

DATE 29 March 49

TO	FROM	TO	FROM
✓ Chief, ASA..... (10)	_____	_____	Tech Staff..... (96)
Executive O..... (11)	_____	_____	Ch, Security Div..... (80)
Co'r Joint Oper..... (12)	_____	_____	Tech Staff..... (81)
Deputy Chief, ASA... (20)	_____	_____	Ch, Materiel Br.... (82)
Ch, Comm Res Sec (14) ✓	_____	_____	Ch, Methods Br.... (83)
Ch, Hist Unit.... (13)	_____	_____	Ch, Protective Br... (84)
Ch, Pers Sec..... (21)	_____	_____	Ch, Maint Br..... (85)
Ch, Org & Tng Sec.. (22)	_____	_____	Ch, Res Lab Div.... (70)
Ch, Plans & Oper... (23)	_____	_____	Tech Staff..... (71)
Ch, Materiel Sec.... (24)	_____	_____	Ch, Ch. Ciph & Cif Br (72)
Ch, Fiscal Sec..... (25)	_____	_____	Ch, Int Equip Br... (73)
Adjutant, ASA..... (26)	_____	_____	Ch, Elec & Elec Br. (74)
Ch, Sec Cont Sec... (27)	_____	_____	Ch, Lab Serv Br.... (75)
Ch, Operations Div.. (90)	_____	_____	Ch, C'logic Br..... (76)
Ch, Lab Br..... (91)	_____	_____	Ch, Pers & Tng Br... (61)
Ch, Machine Br.... (92)	_____	_____	Ch, Supply Br..... (62)
Ch, Crypt Br..... (93)	_____	_____	Co, Arlington Hall... (40)
Ch, Int Cont Br.... (94)	_____	_____	_____
Ch, I & D Br..... (95)	_____	_____	_____

- () Approval & Return
- () As Requested
- () Concurrence or Comments
- () Information & Forwarding
- () Information & Return
- () Information & File
- () Recommendation
- () Signature if approved
- () Your action by
- () Info upon which to base reply

Had 1st meeting with C. Fox.

Recommends getting Ogara in on the Study. I concur. Is it OK with you?

OK sent J

TOP SECRET
G

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REF ID: A61199

DATE 17 ~~Mar~~ 49

TO	FROM	TO	FROM
✓ Chief, ASA..... (10)	_____	Tech Staff..... (96)	_____
Executive O..... (11)	_____	Ch, Security Div..... (80)	_____
Co'r Joint Oper..... (12)	_____	Tech Staff..... (81)	_____
Deputy Chief, ASA... (20)	_____	Ch, Materiel Br.... (82)	_____
Ch, Comm Res Sec. (14) ✓	_____	Ch, Methods Br.... (83)	_____
Ch, Hist Unit..... (13)	_____	Ch, Protective Br... (84)	_____
Ch, Pers Sec..... (21)	_____	Ch, Maint Br..... (85)	_____
Ch, Org & Tng Sec... (22)	_____	Ch, Res Lab Div.... (70)	_____
Ch, Plans & Oper... (23)	_____	Tech Staff..... (71)	_____
Ch, Materiel Sec.... (24)	_____	Ch, Ch. Ciph & Cif Br (72)	_____
Ch, Fiscal Sec..... (25)	_____	Ch, Int Equip Br... (73)	_____
Adjutant, ASA..... (26)	_____	Ch, Elec & Elec Br. (74)	_____
Ch, Sec Cont Sec... (27)	_____	Ch, Lab Serv Br.... (75)	_____
Ch, Operations Div.. (90)	_____	Ch, C'logic Br..... (76)	_____
Ch, Lab Br..... (91)	_____	Ch, Pers & Tng Br... (61)	_____
Ch, Machine Br.... (92)	_____	Ch, Supply Br..... (62)	_____
Ch, Crypt Br..... (93)	_____	Co, Arlington Hall... (40)	_____
Ch, Int Cont Br.... (94)	_____	_____	_____
Ch, I & D Br..... (95)	_____	_____	_____

- () Approval & Return
- () As Requested
- () Concurrence or Comments
- () Information & Forwarding
- () Information & Return
- () Information & File
- () Recommendation
- () Signature if approved
- () Your action by
- () Info upon which to base reply

1. Herein draft of paper suggested by you.
2. This is 2^d draft, embodying some minor changes made in the light of certain comments by Col. Hayes and Mr. Rowlett on my 1st draft.
3. 1st Draft and comments also herein.
4. Would like to discuss.

