

So far This is a
one-paper series.

23 Feb. '54 JGM

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USCIB: 33./1 Item 3 of the Agenda for the Sixth Meeting of USCIBEC, held on 20 August 1953.

Subject: Allied (NATO) Communications Security.
 (USCIB 14/313)

The CHAIRMAN stated that this item also had been referred to the Committee by the Board for prompt action, and explained that the paper before the Committee contained the recommendations of the Department of State as the "Cognizant U.S. Authority". It appeared, he said, that the immediate requirement was for the Committee to appoint a working group to stand as an ad hoc committee of USCIB to:

- (1) Coordinate US and UK proposals for the initial approach to the French, subsequent technical discussions, preparation of a memorandum to be issued by the NATO Standing Group and formulation of minimum security standards;
- (2) Coordinate between the US and UK conclusions as to the status of the COMSEC of NATO countries as this program develops; and,
- (3) Coordinate US and UK recommendations for further steps, as envisaged in paragraph 23 of the Conference Report, should this program not accomplish the desired response from NATO countries or improvement in their COMSEC.

He noted the State Department recommendation that the committee consist of representatives from State, OSD, NSA, CIA and FBI, and invited comments.

MR. KEAY said that it was his understanding that a further group would be appointed, permitting the working group representing the Board to serve as the U.S. element of the Combined Working Group, and providing another ad hoc group to do the technical work involved in the preparation of minimum standards.

After some discussion it was agreed that the purpose of USCIB would be served if USCIBEC appointed an ad hoc committee to take cognizance of this matter. Such a committee would then serve both to keep USCIB advised, and to serve as the U.S. element of the Combined Working Group to insure adherence to USCIB policy. Its members could call upon the expert assistance available in their respective departments and agencies as necessary.

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LT. COLONEL LONG noted that paragraph 2d of the enclosure with USCIB 14/313 referred to the "Tripartite Security Working Group" while paragraph 3 referred to the "Tripartite Security Survey Group". He asked if there was a distinction between the two.

MR. KEAY said that the Groups were one and the same and that the proper designation was "Tripartite Security Working Group".

CAPTAIN AGNEW read the following statement for the record:

"Program to Improve French Communications Security"

"1. NSA has one substantive and two procedural recommendations to make on this item. These items have been generally discussed with the State representative, and, I believe, have his preliminary approval.

"2. On the substantive side, it is strongly recommended that the participation of the Tripartite Security Working Group be limited to the initial selection and bringing together of the COMSEC authorities. In this way, the advantage of making sure the French personnel are trustworthy may be retained, but the disadvantages of having physical security personnel monitoring COMSEC activities will be eliminated. It is highly desirable that the actual COMSEC discussions and actions be undertaken without the interference which would be inevitable under the Tripartite Security Working Group sponsorship.

"3. Procedure-wise, it was recommended at the Conference that the UK and the US agree on a set of minimum security standards and procedures for NATO. These minimum standards would be reflected in a list of dangerous security practices promulgated by SECAN, and also would serve to indicate appropriate action to be taken to improve NATO security. This list would be the invitation to the NATO countries to apply to SECAN for assistance.

"4. Thus, the French would not be involved in drawing up minimum standards as indicated in paragraph 2b. The initial approach to the French should:

a. Obtain French agreement to use of the Standing Group Mechanism to improve NATO COMSEC.

b. Obtain French agreement to have the Tripartite Security Working Group bring together appropriate national authorities to enter into COMSEC discussions on French security.

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"5. NSA suggests USCIBEC approve the establishment of the Combined Working Group as outlined in paragraph 4 of USCIB 23/70, and direct the working group to undertake a rewording of the reference to reflect the changes necessary to conform to the NSA recommendations."

The CHAIRMAN noted the changes proposed by NSA and said that in view of these, and minor changes suggested by other members, he would like to ask if the original drafter of the paper, Mr. Packard, would be willing to incorporate the changes into a revised draft which could be forwarded to USCIB for approval on a seven-day basis.

MR. PACKARD said that he would undertake to prepare such a redraft.

The members discussed the question of membership on the ad hoc group, recommended in paragraph 4 of the State paper. It was agreed that members from State, NSA and FBI would make up the committee to work on the French problem, and that the committee might not require an FBI member in the consideration of subsequent problems. Mentioned as probable members of the ad hoc committee were Mr. Polyzoides (State), Mr. Friedman and possibly Mr. Austin (NSA), and Mr. Keay (FBI). It was agreed that CIA and OSD representatives would participate in the committee work on a consultant basis.

MR. PACKARD asked if the members had agreed that the proposed NSA changes, read by Captain Agnew, were acceptable and might be incorporated in his redraft. There was agreement in principle; however, Mr. Keay said that he would like to suggest certain modifications. It was therefore agreed that the ad hoc committee named above would be authorized to act in behalf of the Executive Committee in the preparation of a revised draft which would, when available, be submitted to USCIB on a seven-day basis.

The CHAIRMAN informed the members of Mr. Armstrong's comments at the 89th USCIB meeting, with particular reference to his statement that the tenuous nature of the French internal situation might possibly require a postponement or cancellation of the approach to the French.

In this regard, MR. PACKARD pointed out that the entire program was geared so that it could be broken off at any time.

DECISION: (20 August 1953) USCIBEC appointed an ad hoc committee consisting of members from the Department of State, NSA and FBI to take cognizance of Allied (NATO) Communications Security Problems in the manner outlined in the foregoing discussion.

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USCIBEC agreed, further, that USCIB 14/313 would be revised (by Mr. Packard) in light of comments presented by the members, and upon revision would be coordinated with the members of the ad hoc committee, whose concurrence would constitute USCIBEC approval, thereby permitting distribution of the paper directly to USCIB for action.

This item to be dropped.

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