

~~TOP SECRET~~COPY No 1~~TOP SECRET~~ — ~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~File  
03-578Subject:  
Coordination of Service SIGINT  
Activities.

COMMENT NO.1

TO: Chief, Plans and Policy Division FROM: Asst. Technical Director, Office of R &amp; D Date: 11 JUL 1952

THRU: Chief, Office of Research and Development.

Mr. E. N. Dingley, Jr./60256

1. For the purposes of this document, the terms SIGINT and COMINT are defined as follows:

- a. SIGINT: Intelligence, derived from "Noise Listening" or "spectrum search", concerning the character and geographical origin of any electromagnetic radiations that are intercepted during searches of the entire spectrum. This may include collateral intelligence derived from the context of voice or morse signals during short intercept periods but not from continuous monitoring.
- b. COMINT: Intelligence derived from the context of communication signals that are intercepted on a substantially continuous basis.

2. The inclosure indicates the existence of the following situations:

- a. GCHQ has sole cognizance of the SIGINT (as well as COMINT) activities performed by and for the U.K.
- b. Ground and airborne SIGINT activities, mainly above 30 mc with emphasis on non-communication signals, are performed separately, and with little or no coordination, by Electronic Warfare groups of the U S. Army, Navy and Air Force. There is no official coordination or exchange of SIGINT derived intelligence between these groups and the SIGINT and COMINT groups of AFSA and the Service Cryptologic Agencies.
- c. Signals having carrier frequencies above 50 mc usually cannot be heard beyond line-of-sight distance nor outside the directive transmission beam, hence the existence of many important communication circuits and the location of suitable COMINT intercept sites on friendly terrain cannot be discovered except by airborne or mobile SIGINT teams.
- d. SIGINT equipment, under development by the U S. Army, Navy and Air Force, is not necessarily suitable for conducting SIGINT on communication types of signals because major emphasis is placed on radar interception by the sponsoring Electronic Warfare groups.

03 865

~~TOP SECRET~~

007

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION~~

File 03-578

Subject: Coordination of Service SIGINT  
Activities.

COMMENT NO.1

TO: Chief, Plans and Policy  
DivisionFROM: Asst. Technical Director,  
Office of R & D

Date: 11 JUL 1952

THRU: Chief, Office of Research  
and Development.

- e. Analysis of recorded intercepted signals is performed independently and without official coordination and exchange of recordings, by the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force.

3. It is recommended that the situation outlined above be presented to the Directors of Intelligence of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA, with a view to accomplishing the following:

- a. Provide official channels for the rapid interchange of technical information on the methods, techniques, and equipment required for the efficient performance of SIGINT on any type of signal.
- b. Provide an integrated operational program for all SIGINT activities whereby the signal intelligence needs of the cryptologic agencies will be integrated with those of the Electronic Warfare (countermeasures) groups.
- c. Provide for the official exchange of scientific intelligence derived by SIGINT activities.
- d. Provide for the official exchange of intelligence, concerning foreign electronic equipment, derived from collateral sources by all Intelligence Agencies.
- e. Provide official channels for the exchange of recordings of signals intercepted by SIGINT activities.

E. N. DINGLEY, Jr.,  
Asst. Technical Director,  
Office of Research and Development

Inclosure - Memorandum for Record,  
dtd. 28 June 1952 - Subj: US/UK Con-  
ference

Copies to

AFSA-COT ✓

02  
28  
33  
334  
25  
26  
331

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~TOP SECRET~~