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USCIB: 9.3/26

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18 February 1955

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC:

Subject: USCIB Master Requirements List.

Reference: USCIB 9.3/24 of 7 January 1955 (item 1 of the agenda of the 23rd (Special) Meeting of USCIBEC).

1. The Ad Hoc Committee established by the decision set forth in the reference has completed its report which is submitted herewith as an enclosure (consisting of a cover memorandum, an inclosure and three tabs marked A, B and C. However, Tab C was not quite ready for consideration at this writing. It will be distributed separately as soon as possible.)

2. The enclosed report is being placed on the agenda for consideration at the next regular meeting of USCIBEC.


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure
a/s.

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USCIB: 9.3/26

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Serial:

15 FEB 1955



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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, USCIBEC

SUBJECT: Draft Report, Master Requirements List

Reference: USCIB 9.3/19 of 13 Dec 54

Appended as an inclosure is a report drafted by the ad hoc committee appointed at the 7 January meeting. The committee recommends that this report be approved by USCIBEC and forwarded to USCIB as an answer to the referenced paper.

J. S. HOLTWICK, Jr.
Captain, US Navy
Chairman

STEPHEN J. DONCHEZ
Member

F. J. HARROLD
Lt. Col. USAF
Member

Incl:
a/s

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, USCIB

SUBJECT: Requirements of U. S. Intelligence Agencies for Information from COMINT Sources

1. The Executive Committee has considered the subject matter in its various facets, as directed in the 10 December meeting of the Board, and recommends that the problem be resolved as outlined in the succeeding paragraphs of this document, and the tabs thereto.

2. Underlying the entire problem is the basic question of how to use most efficiently and effectively a "common-user" collection facility with a broad, but still not unlimited, potential for obtaining information of relatively high intelligence value.

3. The Executive Committee feels that this problem can best be solved by establishing a means whereby USCIB provides the Director, NSA, with authoritative guidance in carrying out his function as a collector of intelligence information from COMINT sources. It feels that this guidance should be in two forms: basic guidance in the form of a USCIB approved list of the information required by the national intelligence community for which COMINT has been assigned the responsibility of producing (hereinafter referred to as the COMINT REQUIREMENTS LIST); and supplemental guidance whereby interpretation or amplification of the basic guidance, and periodic shifts of emphasis or interest therein, can be provided in a manner which will insure accurate communication of consumer desires to the producers of COMINT.

4. The COMINT Requirements List must meet certain criteria. These are outlined in TAB A, as are the successive steps which this committee feels are the logical ones in order that a list meeting these criteria can be developed.

5. It is recommended that the Board approve the recommendations listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 of TAB A, and request or direct, as appropriate, the organizations designated therein to implement them.

6. After USCIB has approved and delivered to the Director, NSA, its guidance in the form of the before-mentioned list, it is necessary that an implementing plan be developed. The Executive Committee feels that preparation of this plan is properly the responsibility of the Director, NSA. We therefore recommend that after preparation of the COMINT Requirements List, USCIB forward it to the Director, NSA, together with a request that he (1) Prepare an Implementing Plan (2) Forward it to the USCIB for review and approval (3) Advise the USCIB of what provisions he has made to carry out paragraph 2 h. of NSCID No. 9.

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7. It is apparent that any increase of emphasis on any requirement or imposition of any new requirement, will normally require a corresponding decrease in the effort committed against some other requirement since it would be obviously impractical, inefficient, and wasteful for the Director, NSA to hold in reserve any of his COMINT resources for such contingencies. This Committee has therefore provided, in TAB A, for such changes in USCIB's basic guidance. In TAB B, the Committee proposes a mechanism for providing the Supplemental Guidance mentioned in paragraph 3 above, and recommends that the USCIB approve and implement this plan.

8. As a final step in the cycle of relations between consumer and producer, NSA should prepare, after a suitable period has elapsed since approval of its Implementing Plan, a clear and understandable progress report to USCIB concerning conformity with, and fulfillment of, the guidance received; the adequacy, in form and substance, of his basic guidance; an appraisal of the practical working of the procedures established for supplemental guidance; the basic allocation of COMINT resources; and an estimate of the additional resources required to improve the amount and quality of information produced. After study of this report, USCIB should advise the National Executive Agent what resources it considers should be made available for COMINT production in the coming year.

9. Subsequently, the USCIB should revise, as necessary, its basic guidance, thus initiating the recurrence of the cycle.

10. The Committee recommends that the USCIB approve the concept advanced in paragraphs 8 and 9 above, and so advise the Director, NSA.

