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	ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION <i>AFSA-14</i>	DATE	COORDINATION
2			FILE
			INFORMATION
3			NECESSARY ACTION
			NOTE AND RETURN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4			SEE ME
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REMARKS			
<p><i>What goes on here? Looks to me as though Mac + Willoughby are laying the groundwork for something.</i></p> <p><i>This does not jibe with Willoughby's statements when Johnson was in Tokyo.</i></p> <p><i>ACP</i></p>			
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## Alarm Given in March About Korea

# Army Intelligence Warned of War

By JIM G. LUCAS Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

TOKIO, Sept. 1.—Three and one-half months before it happened, Gen. Douglas MacArthur's intelligence officers predicted the invasion of South Korea by the Reds.

The Korean war started at dawn June 25. On March 10 Far East Command Intelligence said it had reliable reports that the People's (North Korean) army would invade South Korea in June. That went to all responsible military men in the Far East. It also went to Washington.

Far East Intelligence—particularly its chief, Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby—has been sharply criticized since the Korean war started. Its critics say it gave Washington bad advice or none at all. But an on-the-spot investigation reveals an entirely different story. It needs to be told.

Actually, Gen. MacArthur's intelligence men need not have concerned themselves with Korea. Spying on the North Koreans was the responsibility of the South Korean army.

## KEPT IN TOUCH

Nevertheless, documents made available today reveal that the Far East Command—as a matter of sound military operating policy—did keep in touch with the situation. Last winter it forecast an invasion in the spring.

At that time, Gen. MacArthur said the threat was building up. A report on Dec. 8 said no invasion appeared imminent and no long-range prediction would be valid in view of rapidly changing factors—namely, the impact of Chinese Communism. However, the report continued:

"With the conclusion of the Chinese Communist campaign in China, more troops and supplies will be channeled into North Korea. It appears that the danger to this southern republic will mount at that time. Climate conditions most favorable to military operations have passed (December, 1949). The next favorable period for any such action will occur in April and May, 1950."

On Jan. 5, 1950, Far East Intelligence warned that the North Korean government had set March and April, 1950, as the time to invade South Korea. In March came the flat prediction that the invasion was set for June.

At that time, Gen. MacArthur's intelligence reported it was fairly confident the North Koreans had 13 divisions and possibly seven more. Today 13 Red divisions and possibly 15 are massed along our defense perimeter.

Last fall U. S. intelligence officers reported entire divisions of Communists of Korean ethnic origin were moving from Manchuria into North Korea. These are not Chinese Communists. They are Korean exiles who had lived and fought with the Chinese Red armies for many years. One estimate is that there are 1,400,000 of them.

## CONFIRMED BY PRISONERS

Intelligence officers at the time said they were being used to make up manpower deficiencies in the invasion plan. Prisoners since have confirmed this.

It has been established, for instance, that two Korean volunteer army divisions (originally part of the Red Manchurian army) crossed the border in August. They then were broken up and their battle-tried veterans scattered.

Until this happened the average North Korean company had 80 men. But 20 to 30 of the Korean volunteer army veterans were assigned to each North Korean company. Prisoners say no company is without its hard core of such veterans.

Gen. MacArthur's headquarters is convinced Russian officers are with the North Korean army, particularly in its technical branches. Several Red majors and lieutenants colonels were reported in Seoul this week. But the Russians apparently won't let them go past Seoul since their capture would be embarrass-

sing.

Psychological warfare is paying bigger dividends here than anyone expected. Millions of leaflets, including surrender passes, have been dropped. Early in the war we

dropped them at all hours. But North Korean police quickly confiscated them and anyone caught reading them was arrested. So now we drop them only at night and a marked increase in surrenders has

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been noted.

In Tokio a powerful transmitter beams broadcasts to North Korea 24 hours a day. The Reds recently paid us the compliment of copying. Two nights ago they set up loudspeakers along the South Korean front and spent the night urging

the South Koreans to desert. But none did.

One form of psychological warfare worries us most—the growing feeling that the war will be over by Christmas. No responsible officer of the Far East Command believes that.