

~~TOP SECRET~~

CSDIC/CMF/Y39

SECOND INTERROGATION REPORT ON

TEMP Enrique

Name : TEMP Enrique
 Rank : Matrose (Civilian in equivalent rank)
 Unit : "B" GRUPPE SAN REMO (German Navy)
 Function : Asst cryptographer and translator, later W/T mechanic
 F.P. No. : 02516 (?)
 Captured : 10 May 45, GENOA
 Secret No. : M45/611
 Interrogated : CSDIC, CMF, 28 July 45

This report has been compiled in answer to a questionnaire from SO(I) ROME, and should be read in conjunction with CSDIC/CMF/Y 37.

1. HOW, WHEN, WHERE AND BY WHOM WAS THE RESEARCH WORK DONE?

Research work was done by small groups formed ad hoc, which were given cover names applying both to the groups themselves and the system of encoding or enciphering on which they were working, e.g., STETTIN, BREMEN, HAMBURG, etc. After the HQ moved to EBERSWALDE, all these small groups were fused into one Referat called Fm (FRITZ MAX). This Referat carried on research work on any traffic which was considered worth trying to read, mostly traffic of small volume. The Referat was under the direction of Regierungsrat Dr. STEITZ and 3-4 men and a few female employees.

It was in this Referat, and in the ad hoc groups preceding its formation, that such traffic as the 4 or 5 figure code messages intercepted from units taking part in the sinking of the BISMARCK was dealt with and read. Source thought it was the STETTIN traffic. Apart from that little was done. Source heard of some messages called "DF messages" (PEILSPRUECHE) because it was assumed - according to hearsay - that they contained DF results signalled to all important W/T stations on land, in Allied territories. These messages were originated by such land bases W/T stations as ANNAPOLIS, WHITEHALL, BELCONNEN, TRINCOMALEE, SUMMIT BALBOA, REYKJAVYK, etc., and were characterised by their large distribution groups (VERTEILER KOEPFE), indicated by a bigram, which the Germans had broken, e.g. till end 44 HJ - British Admiralty address indicating (distribution) group. Traffic was in 4 or 5 figure groups and messages were about 15 groups long. In the end Fm Referat merely collected and filed these messages, the assumption that they contained DF results having never been proved to be correct or otherwise.

2. WAS ANY RESEARCH EVER CARRIED OUT ON CIPHER MACHINE TRAFFIC AND WITH WHAT RESULTS?

The "AMERIKA Abteilung" attempted to read cipher machine traffic, but never succeeded in doing so. Source stated that the Germans were never sure that the traffic in question was actually cipher machine traffic; it was assumed that it was. Also, no knowledge of Royal Navy cipher machine traffic was had by source or any other German CA he ever met.

3. WHERE AND BY WHOM WAS THE BOOK BUILDING DONE?

This was done by the code registration clerks (CODEDEUTER) who

entered everything on cards and kept the "book" as well. As source put it, they did the work from a statistical and an interpreter's point of view ("STATISTISCH UND DEUTUNGSMÄSSIG"). Any new code groups were submitted to the Head of General Referat "F" (Oberregierungsrat TRANOW) who decided if they were correct (confirmed) and then passed them on for circulation in a bulletin (for HQ use only) called the NACHTAUSGABE.

4. HOW AND IN WHAT FORM DID THE MATERIAL PROVIDED BY OKM OR AN MP Abt REACH THE TACTICAL GROUPS?

Source did not know how the Evaluation (AUSWERTUNG) passed on material to formations using it. He stated that by the time he arrived at the OKM, results of code-breaking were only of historical interest. He only visited the OC Evaluation's room once and saw a large map on the wall where all convoys were plotted. Before Mar. 43 results were supposed to have been of great tactical value. However, source could give no accurate details on this. He thought that 4 SKL III co-operated with BdU (BEFEHLSHABER der U-BOOTE) in 43 at BERLIN, Steinplatz, and that MP Abt FLANDERN was in constant and direct touch with FdS (FUEHRER der SCHNELLBOOTE) SCHEVENINGEN. Source stated that in 4 SKL III a daily conference ("LAGEBESPRECHUNG") was held at 0900 hours at which matters of intercept, cryptography and strategic interest, etc., were discussed and decisions concerning work were taken. Only 4 SKL III personnel attended (heads of depts., etc.).

