

Director of Communications
Research

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We talked about this yesterday (Major Taylor, Meass, Barasch, Revere and I), and all agree that ~~the~~ one unit working together at SSA, including Spitzer and his files would be best, but where, under whom and question of personnel remain undecided. Major Taylor can and will furnish 1 officer fulltime, but that is all.

I am inclined more and more to taking cryptographic security out of Security Division and putting in Int. Div. like the British do, or of bringing up the old idea of the ABC Committee I proposed long ago, and such a working group could be under this Committee. This office could do it given personnel but do we want to?

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6 June 1945

MEMORANDUM: Major James C. Taylor

SUBJECT: The Relationship of Japanese T/A to the Security Problem

1. In April 1944 Japanese T/A at SSA (B-4-C) concluded from available Japanese Army bulletins that the Japanese possessed a Signal Intelligence Service which was actively engaged in performing T/A on Allied Army and Navy Communications. A memorandum was submitted to Col. Corderman setting forth the results of this preliminary investigation and ultimately the gist of this memorandum was incorporated in a study prepared by Capt. Rhoades on Japanese signal intelligence operations.

2. Thereafter a member of the Japanese Military Crypt Branch (Capt. Raskin) worked with the Security Division with respect to breaches of both cryptographic and traffic communications security. Although members of the Japanese T/A section cooperated in this venture, it was felt that Japanese T/A section should participate actively in the evaluation of evidences of traffic analysis by the Japanese on American communications, since the Jap T/A section was engaged in deriving intelligence from enemy traffic and was in an excellent position to evaluate the techniques employed and suggest possible counter-measures.

3. In January 1945, B-4-C invited attention to the apparent success of the Japanese in using traffic analysis to predict B-29 raids over the mainland. Pursuant to this memorandum a conference was held with Col. Huddleson, Major J. C. Taylor and others providing for the submission to MIS of all available material in connection with these raids. The minutes of this meeting dated 10 February 1945 concluded with the following statement:

"The purpose of this memorandum is to act as a work-sheet for following through on the various measures presented herein, and to assure that all possible information available within the Japanese military traffic analysis section is presented to proper authorities in MIS. It also endeavors to bring to attention the possible contributions of T/A personnel engaged in analysis of enemy activities and therefore such personnel might be of considerable assistance if employed by missions on security."

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4. In April 1945, the Japanese T/A section was invited to work with Major John D. Spitzer of the Political Reports Section of MIS and with members of A and C Branches of the Security Division of SSA with respect to Japanese success in deriving intelligence from Allied communications. Although the Security Division extended all cooperation to this team-working in the form of liaison it was unable to supply personnel to work on the material on a day-to-day basis. Members of B-4-C commenced working with Major Spitzer at the Pentagon specifically with respect to Japanese use of T/A in analyzing Allied communication.

5. A study was concluded on the activities of various Japanese signal intelligence agencies engaged in analyzing Air Transport Command traffic transmitted in conjunction with flights over the Hump. A further study is now in progress analyzing the traffic analysis activities of the Second Area Army at Pinrang in conjunction with Allied Transport and Bomber activities in the New Guinea-NEI-PI Area. Both studies are being conducted by B-4-C personnel working full time with Major Spitzer. Members of the Security Division provide collateral data needed to determine the correction of the Japanese inferences.

6. To clarify the respective divisions of labor between MIS, Security Division, and Intelligence Division a meeting was held at Major Spitzer's office on 3 June 1945, at which were present Major Spitzer of MIS, Capt. Maass, and Lt. Reimers of the Security Division and Lt. Barasch and Lt. Burcum of the Japanese T/A Section of the Intelligence Division. The discussion resulted in the following conclusions:

a. The task of "evaluating" Japanese success in cryptanalysis and traffic analysis is properly divisible into the following categories:

1) ^h [The assemblage of the complete information of the Japanese results and their explanation in terms of standard T/A techniques is to be the primary responsibility of the T/A section of the Intelligence Division.] The responsibility is so imposed because the Jap T/A section has available to it (in conjunction with B-1 and B-2) the complete history of the workings of any Japanese intelligence center, whether or not the results reach translated form, and can make judgments from raw traffic even if not decodable. Moreover, because of the nature of its activities the T/A section is in the optimum position to determine how the Japanese make their inferences and can suggest possible counter-measures based on their experiences with enemy traffic.

2) ^h The identification of the Allied cryptographic system or communications practice referred to by the Japanese and the determination of the correctness of the Japanese conclusions is to be the primary responsibility of the Security Division, since this unit has access to the actual cryptographic systems and the communication practices employed as well as to collateral information (including any possible deception program which may be used).

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3) c The determination of the correctness of the information reported by the Japanese with respect to battle order, disposition, subordination, and operations of Allied troops is to be the primary responsibility of MIS, since it has access to such information.

b. When the three phases of "evaluation" are completed, recommendations for corrective action are to be made jointly, and the result, written up in useable form for the theater commander, is to be disseminated through established MIS channels.

c. The process of evaluation and corrective recommendations is to be applied to communications not only of a War Department echelon but to those employed in the Theaters, since the knowledge of such possible breaches of security their evaluation and possible corrective action may be available only at Washington.

d. To implement these suggestions it was recommended by B-4-C representatives that MIS, B-4-C, and the Security Division set up facilities to act as a unit, such facilities to be established at SSA. Various queries were raised to such proposal: Major Spitzer was willing to participate in such venture, particularly because he felt that it was advisable to work at the source of the material, at SSA. Although he believed that Gen. Clark's directive imposing responsibility in MIS for the evaluation and dissemination was general enough to permit the implementing of this suggestion, he stated frankly that the policy of some members of C Branch was opposed to working on any evidences of Japanese success with any cryptographic systems or communications other than War Department, and that he felt that it would be disastrous to the agreement for all units concerned to work on this material if the persons in charge were not sympathetic to the endeavor. He was willing, however, to set up such working at SSA under Mr. William Friedman, Director of Communications. Major Spitzer expressed his willingness to participate, but did not believe his superiors would release him on a full time basis. Members of C Branch stated that they did not have personnel to participate in such venture on a full time basis, but were willing to cooperate by performing the duties stated in Paragraph 6 A 2 above, and that they could not obtain the consent of their superiors to work in a new unit, as suggested.

e. It was finally decided that B-4-C would work with Major Spitzer, at the Pentagon, or at SSA if space could be obtained to perform the first stages of evaluation, as discussed above, and that the Security Division would cooperate in the manner stated above, but working on a liaison basis.

Clarence S. Barasch
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