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TAB A

1. The Executive Committee is of the opinion that the COMINT Requirements List should meet the five criteria listed below in order to be satisfactory as basic guidance from the Board to the Director, NSA:

a. It should be based on, and be in consonance with, the most recent expression of National Intelligence Objectives.

b. It should not include requirements for information which are beyond, or inappropriate to, COMINT's potential capability to produce.

c. It should not include requirements for information for which Intelligence needs can be satisfied by other sources.

d. It should include requirements for information which could be obtained from COMINT which is needed to complement, supplement, or corroborate that from other sources.

e. It should indicate the relative importance attached to the COMINT-produced information pertinent to each requirement, by division of the List into categories of COMINT priority.

f. It must be quickly and flexibly responsive to changes in National Intelligence Requirements.

2. To produce a COMINT Requirements List which would meet the criteria listed, several operations must be performed. Starting with an authoritative list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives, these successive steps are involved:

a. Producing a list of National Intelligence Requirements.

b. Integrating into this all Departmental Intelligence requirements.

c. Eliminating from this list those requirements which can be fulfilled to the satisfaction of the Intelligence Agencies by other than COMINT sources of information.

d. Evaluating the potential of COMINT as a source of information in satisfying each remaining item, and eliminating those which are beyond the capability of or inappropriate for COMINT to satisfy or which do not serve to complement, supplement, or corroborate other sources of information.

e. Dividing the resultant list into categories of relative importance in order to indicate the priority which the Director, NSA should accord to each.

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3. The Executive Committee has considered the several ways in which the above-listed steps could be accomplished, and makes the recommendations indicated after the discussion in the following subparagraphs.

a. To produce a list of National Intelligence Requirements from the current list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives (DCID 4/4 of 14 Dec 54) requires that some provision be made for requirements in support of non-priority National Intelligence Objectives, which are defined implicitly in DCID 4/4 as those which do not "warrant priority in relation to normal coverage." If this can be done without expending the time-consuming effort involved in spelling out a list of the non-priority objectives themselves, it would appear profitable to adopt such a course.

Recommendation: USCIB stipulate, in the carrying out of the succeeding steps in this process, that any requirement for National or Departmental Intelligence which does not clearly and directly relate to one of the Priority National Intelligence Objectives be considered to relate to a non-priority objective.

b. The Committee feels that ideally an authoritative translation of DCID 4/4 into Priority National Intelligence Requirements should be made by a suitable body at the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence in collaboration with the IAC agencies. However, this has not yet been done, and, since there are other means of accomplishing the desired end result, the Committee questions the need for delaying implementation of this plan until an authoritative list is available. The CIA member of USCIBEC has made available a document in which such a translation has been made.

Recommendation: USCIB accept the list prepared by the CIA member (TAB C) as a base from which a COMINT Requirements List will be derived, and seek IAC approval of this action.

c. As the next steps in the process, it is necessary that National Intelligence Requirements in support of non-priority National Intelligence Objectives be added to the list adopted in a result of the preceding recommendation, and that any requirements for information needed for the production of Departmental Intelligence (NSCID #3 paragraph d 1) be integrated with them.

Recommendation: USCIB request each IAC agency, through its USCIB member, to submit a list of its requirements which fall within these categories; and

Recommendation: USCIB direct the USCIB INT COM to combine these lists into one list to be added to the Priority National Intelligence Requirements list in order to obtain an overall all-source Intelligence Requirements List.

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d. In order to tailor this list to fit the potential capabilities of COMINT as a source, a body competent to assess the potentialities of all sources of information is needed. The individuals comprising this body must have in aggregate not only a thorough knowledge of the peculiarities of any particular source of information, but also a thorough knowledge of the degree to which each source may be expected to fulfill a given requirement. The Committee does not feel that it is necessary that this body be empowered to assign collection tasks to other sources than COMINT, or even to recommend which specific Non-COMINT source(s) be utilized in fulfillment of any requirement. Their task is primarily to compare COMINT versus all Non-COMINT, and determine those requirements for which COMINT is properly the primary, a complementary, a supplementary, or an inappropriate, source.

Recommendation: USCIB designate a committee of individuals having the specified competence, to review the all-source Intelligence Requirements List and (1) eliminate therefrom all requirements which COMINT has not a potential capability to satisfy or for which COMINT is not an appropriate information source; (2) eliminate therefrom all requirements which potentially are wholly within the capability of a Non-COMINT source to satisfy; (3) indicate those requirements for which COMINT is not the primary information source, but rather is used to complement, supplement, or corroborate information from other sources; and for each the degree to which COMINT information is needed for this purpose.

e. The end product of the operation discussed in the preceding subparagraphs will be a list of Intelligence Requirements properly assignable to COMINT as a source of information. They will be grouped into four categories of intelligence importance, in accordance with the categories of priority of the objectives to which they relate. Those for which COMINT is not the primary source of information will be identified, and for each of these the degree to which fulfillment is dependent upon COMINT-produced information will be indicated. In order to meet the specified criteria, those requirements for which COMINT is not the primary information source should be evaluated and compared with the others, in order that each can be weighed in terms of the relative amount of COMINT effort which is warranted on it, and that it can be then assigned if necessary a new category. At this point it may be desirable, or even necessary, to establish sub-categories of COMINT importance within one or more of the four categories of intelligence importance.

