

USCIB: 9.2/4

6 October 1954

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~~TOP SECRET FROTH U.S. EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC:

Subject: COMINT Capability to Provide Early Warning of Chinese Communist Attack on Formosa and the Off-shore Islands Occupied by the Chinese Nationalists.

1. The enclosed report of the Chairman, USCIBINTCOM is forwarded for information with a view to consideration at the next meeting of USCIBEC.


2. Attention is invited to the recommendation contained in paragraph 5d of the enclosure. This recommendation is not being followed by the Executive Secretary because it is believed that the Board might benefit from such additional recommendations as the Executive Committee may see fit to submit. This would appear to be particularly appropriate in view of the fact that USCIBEC will meet on 22 October or sooner and the Board is not expected to meet again until 12 November unless a special meeting is called. In addition, the INTCOM, whilst stating that the matter is urgent, has not said why nor has it made any specific statements as who in the U.S. should perform the tasks recommended, by what means and under what limitations, if any. Thus, the effect of the report is to view with alarm without making very specific recommendations for solution of the problem. In particular:

a. Who should make the examination indicated in paragraph 5a and how close in does the INTCOM feel it would be feasible to establish intercept facilities "near the China East Coast"?

b. What specific resources does the INTCOM have in mind in paragraph 5b and how should they be utilized?

c. Who shall exert the pressure recommended in paragraph 5c and what limitations should USCIB place on such an effort?

3. If, however, the above view is considered erroneous and any member should desire to have a special meeting of either USCIB or USCIBEC to consider the enclosure, please notify this office as soon as practicable.


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure

INT #0006 dtd 5 Oct 1954.

USCIB: 9.2/4

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 03-24-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

INT #0006

5 October 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB

Subject: COMINT Capability to Provide Early Warning of Chinese Communist Attack on Formosa and the Off-shore Islands Occupied by the Chinese Nationalists

1. The USCIB Intelligence Committee convened at a special meeting on Friday, 24 September 1954 at the request of the CIA Member to consider the above subject. The Committee reviewed the present USCIB intelligence requirements and assessed the National Security Agency's expressed capability to meet the requirements.

2. The Intelligence Committee agreed that the existing intelligence guidance provided on this subject is adequate. Under the second priority USCIB Intelligence Objective, China is at present considered to be the number two priority country for COMINT effort and is so treated by NSA. The Intelligence Requirements under this objective of the USCIB Master Requirements List outline the COMINT information required by the USCIB intelligence agencies in order to estimate the Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions. Further, such supplementary detailed guidance for NSA as is required, is contained in the Information Requirements Lists and is provided routinely by consumer representatives located at NSA.

3. The NSA representative then outlined the extent and status of the current COMINT collection and production effort on the Chinese Communist problem. It was concluded that NSA is exploiting current Chinese Communist communications to the maximum extent feasible within existing resources, other requirements and technical limitations. The NSA representative provided the following estimate of current COMINT capabilities:

a. COMINT could probably detect CHICOM preparations for an invasion of Formosa; however, COMINT capabilities of predicting actual commencement of hostile air operations would be slight.

b. COMINT probably cannot detect CHICOM preparations for an invasion of Quemoy.

c. COMINT might detect preparations for CHICOM invasion of the other off-shore islands.

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4. In response to questions raised by the various INTCOM members, the NSA representative listed the following limitations on the current GOMINT capability:



b. The potentially exploitable tactical communications of CHICOM military units deployed in East China areas such as the Amoy area cannot be intercepted from the sites now available. While base rights in Formosa will provide additional unique and valuable traffic, only the establishment of intercept in the immediate area could provide the bulk of the tactical communications desired.



5. INTCOM unanimously recommends that in addition to the action now under way to acquire base rights on Formosa:

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

a. The U.S. examine on an urgent basis the possibility of establishing intercept facilities as near the China East Coast as may be feasible.



d. The above recommendations, in view of their urgency, be forwarded directly to USCIB.

H. C. Simmons
H. C. SIMMONS
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Chairman, INTCOM