J

~~REF ID: A61199~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~ **CLINT**
HEADQUARTERS
ARMY SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25 D C

CSGAS-10

22 March 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRIEDMAN:

SUBJECT: Central Evaluation, Publication and Dissemination of SIGINT.

1. This draft, together with its supporting discussion was precisely the line of thought which I have on the subject. I have discussed this with my two legal advisors and submit for your consideration, in the rewriting, the following:

a. Paragraph 1. a. pg 1 - Why restrict only to Armed Forces? Since you are submitting the memorandum to the Members of USCIB, it would seem to me that CIA and State might well be included. Possibly you have a reason for omitting them that does not occur to me.

b. Paragraph 1.c. pg 1 - This is alright for the memorandum but since it only touches, and does not deal definitely and effectively with the individual agency intelligence problems, I think these might well be covered in your discussion. This paragraph mentions only publications and omits mention of the more elaborate integration problem.

c. Paragraph 3.a. of the Discussion - The discussion on the Diplomatic Summary does not go far enough. It attacks how the State does the job but does not go sufficiently into the theory behind it.

d. Paragraph 4.c. of the Discussion - The discussion on the peacetime justification can be made much stronger.

2. My general comment on the whole thing is that we should shoot for record in this paper, dealing in detail with the specific problems of the Services and the difficulty of separating lower and higher level intelligence. I also feel that we might well here take an indirect crack at the Stone Board report by pointing up those areas in which they avoided making responsible decisions.

CWC

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, Signal Corps
Chief, Army Security Agency

~~TOP SECRET~~ **CLINT**

2^d Draft

MEMORANDUM to Chairman, USCIB

Subject: Central Evaluation, Publication and Dissemination of SIGINT.

1. It is recommended:

a. That a single center be established under USCIB direction for the evaluation, publication, and dissemination of the fruits of signal intelligence activities of the Armed Forces ✓

b. That a single SIGINT Summary be published on a weekly basis, supplemented by more detailed monthly and quarterly publications with cumulative indexes. The first few pages of each Summary should contain highlights for the busy reader.

c. That such special ~~GLINT~~ publications as are elaborated by the respective cryptanalytic processing centers or by the respective intelligence agencies of the Armed Forces, of the Department of State, or of the Central Intelligence Agency be also published and disseminated by the central unit.

d. That the central unit for evaluation, publication, and dissemination be located at one of the existing U. S. cryptanalytic processing centers.

e. That the present policy of disseminating "spot

REF ID: A61199
~~TOP SECRET GLINT~~

items" of ~~GLINT~~ intelligence in the case of important or urgent items be continued, but with a more limited distribution.

2. The reasons for the foregoing recommendations are set forth in Incl. 1.

3. It is requested that the foregoing recommendations be placed on the Agenda for discussion at the next regular meeting of USCIB.

1 Incl.
Discussion

Gen. Irwin.

~~TOP SECRET GLINT~~

~~TOP SECRET GLINT~~DISCUSSION

1. a. There are now at least three publications which contain the final product of the signal intelligence activities of the U. S. Government and which are issued on a periodic basis. They are as follows:

- (1) The Diplomatic Summary, prepared and issued on a daily basis by the Department of State;
- (2) The Military Digest, prepared and issued on a weekly basis by the Intelligence Division, U. S. Army; and
- (3) The Soviet Intelligence Summary, prepared and issued on a weekly basis by the U. S. Navy.

b. In addition to the foregoing periodic publications containing GLINT material there are several others which are prepared and issued on a non-periodic basis, such as the following:

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| (1) Special Reports | } Prepared by
Special Research
Branch, Intelli-
gence Division, U.S. |
| (2) Order of Battle Studies | |
| (3) Communication Intelligence Briefs | |
| (4) Special Reports | } Prepared by U. S. Navy |
| (5) CSAW Handbooks | |
| (6) Order of Battle Studies | } Prepared by Army Security
Agency under authority of the
Director of Intelligence |
| (7) Special Studies | |

c. Finally, there are the periodic publications prepared and disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency.

~~TOP SECRET GLINT~~

They do not contain GLINT material but since the CIA receives such material, it may be possible that it is used as ^a collateral source of information.

d. It is to be noted in this connection that ~~GLINT~~ intelligence is and must be more carefully protected than other types of intelligence and that there is and must be a rather strict isolation of ~~GLINT~~ material from other intelligence produced within or by U. S. intelligence agencies. This implies that there are intelligence units even within those agencies which operate without benefit of any ~~GLINT~~ source material. Their reports can, therefore, hardly avoid reflecting the lack of such material and the usefulness of these reports is obviously impaired to the extent of the importance of the items which have to be omitted because they are unknown and unavailable to the writers.