5. DID TACTICAL GROUPS EVALUATE AND TAKE ACTION ON INFORMATION OBTAINED?

Until Mar. 43 the BdU relied very much on 4 SKL III for information on convoys sailing on a route: HALIFAX, BERMUDA, GREENLAND, IRISH CHANNEL and LIVERPOOL or CLYDE. Information of tactical value to U-boats was sent by W/T to the OC U-boat pack concerned. Source stated that all the U-boat personnel recognised the value of the "B-Dienst".

6. HOW WAS A WATCH ORGANISED FOR COPING WITH THE FLOW OF TRAFFIC FROM RAW MATERIAL TO FINISHED ARTICLE?

(a) W/T forms were collected from the Traffic Sorting or Distribution Group (VERTEILER-GRUPPE) every two hours. They had reached Distribution from the TP room.

(b) The i/c watch inspected W/T forms and sorted out at once the material which was in the code and decipher system the Referat worked on (i.e. certainties) and other traffic for sub-divisions of the Referat (say MUENCHEN BLAU, etc.) and doubtful traffic.

(c) Traffic was then passed to registration clerks of the watch to register the:-

Time Group (UHRZEIT GRUPPE)
5-figure group
4-figure (indicator) group
Bigram (rec. camouflage) and 5-figure group
(Note: Probably "bigram and 4-figure group")
and the first five groups in the message.

(d) Traffic was then re-sorted with a view to finding pairs (SERIEN). W/T forms were kept for a fortnight in a cupboard with 100 shelves marked 00 to 99. One of the methods of finding a pair was to look for a double in the shelf marked with the same decipher camouflage bigram on the message just received.

(e) If a pair (SERIE) was formed, it was given a number and entered on a separate table called the SERIEN LISTE on which were

marked the number of the SERIE, the rec. camouflage bigram and the 4-figure indicator group.

(f) If after treating the first 5 groups of the message, results were good, the complete message text was requested by TP. The original W/T forms usually arrived by bag two to seven days later, and were more often than not filed directly they were sorted out.

(g) The i/c watch taking over at 0800 hours (one hour before the conference) handed in to the General Referent "F" (TRANOW) the current messages file (VORLAGEMAPPE) for inspection of last 24 hours' results, checking of translation and evaluation. After that, the material went to the appropriate Referate, and the code registration clerks and i/c morning watch had to collect it from the latter (all messages on which work was done were in one copy only). Source said that before 43 results obtained during the night shift were sent direct to the Evaluation Sec. for immediate attention.

7. WHAT WAS THE LIAISON LIKE WITH THE CORRESPONDING ITALIAN ORGANIZATION?

There existed an exchange of information and results service (AUSTAUSCHDIENST) which functioned till 8 Sep 43. All known recipher groups (MUENCHEN BRAUN and BLAU) were given to the Italians, and the Italians gave their results to the Germans. (IO's Note: If TEMP is talking about the same code and recipher as BARBAGALLO (CSDIC/CMF/Y 34) the Germans did not give the Italians anything after May 43, probably knowing what to expect in summer of that year). The exchange of known recipher groups was known as ELENCO and HANNIBAL. Source could not remember which cover name applied to which direction of AUSTAUSCHDIENST link. One man in the traffic sorting office did the listing of all these known recipher groups going to the Italians. Source did not know how the information was transmitted to ROME. No Italian officers in uniform were ever seen at 4 SKL III by source, or any of his friends. Only an Italian Navy P.O. was seen in the OKM canteen for a time in early 43, but his connections there were unknown to source.

(W. S. Valentine),
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Comd, SCDIC, CMF

C.S.D.I.C.
C.M.F
5 Aug 45