

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT:

Director says make sanitized version +
 extracts from NSA SAB Study on Communist
 for Canadian + Rn
 45 Jan 54

12 Jan. 54

Checked with Capt. Agnew
re status of this and he
said nothing has been done
but they are going to
do it. They ~~are~~ not
finished ^{with} the Robertson Rpt.

J. B. Young

Suspense 15 Feb.

MEMORANDUM ROUTING SLIP		NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS	
1	NAME OR TITLE CAPT AGNEW	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
	ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	DATE	COORDINATION
2	<i>Suspense</i>		FILE
3			INFORMATION
	<i>11 Jan 54</i>		NECESSARY ACTION
4			NOTE AND RETURN
			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE
REMARKS			
<p>Re Para 3 of your OM. Recommend the extract be prepared by P/P as soon as practicable. Please let me know if this will be done so I can tell </p>			
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605			
FROM NAME OR TITLE <i>[Signature]</i>		DATE <i>4 Jan 54</i>	
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION		TELEPHONE	

MEMO ROUTING SLIP		NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS	
1	NAME OR TITLE <i>General CANINE</i>	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
	ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	DATE	COORDINATION
2			FILE
	PL 86-36/50 USC 3605		INFORMATION
3			NECESSARY ACTION
			NOTE AND RETURN
4			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE
REMARKS			
<p><i>[Redacted]</i> Canadian h.o. has been asked by his home office to try to get a copy of the report filed by Prof. Robertson's study on "Comint in Early Warning". I told him I'd ask you.</p> <p>2. We do not have any copies to spare & would have to run off another copy for Canada. If we do that, we should give one to GCHQ also.</p>			
FROM NAME OR TITLE <i>Fredman</i>		DATE <i>17 Dec 53</i>	
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION		TELEPHONE	

Little over 1/2 a dozen +
feels he should consult
his authorities.

Summary of Questionable Items in
"Robertson Report" in Regard to NSA's
Possible Releasing of The Report To
The Canadian's and British:

I. References on which NSA probably
should not be quoted as an authority
or source:

1. Operations of Intelligence Advisory
Committee

2. Operations of Watch Committee

3. Operations of Indications Boards

4. % figures showing relative amount
of intelligence on certain subjects derived from
COMINT

5. ELINT

6. SOSUS (Navy's sound surveillance
system)

7. Estimates on the Soviet atomic
stockpile, BW capability and delivery
systems

8. The fact that SAC needs 3-6
days warning for an "immediate" counter-
attack

II. Items in report which are potentially embarrassing to NSA:

1. The fact that The Group used a certain British JIC paper
2. The fact that The Group used The Kelly Report and other closely held documents
3. Certain details of The Russian problem

III. Page-referenced Comments:

Pg 3: The only one of these reports that has not been widely referred to by columnists in the same sense as used here is The WSEG (Weapons System Evaluation Group).

Pg 4: This reference to The Bull Report has also appeared in the press, but slanted to the more general "air defense" rather than to intelligence.

Pg 5: The pencilled objection to using The Brownell Report as a source seems peculiar since one of the witnesses before The Brownell Committee was Sir Edward Travis, KCMG, then Director, GCHQ. (4 April '52).

Pg 6: It may not be within the scope of NSA's authority to release information on the Indications Boards, Watch Committee, IAC, and percentage figures indicating the relative amount of all intelligence derived from COMINT.

(see also remarks about Pg 7.)

Pg 7: The intention of The Group in discussing ELINT, the use of Indications Boards, and The Watch Committee was to advise The Director, NSA, of certain situations. These matters are beyond The purview of NSA.

Pg 8: Judging from The manner in which we were required to handle The referenced British JIC paper, it's conceivable that, as far as The British are concerned, we had no business having it. It might be well to omit any such reference.

Pg 9: See remarks relative to Pg. 6 & 7

Pg 13 }
Pg 15 } OK as is
Pg 16 }

Pg 19: Again, ELINT is beyond NSA's scope, and hence it is not within NSA's authority to release such information.

Pg 22: NOMAC ?

Pg 24 :)
Pg 25 : } OK as is

Appendices

I. Pg. 5: Considering the nature of the liaison between Canada and Britain and the U.S., I don't see any objection to mentioning the Watch Committee in this manner, even if it is tied to SRB, A-2.

II. Pg. 1: Again, these are matters well beyond the scope of NSA.

III. Pg. 142: Although the figures in the table (particularly those on SAC) were very closely held even among our own people when this report was prepared, some of them were released in the 16 Oct. '53 Colliers. The only one that may still be very sensitive is the 3-6 day statement on SAC.

Pg 3. See Callers, 16 Oct. '53 and Aug. - Sept. columns by Alsep & Pearson

Pg 4: The sound surveillance system (SOSUS) is a Navy project. I assume ONI is the releasing authority.

IV Pg 1 & 2: See remarks relative to Pgs 6 & 7 (i.e. operation of Watch Committee beyond scope of NSA)

Pg 3: Another reference to The British JIC paper previously mentioned (re: Pg 8) as a source of possible embarrassment.

VI. Pg 1: Another percentage figure on relative amount of intelligence coming from COMINT

VII. Pg 3: The indicated section should be omitted on the grounds that, even among the COMINT community (both US & UK) the distribution of this information is strictly

controlled.

VIII Pg 1-6: The releasing to anyone of information on ELINT seems beyond NSA's scope. As of last summer, some of the listed ELINT operations were of a semi-covert nature; and, although undoubtedly known by the British & Canadians, such information probably should ^{NOT} come from NSA.

IX Pg 3: OK as is

XI Bibliography: Perhaps the entire bibliography should be omitted. Most of the publications listed have very limited distribution. Many were obtained semi-officially through personal contacts in DOD. Listing all of these could attract undue attention to some of the more closely held documents. Some of the more sensitive items are numbered 4, 5, 9, 17(?)

IV General

1. From a security point of view (with one or two possible exceptions) there is probably very little of an objectionable nature in this report as far as releasing it to the properly cleared Canadians and British is concerned.
2. From a domestic diplomatic point of view, NSA might do well by avoiding a position where they could possibly be quoted by the British or Canadians as an authority or source on certain areas mentioned in the report.
3. From the point of view of future dealings with the Canadians and British (at all levels), this report could be construed in a few areas as being a rather bare-faced and soul-searching confession of certain weaknesses that may or may not work to our advantage.

ggm