2. With reference specifically to the publications listed under Par. 1a, it is only to be expected, and it is perhaps unavoidable, because they are produced separately by different agencies, that duplications of material or items of intelligence should appear from time to time. Such duplication, however, is not a particularly serious matter, and might even be considered desirable in some small degree. What is more serious is that the intelligence coverage and the broad picture that might be painted from ~~GLINT~~ sources

is not and cannot be painted by the present system of decentralized evaluation and dissemination.

3. a. Taking up first the Diplomatic Summary, this publication, being on a daily-production basis, can only represent at best a series of isolated items of intelligence. In fact, it is possible that the old adage to the effect that "one cannot see the forest for the trees" is applicable in this case. Little attempt is made in the present Diplomatic Summary to consolidate or integrate the isolated and seriatim items into a comprehensive picture of the policies, diplomatic maneuvers, intrigues, and aims of other countries, as they are reflected by ~~GLINT~~ intelligence, which is by far the most reliable and timely source by means of which an accurate and timely estimate of the international diplomatic situation can be made.

b. In regard to the failure to paint a comprehensive picture of the sort indicated, the situation which now exists is not much better than that which existed prior to Pearl Harbor and which was censured in no uncertain terms by the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Attack on Pearl Harbor. Upon the shoulders of those engaged in the SIGINT effort rests the tremendous responsibility of forewarning the proper authorities of the Government in all international crises. But if all the

bits of information obtained from various SIGINT sources are not properly pieced together and fused with the many items from collateral intelligence to give a timely and complete picture, the SIGINT effort as well as the other intelligence effort will have been wasted if another Pearl Harbor catches us unawares.

4. a. It is estimated that the Army has an investment of about \$30,000,000 in the Army Security Agency plant, and an annual budget (FY 1949) of approximately \$22,000,000. Of this probably 80% is devoted to SIGINT operations. The Navy's investment and budget are probably not much different. Roughly, then, the plant investment is \$48,000,000, and the annual budget, \$35,000,000.

b. Basically, there are only two justifications for the foregoing large investments and expenditures. The first is that signal intelligence activities do not have their counterpart in civil life and cannot, in view of their complexities, be improvised de novo on the outbreak of war. It is therefore essential to maintain, in peacetime, establishments that will function effectively just before or immediately upon outbreak of actual hostilities, a condition which is today a technical prerequisite to SIGINT success for the duration of the war. This means that large plants and large numbers of tech-

nicians have to be maintained in peacetime and kept at a high level of efficiency. On this score, while it is believed that a fairly adequate job is being done, if that accomplishment represented the only fruit of the large investments and annual expenditures, the cost thereof could certainly be questioned and might be thought to be excessive. The other basic justification for the large investments and annual expenditures is the peacetime production of an intelligence picture of such timeliness, accuracy, and completeness as to give forewarning of impending momentous changes in the international situation.

c. When viewed in the light of the latter basic reason for maintaining the large staff and plant devoted to peacetime signal intelligence operations, the three items mentioned in par. 1 above are not believed to represent a product commensurate with the high cost thereof. It is probable that TIME, the weekly newsmagazine, operates on a smaller investment and budget than is represented above. But, TIME'S very existence depends upon the perfection of its product. If we are to continue to merit the confidence and approval of the highest governmental authorities, the SIGINT product must be as nearly complete and as perfect as we can possibly make it. It is largely upon the quality of this product that the value of our

P. 5.

~~TOP SECRET GLINT~~

SIGINT operations in peacetime can be judged and defended by those who see only this part of the SIGINT effort from day to day.

5. a. A consolidation of the research facilities and personnel presently employed in the several separate agencies concerned with the evaluation and publication of the SIGINT product would bring about greatly increased benefits and a much improved product. Such a consolidated or centralized organization would be more thorough, more efficient, and more economical than is now the case. Currently there are four agencies concerned; when the USAF begins SIGINT operations in its assigned portion of the field there will be five.

b. It may be pointed out in this connection that on strictly technical grounds, as established by British and U. S. Navy experience, placing the cryptanalytic processing and the evaluation centers in close proximity to each other has three important advantages:

(1) Voluminous files of collateral information and special data are required for cryptanalytic processing and practically the same types of information and files are essential for the proper evaluation of the final GLINT product. If the same files were

~~TOP SECRET GLINT~~

utilized for both operations they would serve a dual purpose, eliminating the need for duplicate, triplicate, or quadruplicate facilities, space, and personnel, as is now the case. Thus, there would be a considerable monetary saving.

