定0 3.3(h)(2) 红 86-36/50 USC 3605

	USCIB	Meeting to be	beld on 18 Ja	nuary 1952		
		Briefing St	set on Item 3			
	Comm	enication Secur	ity (USCIB:	14/185 and	188)	
on		nd consideration Security, he				rence set
discussed	and approvo	51 the Report of by USCIB, whi ncil (NSC) for conditions pre	ch also agree approval of the	d to submit he recommen	it to the	•
	ll January 19	of USCIB submi 952 the Preside				
Chairman, lecided the lso state ls being ;	USCIB, in what it does need that "a di prepared for In a memora	red the Report nich the Chairm not require the raft brief to t discussion bet andwa to the Ch Chairman LSIB s	an, LSIB state approval of a he ween represent airman, USCIB	ed further to my higher s tatives of c	that LSTB nuthority. our two Bo	Thas The ards."
J.K. makii SIB furti	ng an initial mer proposed	approach to t	hem about the	ir communica	ation secu	rity." ity"
achines (	to be offered	K authorities ( to the pendix "A" to )	(as per the	recommendat	ion in pa	ragraph
		ub-paragraph a rat its earli		:	USCIB*s	508
5.4.	Paragraph 3	k of the Report	t of the	Conference	states ti	hat:
	report."					
				ne To en stagnissi		<del>-</del>
		3 Stanton &	agent have seen		من الوالية	<u>, 1 - 7 - 7 - 7 - 7 - 7 - 7 - 7 - 7 - 7 -</u>

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EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

b. In August 1951 the Report of the Tripartite Working Group was approved by the US. As of this date neither the nor the Government has approved that Report. However, it is to be noted that despite the conclusion quoted above in sub-paragraph a, the partinent recemmendation based upon that conclusion simply states that: (USCIE:lk/132,kb)		
Wh. The proposed approach and plan h LSIB and USCIB have agreed that the have been met."	e implemented when requisite conditions	
6. With reference to the CCM's to be provide will be ready in about two months to provide its machines initially required for the; the remaining twelve. At the time of the Conference provide these twelve machines and it is assumed to valid. Sixty additional machines are to be provide program phased in consonance with their respective	ed, the UK, as noted above, quots (8) of the twenty he US agreed to furnish mee, the Army agreed to hat this promise is still ded by the US and the UK "in a	

W.F.F.

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# **JECUATY INFORMATION**


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EO 3.3(h)(2)	ENCLOSURE EO 3.3(h)(2)
Ph 86-36/50 USC 36	PI 86-36/50 USC 360
<u> </u>	1.a. Rarly Consideration: In 1948 USCIB discussed the problem of
	as the most important aspect of the "Security
	of Western European Union Consideration. USCIB could not agree on measures
	to be taken and submitted to the Hational Security Council (NSC) a split
	report: the majority (ID, ASA, CNC, and CTA) feeling that too much would be lost to the US by informing the
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	HSC voted to take no action but to keep the problem under surveil-
	lance.
<u>\</u>	b. It may be noted at that time that Great Britain wanted to reveal
\rangle	so expressed himself to Marshall, but Marshall replied that NSC could
L	not accept the British proposal.
	2.a. Reconsideration of Problem 1950: The problem was raised again
	in USCIB in September 1950 when the seriousness of the situation was felt
	by CIA and the Department of State to merit reconsideration.
	b. SECCOM to which the problem had been referred submitted its
	report to USCIB in November 1950 recommending that steps be taken to improve
	only when a secure group had been established
and the second s	dthin the Government which could receive information without risk of compromise. The provision by the US or UK of a cryptographic system for
	was recommended as the best solution.
EO 3.3(h)(2)	
PL 86-36/50 USC 36	At our we become the way of the second transfer that the second transfer and
	British views on the subject of the insecurity ofcommuni-
	sations. The bitter stated that the British were of the opinion that a complete reorganization of the arrangements was necessary
	and that they were prepared to reveal to the French the fact that they could
	read The letter further proposed that an AFSA/CCHQ
EO 3.3(h)(2)	conference be held in early 1951 to work out the details of action required.
PL 86-36/50 USC 36	05
(	d. In late January 1951 Admiral Stone appointed an AFSA Ad Hoc Committee under the chairmenship of Hr. William F. Friedman to work out a
	iraft of the US position on the matter. This committee submitted on 7 Feb-
	ruary its report, the main conclusions of which were:
	"a. Much Valuable intelligence is contained in the
	<u> </u>

Enclosure to Briefing Sheet on Item 3 (73rd Heeting USCIB)




### TOP SECRET SUIDE

b. The present cryptographic systems and practices of the are such that this intelligence is fully available to any efficient communication intelligence (CONINT) organization.

- c. This situation can be corrected only by a complete overheal and replacement of the present insecure cryptographic systems by secure systems.
- d. The importance of denying this source of COMINT to Russia is

3.3(h)(2)	such that it is in the interest of the United States not only to accept a similar denial for itself, but to provide, at least in part, the cryptographic devices essential to security.
36-36/50 USC	e. Negotiations with the should be conducted in such a
	manner that there is
	f. Negotiations with the should, if practicable, be conducted entirely by the British in order to avoid disclosure of cryptologic collaboration.
	PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
	g. Negotiations should not be instituted prior to the formation of a secure group within the Government."
	e. On 13 Harch 1951 a letter was sent to LSIB proposing the agenda for the forthcoming conference within the framework of overall The points of the agenda were:
·	"1. The nature and scope of the insecurity of
	communications.
	2. The nature and scope of present internal insecurity.
	3. The most effective technical assistance which can be given to the
	4. The development of a specific plan for improvement of communications insecurity.
	5. The basis for a successful approach to the Government."
	The letter also stated the composition of the US delegation.
г	f. British proposals for the Conference were received 13 April 1951.
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EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



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- g. The US/UK Conference was held 1-lk May 1951 in Washington. Its recommendations were
  - \*a. The above conclusions be approved;
  - b. The proposed approach and plan be implemented when LSIB and USCIB have agreed that the requisite conditions have been met;
  - c. The respective Chairmen of LSIB and USCIB and/or their nominees order to brief the U.K. and the U.S. Ambassadors and also to participate as required:
  - d. LSIS and USCIB keep this problem under continuous review, and take such implementing action as may be agreed to be necessary;
  - e. The U.K. Government provide eight and the U.S. Government twelve of the twenty CCMs required for initial implementation of the cryptographic plan, and that the additional sixty CCMs be provided by the two Governments in a program phased in consonance with their respective NATO commitments."

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