Recommendation: USCIB designate the State, CIA, FBI, Army, Navy, and Air Force members of USCIBEC as a Standing Group to carry out this operation.

f. The final list should be authoritatively reviewed and approved before delivery to the Director, NSA, as basic guidance.

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Recommendation: USCIB direct that USCIBEC review, and deliver to the Board for approval, the completed COMINT Requirements List.

4. Provision must be made for changes in the COMINT Requirements List which are necessitated by changes in the fundamentals from which this basic guidance is derived, and which will probably not occur at the same time as the recommended periodic revision. Such changes will be of the following types:

a. Changes in the IAC list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives, either in substance, such as addition of a new objective or deletion of an objective, or both; or in priority.

b. Similar changes in National Intelligence Requirements.

c. "Crash" requirements - usually of an interim or temporary nature, which do not result from or in changes in Priority National Intelligence Objectives or in National Intelligence Requirements.

Recommendation: USCIB approve all changes in the COMINT Requirements List necessitated by revision of the Priority National Intelligence Objectives or of National Intelligence Requirements, of the nature described in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above.

Recommendation: Each USCIB member (or his alternate) be required to approve any "crash" requirement, of the nature described in sub-paragraph (c) above, which his agency imposes upon NSA, and concurrently submit this requirement to other USCIB members for approval. In stating such a requirement its priority in relation to the COMINT Requirements List must be indicated, and, if possible, its probable duration.

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TAB B

1. The Committee recognizes that basic guidance, in the form of a COMINT Requirement List, whether it be that described in TAB A or any other which it is feasible to produce, will necessarily state requirements more broadly and in more general terms than are usable in daily conduct of operations. The basic guidance must, and will, be of such a nature as will permit using it as a base upon which to prepare an Implementing Plan upon which Implementing Programs can be based. Some means must, however, be provided to supplement it.
2. The Executive Committee feels that the nature and scope of such supplemental guidance must be determined in light of the following factors:
 - a. Supplemental guidance must be consistent with the basic guidance provided by the COMINT Requirements List.
 - b. Supplemental guidance, in the main, will be in the form of supplemental or amplifying requirements which are originated by the USCIB intelligence agencies individually or collectively, or which are prepared at the request of the National Security Agency.
 - c. The mechanism designed to provide supplemental guidance must be responsive to the daily needs of the USCIB intelligence agency(s) and to the requests of the National Security Agency for advice, interpretation, and clarification.
 - d. Coordination of supplemental requirements among the USCIB intelligence agencies is essential in those cases where two or more agencies have a common interest in the information requested, and provision must be made to facilitate such coordination.
 - e. USCIB intelligence agencies should establish a joint intelligence agency facility (hereinafter called The Panel) empowered to act authoritatively on matters of supplemental guidance.
 - f. The National Security Agency should establish a centralized facility (hereinafter referred to as "The NSA Group"), empowered to determine authoritatively NSA's action in response to the supplemental guidance furnished by, or requested from, the USCIB intelligence agencies.
 - g. Any extensive amplification of a Requirement(s) which necessitates reallocation of intercept or processing facilities must be approved by all USCIB intelligence agencies before NSA initiates implementing action.

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3. In light of the factors outlined above, it is the opinion of the Executive Committee that supplemental guidance can be provided most effectively by:

a. Establishing a panel composed of USCIB intelligence agency representatives, empowered to deal authoritatively with NSA on matters of supplemental guidance.

- (1) Requiring that each supplemental requirement be prepared in writing and directly related to a requirement(s) on the COMINT Requirements List.
- (2) Requiring that the panel approve each supplemental requirement which, though in conformity with the COMINT Requirements List, is an extensive amplification of a requirement(s) on the COMINT Requirements List, and authorizing the NSA Group routinely to bring such requirements to the attention of the panel for action.

b. Establishing a central facility composed of NSA representatives knowledgeable in terms of established consumer requirements and NSA capabilities, which can deal authoritatively with the panel on matters of supplemental guidance.

- (1) Establishing a central file at NSA of all supplemental requirements originated by the consumer agency(s) and accepted by the NSA Group.

c. Requiring that the panel meet with the NSA Group as frequently as necessary, and at least once each month, to solve, and to exchange information on, mutual problems, and to review the supplemental requirement file monthly to ensure that both consumer agencies and NSA agree on matters of supplemental guidance as reflected by the current file of supplemental requirements.

- (1) Empowering the NSA Group to remand to the panel any supplemental requirement which, in the opinion of NSA, requires coordination, or additional coordination, among the consumer agencies.

d. Ensuring that USCIB make decisions on all matters of supplemental guidance which are irreconcilable between the panel and the NSA Group.