(2) Cryptanalytic processing often requires the elaboration, collection, or development of special information for the immediate use of the cryptanalysts; similar information is later required for proper evaluation of the final product, and must often be elaborated, collected, or developed by the evaluators. If the material elaborated for or by the cryptanalysts were also directly available to and used by the evaluators, time would be saved in publishing the final GLINT product, since much of the work that the evaluators must now do for themselves by way of collecting collateral information would have already been done in connection with cryptanalytic processing. Hence there would be an improvement in efficiency of the overall SIGINT operation, since the time required to produce the final results is a vital element in their value.

(3) The closer the cryptanalytic, collateral information, and evaluation personnel are to one another, the more effective are SIGINT operations as

a whole, since the quick and unimpeded interchange of new ideas, new developments, and new directions of interest among all the personnel involved in these operations would improve their respective effectiveness.

having a lab in disconnection with important personnel & partially processed those by low staff

c. The technical considerations outlined in the preceding subparagraph b must, however, play a secondary role in view of the present situation within the U. S. signal intelligence field, in which the complex problem of establishing a unified cryptanalytic processing organization is still under discussion and remains unsolved. Therefore, the best that could be done under existing circumstances would be to place the single evaluation, publication, and dissemination center in close proximity to one of the cryptanalytic processing centers, to be selected on the basis of optimum facilities for the operation of the single evaluation, publication, and dissemination center.

6. a. A single, central organization for the control and dissemination of the final ~~GLINT~~ product would also be advantageous in at least three respects:

- (1) Such an organization would bring about economies in facilities, space, and personnel.
- (2) The substitution of a single complete publication to replace the three or more separate and incomplete

ones which are now disseminated to the various higher level officials of the Government would save the time of these very busy men, would demonstrate unification of operations within and among the responsible agencies, and would give a better overall picture of the international situation.

(3) It would be more efficient in proper control for the security of all operations.

b. The last-mentioned advantage deserves further comment. One of the important byproducts of a consolidation of SIGINT evaluation, publication, and dissemination agencies would be that the present wide dissemination of the individual items of intelligence in mimeographed, dittoed, or printed form, a condition fraught with great hazard to the security of the operations, would no longer be necessary, which would thus improve the security of all SIGINT operations, especially the cryptanalytic. This would not mean that individual messages or items of SIGINT would no longer be available to those who have a need therefor; it would simply mean that these items would be made available only on proper request or, if the central dissemination unit deemed an item to be of such character as to warrant immediate forwarding to the officials concerned, the item would be forwarded with expedition without such a request. As an example of the breadth of the present dissemination of the individual processed messages, Inclosure 1 shows the distribution given by the Army Security Agency to its product.

Ind 1

TOP SECRET GLINT

TOP SECRET GLINT

ID-2	9	9	9	4	8	2	7	5	10	10	10	10	10	10	1	10	9	19	9	9	4	4	4	5
NAVY	8	8	8	7	8	d	d	2	d	d	d	d	d	d	10	7	X	15	d	15	15	15	d	
NWO	3	3	3	X	3	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
USAF	2	2	2	X	2	X	2	X	5	5	5	5	5	5	X	5	5	X	5	5	5	5	5	5
SPS	8	8	8	X	3	X	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	X	1	1	X	1	1	1	1	1	1
CIA	5	5	5	X	5	X	5	2	5	5	5	5	5	5	X	5	5	X	5	5	2	2	2	5
	1	1	1	X	1	1	1	1	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	8	4	8	3	5	5	5	3	
CBO	a	a	a	X	a	2	8	X	8	8	8	8	8	8	5	8	X	X	X					
	30	30	30	11	36	18	9	26	26	26	26	26	26	10	36	35	23	43	23	32	32	32	20	
INFO	2	2	2	8	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	7	2	2	2	7	
PERM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
LIAISON	1	1	1	X	X	X	1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
TOPI	1	1	1	X	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	X	1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
HOLMES	1	1	X	X	1	X	1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
OGARA	X	X	1	1	X	X	1	X	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	X	
SECT	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	2	12	12	12	12	6	12	22	12	44	14	20	9	30	30	30	6
CLARKE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
EXTRA						4	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	5	1						

