

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

DGC/1687

1st May, 1951

Coordinator, U.S. C.I.A.

I have been requested by the Joint Intelligence Committee to write to you in connection with the attached memorandum which is shortly to be tabled by the [redacted]

[redacted] members of the Security Coordinating Committee of the Standing Group of the North Atlantic Council.

2. This attached memorandum recommends that certain steps should be taken to prevent the leakage of N.A.T.O. information through insecure telegraphic arrangements by N.A.T.O. powers. The underlying reasons for producing this memorandum include knowledge from Comint that at least some of the Deputies on the North Atlantic Council have not been making use of Typeex Mark II when transmitting highly secret matters concerning the work of the council.

3. The [redacted] of the Security Coordinating Committee are both indoctrinated and are being informed of these underlying reasons. The J.I.C. considered that, if possible, the United States member of the Security Coordinating Committee should have these underlying reasons for the production of this memorandum fully explained to him, in order that the memorandum should be fully understood.

4. They therefore suggested that I should explain this situation to you and ask that, if possible, you should arrange for the indoctrination of the United States member of the Security Coordinating Committee (if he is not already indoctrinated) and for him to be briefed accordingly.

5. I should be grateful for your assistance in this matter.

[redacted]

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Enclosure

DRAFT

Memorandum by the [ ] Representative to the Security Co-ordinating Committee of the Standing Group, on the leakage of NATO Information through insecure telegraphic arrangements.

PROBLEM

The decision to be taken is whether the Standing Group should take further steps to prevent the leakage of NATO Information through the interception of telegraphic material.

- (a) By ensuring that there is no delay in equipping all appropriate N.A.T. agencies with unbreakable cypher machinery (Typex Mark II), and
- (b) by issuing further guidance on the type of material which should be sent by the approved cypher system.

DISCUSSION

2. Paragraph 17 of Appendix B to SG. 7/34 reads:-

"The special cryptographic arrangements which have been provided will enable national delegates or their national diplomatic representatives at the seat of all NATO bodies to communicate with their Governments and will allow inter-communication between all NATO secretariats. Similar arrangements will be made to allow Supreme Commanders to communicate with Naval, Military and Air Commanders and Service Ministries. The only cryptographic system to be used for the present time at these levels for COSMIC Communications of all security classifications and NATO communications classified Top Secret or Secret is Typex Mark II with simplex settings".

3. As far as we are aware, the provisions of the paragraph quoted above have been or are being implemented in the military agencies of NATO. If SG.7/34 is approved by the Standing Group, and is to be fully observed, however, Typex Mark II Machines should be used by the Deputies to conduct their telegraphic correspondence with their Foreign Ministers and also by the Deputies' Secretariat and the Secretariats of other NATO bodies in London and Paris. At present, we believe that although there may have been a full issue of Typex Mark II machines they may not have been brought into use. The latest information we have about the allocation of machines is in EGM-200-50 of 20th July, 1951.

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4. The Deputies' discussions range over every field of NATO activity except the purely military. Even in the military field the Standing Group make available to them Top Secret information. Individual Deputies frequently require instructions from their Governments at short notice and it is inevitable that they should seek these instructions by telegraph. If cypher systems other than the approved secure system are used, there are grave possibilities that Soviet intelligence will be able to intercept many telegrams and from these piece together a fairly accurate day-to-day picture of N.A.T. planning.

5. From time to time the Deputies also discuss political matters of a highly secret nature which if disclosed to the [redacted] could have grave political and strategic consequences (one such recent example was the discussion of NATO policy towards [redacted]).

6. The present definition of Cosmic material (DCGN 185-50 of 1st November, 1950) covers only "papers tabled at meetings of any body or committee set up under NATO". If the instruction that only Cosmic material of all classifications and NATO top secret and secret material is to be sent by the approved cryptographic system is strictly observed, it would seem that there may well still be a risk of leakages through insecure cypher systems even when Typex machines have been installed in the appropriate N.A.T. agencies. Under the definition of Cosmic purely national papers which might contain highly secret material related to N.A.T. matters need not be marked "Cosmic". In the absence of this marking nations are quite justified in encyphering in their own, perhaps insecure, cypher systems telegrams based on these papers which might contain highly secret material (unless they are expected to mark such telegrams "NATO" but this is not clear). It is even possible for a text which is encyphered in this way on one day to require special protection on the following day owing to its having been tabled in a N.A.T. committee and thereby receiving the Cosmic marking, and consequently qualifying for transmission by Typex Mark II.

7. Thus there is a twofold danger to NATO security (owing to the presence of the Deputies in London the danger is particularly serious there).

- (a) In some cases NATO telegraphic procedure can not be enforced because the prescribed apparatus may not be available, or have been brought into use.
- (b) In other cases NATO information whose disclosure might be dangerous is not subject to NATO telegraphic procedure.

8. It is submitted that the following action is necessary:-

- (a) To ensure that when Typex Mark II machines have been issued, they are brought into use with the least possible delay.
- (b) Since the Council of Deputies was set up after the allocation of Typex Mark II machines, (SP4-200-50 of 20th July, 1950), to draw the Council of Deputies' attention to the regulations regarding cryptographic channels in order to determine whether the allocation is sufficient to meet their requirements.

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- (e) To issue further guidance to NATO agencies, making it clear that telegraphic traffic involving not only "Cosmic" interests but also other communications related to North Atlantic Treaty interests must be sent by the approved cypher system.

RECOMMENDATION

9. That action should be taken along the lines of paragraph 8 above.<sup>11</sup>

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