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1	NAME OR TITLE CAPT HOLTWICK	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
	ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION S/ASST	DATE	COORDINATION
2			FILE
			INFORMATION
3			NECESSARY ACTION
			NOTE AND RETURN
4			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE

REMARKS

Jack:

1. Here is an unofficial document which should make interesting reading for you in re your talk this morning. The paper was prepared by Miss Carolyn Fox, now no longer with NSA, as a personal point of view to be presented to me personally.

2. Please send this back to me in 2-3 days, as I want to use it. Would like your comments. I am inclined to agree completely.

FROM NAME OR TITLE

Friedman

DATE

6 Jan 54

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

TELEPHONE

DD FORM 1 FEB 50 95

Replaces DA AGO Form 895, 1 Apr 48, and AFHQ Form 12, 10 Nov 47, which may be used.

16-48487-4 GPO *

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1	NAME OR TITLE <i>General ACKERMAN</i>	INITIALS		CIRCULATE
	ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	DATE		COORDINATION
2				FILE
				INFORMATION
3				NECESSARY ACTION
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REMARKS

1. Herewith a paper given me informally by Miss Fox before leaving the NSA. I think the paper has much merit. If you agree I suggest giving it to P/P to use as a basis for preparing, in collaboration with PROD, a paper to go from DIRECTOR to Chairman, USCIB.

FROM NAME OR TITLE <i>[Signature]</i>	DATE <i>12 Jan 54</i>
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	TELEPHONE

DD FORM 1 FEB 50 95

Replaces DA AGO Form 895, 1 Apr 48, and AFHQ Form 12, 10 Nov 47, which may be used.

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Chairman: Lt. Col. H. C. Simmons, USAF
(Code 143, ext. 510)

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FBI:	Mr. S.D. Ellis	Dept. of Justice	175	2021
NSA:	Col. J. b. Weeks	AHS	147	322
ARMY:	Col. J.K. Baker	Pentagon	131	56663
NAVY:	Cdr. J. L. Holmes	AHS	147	341
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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
EO 3.3(h)(2)

22 December 1953

TO: Mr. Friedman

FROM: C. Fox

Subject: Attache d Staff Study

1. In the course of studying PROL reporting problems, I had to devote considerable attention to the USCIB Master List of Intelligence Objectives and Requirements, which the USCIB members intend to use as the basic document for guiding current and long range plans and operations of NSA. The resulting staff study points out, relatively politely, that the document won't do.

2. The authors of a large portion of the List (principally, CIA) are evidently not aware that COMINT is essentially different from all other sources of intelligence and that any attempt to impose an "all-source" priority list on the COMINT effort will result in a serious misuse of COMINT.

3. The List is another piece of evidence in the case for CONSIDO (a fact which I did not mention in the staff study). It is a fine example of what happens when several separate agencies, having different intelligence responsibilities and widely divergent views on the role which COMINT is to play in the fulfillment of those responsibilities, attempt to compose their differences in a document which is a collection of compromises and present that "joint" document to the Director of a consolidated COMINT producing agency as a guide for his plans and operations. (In this connection, the organization of the Office of Exploitation, oriented toward the "separateness" of the consumer agencies rather than to the inseparable nature of the problems being exploited, is a major step in the wrong direction.)

4. Among several other dangers, acceptance of the List and of the "detailed information requirements" based thereon would result in the continuation and aggravation of the misuse of , which ought to be exploited as our best available source of current military and political intelligence on the USSR and not as the source of long range intelligence on economic capabilities of the USSR.

5. NSA's mission is too important to be endangered by any catering to the weaknesses of the consumer agencies. It would be misguided kindness on the part of NSA to try to "make do" with the USCIB Master List. The List should be thrown right back to USCIB. If the Board can't do better than that, it had better not try to guide the NSA effort at all.

