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**Gloom Over
Korean Vise**

By Marquis Childs

Could Nehru Help?

AS THE Korean tragedy unfolds, it becomes apparent that the political vise in which the United States is caught is almost as rigid as the military one. The next few days will determine how much can be salvaged politically and diplomatically as well as militarily.

What western European diplomats are saying privately is far more explosive than what they are saying publicly or even than the criticism contained in the press of their respective countries. In essence it comes down to this:

The United States must make efforts going much further than any that have yet been indicated to avoid the disaster of an impossible and endless war on the Chinese mainland with millions of Chinese soldiers trained and experienced in guerilla warfare and moved by a fierce fanaticism. If such a war results from the present debacle, then all hope of saving western Europe will be ended.

The degree of maneuverability left in the United Nations is small. It is highly doubtful that western European nations would support a Korean resolution stronger than that vetoed in the Security Council by Soviet Russia. And that resolution, calling on the Communist Chinese to withdraw, is now more or less meaningless.

The first reaction of many delegates to the violent and envenomed attack delivered by Gen. Wu Hsiu-chuan, head of the Red delegation, was one of almost fatalistic hopelessness. It seemed to shut the door on all Western cooperation, offering a choice between getting out of Asia entirely or fighting endlessly against terrible odds.

EVEN the Indian delegation is said to have reacted in the first instance with the belief that all hope in negotiation was over. Those long accustomed to U. N. venom were startled by the vitriolic nature of the hatred which Wu sprayed at his audience.

Over the weekend a faint flicker of hope has revived. In part, it comes out of the talk which Wu had with Sir Benegal Rau, head of the Indian delegation. In the course of that talk, which was friendly and polite on the surface at least, Wu intimated that nothing could be expected so long as Communist China was outside the U. N.

This is indeed a faint ray of light in a very dark sky. How Communist China could be admitted in view of what has happened is hard to see. Yet the fact remains that in view of the military situation, America's bargaining position is far from strong.

One thing this slight hope suggests is the need to use every avenue of mediation. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru should be invited at once to come to Washington to participate in the talks with President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee. I feel certain he would respond to such an invitation by flying here as quickly as possible.

By his counsel and his presence, Nehru would contribute to a settlement if settlement is still possible. Too often in the past the Indians have not been consulted on major policy decisions directly affecting Asia. And our Ambassador in New Delhi, Loy Henderson, has several times been embarrassed to discover that the British had confided in Nehru an issue previously referred to London.

AS TO the military vise, the only resource not yet tried is to bomb across the North Korean border in Manchuria. It is technically correct to say that General MacArthur never formally requested permission to attack in Manchuria prior to the final and fateful offensive intended to take the last area of North Korea up to the border, but in his telegrams to the Pentagon he plainly implied that if he could not bomb Manchurian concentrations, he would find it difficult to bring the war to a successful conclusion.

If it is now true that there are 600,000 Chinese in Korea, then the time for bombing in Manchuria may have passed. Bombings would now be concentrated on the immediate threat U. N. armies face from Red troops actually in Korea. But whether bombing can be effective against the kind of mass infiltration practiced by the Chinese, with their limited supply lines, is doubtful, and this doubt applies also to the tactical use of the atom bomb.

What President Truman said about the popularity of generals when they are winning battles and the decline in their fortunes when they are losing is a sobering truth. Yet after this has been said, it is necessary to consider certain failures and, above all, the failure of intelligence in Korea.

Many people in Washington, including several European diplomats, know of the over-all intelligence report on Korea prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA report took a very grim foreboding view of the numbers and the intention of the Communist Chinese in Korea. Completed on November 21, it was available to MacArthur's staff before the offensive was launched.

At the very least, the proper committees of Congress are entitled to know whether this report was considered and, if it was considered, why the information it contained was ignored. For the rest, there is faith and prayer in one of the darkest hours in our history.

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To Improve Intelligence

The only surprising thing about the Army's disclosure that it is creating the nucleus of a career intelligence corps is that it has taken so long to launch this project. The announcement comes as questions are being raised at the Capitol and elsewhere as to why our intelligence system was caught napping by the Chinese Communists last Sunday, when the Reds opened their big Korean drive. Why the Army only now is moving to overhaul its intelligence system along lines recommended by a Hoover Commission task force two years ago is hard to understand.

The Army says it is organizing a permanent G-2 group of officers who will make a career of intelligence. Five officers have been selected for this permanent duty and some 30 others will be added to the group. This plan is designed to supplant what the Eberstadt task force of the Hoover Commission termed the "somewhat haphazard method" of selecting officers for intelligence work. The Eberstadt committee pointed out that the Army's G-2 had had seven chiefs in as many years—"some of them with no prior intelligence experience whatsoever."

The Eberstadt report criticized "mistaken" intelligence during the airlift phase of the cold war in Germany, condemned poor selection of personnel for vital intelligence posts and referred to unsatisfactory relationships among the various intelligence services and between them and the Central Intelligence Agency. The latter is the over-all co-ordinating and evaluating authority.

One of the obstacles in the past to establishing a permanent intelligence service has been the lack of any incentive for officers to seek this highly important assignment. The armed services have looked upon intelligence as just another desk job which offered no opportunities for advancement in rank or prestige. The constant turnover of officers has hampered the departments in developing efficient intelligence organizations. To check this turnover the Army proposes to keep a "hard core" of career G-2 men who will be assured of no loss of promotion advantages through their special services. This approach, however belated, is the right one. It will eliminate the "haphazard" duty system which has resulted in so much haphazard intelligence work in the past.