

~~TOP SECRET EIDER~~

EO 3.3(h) (2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

SUMMARY OF RECENT NSA ACTIONS AND
CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING COMINT
RELATIONS WITH [REDACTED]

1. Reference is made to USCIB 29.19/17.

2. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of the LSIB correspondence which is quoted in the reference, detailed proposals concerning the elementary aspects of [REDACTED] have been received from GCHQ. A copy of those proposals is attached as Tab A. On 16 February 1955, GCHQ was informed by the Director, NSA (via SUSLO (L)) that the proposals appeared to be satisfactory. On 1 March 1955, in the same manner, GCHQ was informed that:

a. Although the Directors, GCHQ and NSA, are agreed on an interpretation of the elementary aspects of [REDACTED] the U.S. has not yet decided on how much, if any, of this elementary training will be given by the U.S.

b. No reply therefore has been made yet to the [REDACTED] request for assistance (as described in WL 631, which was circulated as USCIB: 29.19/3).

c. No U.S. approach to [REDACTED] has been made yet on the proposed site survey, base rights, or any other matters pertaining to COMINT.

d. In possible dealings with [REDACTED] the Director, NSA, maintains the U.S. initially should commit itself only to the extent of paragraph 4 of UKUSA Appendix P until the capabilities of the [REDACTED] can be more thoroughly assessed or until the technical advantages of having U.S. sites there can be estimated.

e. The Director, NSA, hopes the site survey can be arranged and completed soon on the understanding that any possible commitments will be considered after the survey.

f. The Director, NSA, expects an adequate assessment of [REDACTED] capabilities might be made on the basis of [REDACTED] which GCHQ will furnish to NSA plus GCHQ observations on this subject.

g. Under the circumstances described above, the Director, NSA, now cannot draft proposals concerning a common UKUSA standard of guidance and [REDACTED]

h. It is noted that until such proposals are made by the Director, NSA, the UK will not proceed beyond the agreed scope of training. If the

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U.K. wishes to proceed beyond that scope without delay, it is suggested that a U.K. standard of guidance and [redacted] be prepared for U.S. comment.

3. The views of the Director, NSA, regarding the future courses of U.S. actions on the subject of COMINT relations with [redacted] are summarized below:

a. Negotiations for the site survey should be undertaken as currently planned. During these negotiations, the U.S. probably will not be asked to make any kind of payment in order to conduct the survey. If payment for that privilege is asked, the U.S. should not offer anything beyond cash or releasable equipment. If, at this stage, the [redacted] should renew their request for COMINT assistance, the U.S. should indicate that this possibility will be discussed on the completion of the site survey.

b. The U.S. should not provide any [redacted] for any purposes other than (1) to obtain COMINT base rights or (2) to obtain from the [redacted] which cannot be procured from any other source.

c. The development of U.K. and [redacted] facilities in [redacted] should be kept under review as resources which might provide an acceptable substitute for U.S. bases. When the extent of profitable UKUSA intercept operations in [redacted] is estimated, it may be possible to depend largely or entirely on U.K. [redacted] facilities to meet U.S. requirements. While U.S. sites may be desired to supplement U.K. [redacted] facilities, the U.S. sites might not be essential and U.S. [redacted] collaboration therefore might not be justified. If such U.S. sites are procurable only at the price of COMINT collaboration, the U.S. should not agree to release information or materials in excess of that authorized for [redacted] until it has been ascertained whether acceptable alternate sites can be obtained in other countries near [redacted].

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