THE USCIB MASTER LIST OF INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
AND REQUIREMENTS

1. The Problem: To evaluate the USCIB Master List of Intelligence Objectives and Requirements in order to determine whether the List (i) can provide the Director, NSA, with basic guidance in planning and allocating resources for current and long range operations; and (ii) can be used as the basis for "detailed information requirements" to be furnished for the guidance of NSA operational personnel.
2. Facts Bearing on the Problem: See Appendix "A", hereto.
3. Discussion: See Appendix "A", hereto.
4. Conclusions:
 - a. The List can not be effectively applied to the planning and allocation of COMINT resources.
 - b. The application to current COMINT production of detailed information requirements bearing the same order of priority as the Intelligence Requirements of the Master List would adversely affect the efficient and economic exploitation of COMINT sources.
5. Recommendation: It is recommended that the Director, NSA, return the Master List of Intelligence Objectives and Requirements to USCIB, with the statement attached as Appendix "B", hereto.

2. Facts Bearing on the Problem:

a. The Foreword to the USCIB Master List of Intelligence Objectives and Requirements states that the List "is provided to give basic guidance to the Director, NSA, in planning and allocating resources for current and long range operations to the extent to which these resources can be effectively employed."

b. The membership of USCIB consists of representatives of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director, National Security Agency.

3. Discussion:

a. The USCIB Master List sets forth, in order of priority, eleven Intelligence Objectives "based upon national security needs" and the Intelligence Requirements which USCIB agencies must fulfill "in order to accomplish those Objectives." The List represents an attempt to place the diverse intelligence requirements of the individual agencies in priority order within a National frame of reference. It is not, nor is it stated to be, a COMINT Priority List. The List was forwarded to the Director, NSA, with a cover letter requesting him to advise the Board concerning the extent to which US COMINT resources can be applied effectively to fulfill those requirements in the order listed. The first step, therefore, which the Director, NSA, must take in applying the List to plans and operations of his agency is a reduction to COMINT terms. Item 1., under Objective 1., is a clear requirement for the solution and processing, on a current basis and in volume, of the [redacted]

[redacted] Thereafter, two fundamental weaknesses render the List ineffective as a guide for determining the allocation of COMINT resources:

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(1) Fulfillment of the Requirements appearing in the eleven Items listed under USCIB Intelligence Objective No. 1 would necessitate full exploitation, on a current basis, of all communications of the USSR, of all military communications of the Soviet Bloc, and of all the [redacted] of non-Soviet Bloc countries. Before Item 20. is reached, the USCIB members have

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already asked for high priority intercept of all communications of the Soviet Bloc and of all of the rest of the world.

This represents an ideal goal for a theoretical COMINT organization, disposing of virtually unlimited funds, facilities, and personnel. Practically, it is not much help to the Director, NSA, in assessing the capability of his resources to fulfill the stated requirements.

The appearance, within the first quarter of the List, of items requiring coverage of almost all foreign communications, arises from the fact that USCIB has tried to give equal consideration to National Intelligence Requirements and to the separate requirements of the several agencies represented on the Board, without admitting that those separate needs exist. The result is a List which is neither a good statement of National Intelligence Requirements nor a workable Priority List for the Director, NSA. The effort to cover the basic needs of the individual agencies within the highest priority items has a most peculiar effect on the order of priority.

For example, Item 9., requiring a detailed Order of Battle of Army, Navy, Air, and Security Police Forces of the Soviet Bloc, covers the basic Intelligence Requirements of the three Services. It is reasonable that the Services should attach considerable importance to the fulfillment of their basic needs and that each Service should desire that its particular requirements be given a priority equal to those of the other two. It is less reasonable to illustrate the importance and the equality of those needs by placing a requirement

The last item under Objective No. 1, "Development of increased capabilities for attack against the US by political, subversive, psychological, and economic means," precedes the Requirement for "war plans and operational orders to the armed forces...to attack vital US possessions, US forces, bases, and fleets, NATO forces and countries, and areas peripheral to the Soviet Bloc." That strange precedence results from the need, forced on the USCIB members by the nature of the List, to give a high priority to the separate Intelligence

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Requirements of the Secretary of State by the extraordinary pretence that an indication of Soviet efforts to break up the Western alliance is an indication of an intention to attack the continental United States.