External ASA


← external

Internal

TOTAL 4444 43 17 36 17 29 18 43 43 43 43 37 43 36 52 86 42 71 42 66 66 66 34

- a [redacted]
- b 2 STEINMEYER FOR WARD
- c 1 COPY EACH (300) PLUS SPENCILS
- d EXTRA SPENCIL - NO COPIES

- EXTRAS
- CI - MITCHELL, PATTON, BRSHAW, HOWLETT
 - INT - MITCHELL 2, SOURCE 1
 - CIB - RICHARDSON 2, PATTON 1
 - [redacted] SOURCE 1
 - BRANSON, HOWLETT, MITCHELL, OSWALL
 - " " " " SOURCE 1
 - " " " " SOURCE 1



*This is
modified -
Incl. 1*



~~TOP SECRET GLINT~~Comments on
1st Draft

15 March 1949

MEMORANDUM TO CHAIRMAN, USCIB

SUBJECT: Central Evaluation, Publication and Dissemination
of SIGINT

1. CSGAS-90 concurs in that portion of the subject paper which proposes closer integration of processing, evaluation, and publication for SIGINT material.
2. A single evaluation and publication unit, to be effective, presupposes a single processing unit. Considerable difficulty in performing proper centralized evaluation and publication of SIGINT by a central unit is anticipated if separate processing units exist. A study on the organization of SIGINT processing has been made by a special board and a decision on the recommendations of this board has not yet been issued.
3. The following points must be taken into consideration in determining the course of action to be taken in centralizing evaluation and publication of SIGINT:
 - a. The concept of integration of the processing, evaluation, and publication of SIGINT has not been proved in practice within the framework of American SIGINT organizations.
 - b. At this time, the course to be followed in effecting centralized evaluation and publication of SIGINT must be workable under either a unified or coordinated concept of processing. This results from the fact that a decision, as mentioned above, has not been issued as to whether SIGINT processing will be unified or coordinated.
 - c. The transition from the present procedures to centralized evaluation and publication will require considerable time and adjustment among the consumer and processing agencies.
4. The major advantages of integration of processing with evaluation and publication of SIGINT are found in the following:
(a) Security; (b) Timeliness; (c) Economy; (d) Effectiveness. These advantages are well covered in the basic paper.

~~TOP SECRET GLINT~~

5. The following course of action is recommended:

a. That within the framework of the Army an integration of processing with evaluation and publication of SIGINT be effected.

b. That the functions of processing, evaluation and publication for the Department of Army be conducted at Army Security Agency.

c. That the function of dissemination be reviewed, taking into consideration recommendations "a" and "b" above.


6. The foregoing recommendations, if carried out, will:

a. Prove the validity of the concept of integration of processing with evaluation and publication of SIGINT.

b. Be acceptable under either a unified or coordinated concept of processing.

c. Be effected with a minimum of time and administrative adjustment.

d. Serve as a model to be followed if it is desired at some future date to embrace all major processing, evaluation and publication in a centralized activity.



FRANK B. ROWLETT
Chief, Operations Division

Co. c. in. in
1st Draft

MAR 7 1949

1. The proposal described here seems to me to be inadvisable for the following reasons:

a. I do not believe in the complete isolation of GLINT in overall intelligence operations. This proposal would set up a single GLINT intelligence unit, while presumably continuing within each department the normal activities which are now carried on, but without benefit of any GLINT source material.

b. A single evaluating and disseminating unit would be easy prey for the CIA. I would predict that it would be taken over by CIA within a few months after it started to function, if not initially.

c. Military, Air, Naval, political, economic and other intelligence requirements each have different perspectives even though in some cases the difference is slight. No advantage can be seen in combining under one roof intelligence analysis for each of the above purposes. In fact, some very serious disadvantages might develop, depending of course upon the energy, imagination, specialized experience, and ability of the personnel comprising the joint evaluation unit.

2. Specific Comments.

Par 1 b of memo - This appears to be an ill-disguised attempt to locate the unit at Arlington Hall and even if the idea were good, it would be opposed by the other USCIB members.

Par 6 a (2) of incl. - The President does not receive the Military and Naval digests.

General - In the memorandum, there is no specific reference to the dissemination of urgent spot items, the most effective use made of GLINT. There is a reference to this matter in the last paragraph of the inclosure but there it is implied that dissemination of spot items would be the exception rather than the rule. Any procedure which fails to encourage the frequent dissemination of spot items does not take advantage of the principal value of GLINT intelligence.

3. The arguments which you advance in the inclosure, while I agree with them, tend to support the closer integration of processing and evaluation rather than the integration of evaluation and dissemination.

KJL

7 Mar 49