(2) The List mixes, without any reference to their distinction, long range, recurrent, and FLASH requirements; requirements which can be filled by currently exploitable traffic; requirements which can be filled only by sources which are not presently exploitable; and requirements for which COMINT is (i) the only or the best source, (ii) a likely source, (iii) an unlikely or uneconomic source, and (iv) a poor source.

Examples of all these varieties appear early in the List. "Capabilities, development, and production of guided missiles", under Item 4., involves a long range research project. "Exercises and training in range extension techniques", in Item 2., is a recurrent requirement. "Operational orders...to attack vital US possessions", under Item 12., is a FLASH requirement.

Under Items 10. and 11. can be found samples of all the degrees to which COMINT is the potential source of the intelligence required. It is neither the likeliest nor the timeliest source for discovery that the USSR has made a "sudden diplomatic maneuver" or that hurried sabotage activities have occurred. It is the only source which can provide the information that major changes in codes, ciphers, and communications procedures have taken place. It is a likely source, and the best source, for discerning a "hurried emphasis on civil defense and widescale militarization of domestic activities."

b. The Foreword to the List states that it is "provided to give basic guidance...in planning and allocation of resources...to the extent to which these resources can be effectively employed". That statement might furnish an explanation for the mixture of requirements involving various time factors and varying degrees of relevance to COMINT. Presumably, the Director, NSA, would be expected (i) to delete those requirements for the fulfillment of which his resources could not be "effectively employed", (ii) to apply the time factor to the requirements which remained, and (iii) to re-arrange the List in COMINT Priority order. The Foreword states also, however, that "detailed information requirements will be issued...as an Appendix" to the Master List. Each information requirement "will bear the same priority as the corresponding Intelligence Requirement". That statement indicates that the USCIB members consider that

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the List (i) is capable of providing both basic guidance to the Director, NSA, and to COMINT production personnel, and (ii) is actually arranged in COMINT Priority order.

The faults of the List as an instrument designed to provide the Director with basic guidance will be substantially magnified when it is used as the basis for providing detailed operational guidance to the production personnel of NSA. For example, Item 23., "Climatic, meteorological, hydrographic, geographic, and geophysical factors affecting military operations and facilities", stands fairly high on a List which has a total of 67 items. Obviously, its position on a list of requirements for information from all sources should not be the same as its position on a list of requirements for which COMINT is the source; but the USCIB members propose to furnish NSA with "detailed information requirements" based on that item, and the fulfillment of those requirements is to be considered as having a higher order of COMINT priority than the fulfillment of requirements based on Items 24.-67.

The effort to cover all requirements in the first nineteen items makes the Master List particularly unsuitable as a document on which to base "detailed information requirements" arranged in COMINT Priority order. "Development and production of guided missiles" appears in Item 25. The same statement appears in Item 4. "Development and production of atomic and thermonuclear weapons" appears in Items 8. and 30. Intelligence on the "concentration of large forces in areas favorable to the interdiction of strategic US maritime lines" is required for Item 3. Twenty-five items later, appears a requirement for intelligence on "movement and deployment of surface and submarine forces towards areas favorable to the interdiction of strategic US maritime supply lines". Item 18, on political, psychological, subversive, and economic capabilities, is as closely related to Item 11, on the same subject, as Item 28. is to Item 3. Similar examples can be found throughout the List.

e. The extent to which a Priority List can be used as a planning and operational guide by a collecting and producing agency depends on the degree of relevance of the List to the sources which it is the agency's mission to exploit. NSA collects its raw material by the interception of foreign communications; its product is COMINT information derived from (1) the decryption of enciphered

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and coded messages, (ii) plain language and voice transmissions, and (iii) traffic analysis.

For purposes of long range planning, the Director, NSA, must know the extent to which his presently available resources are adequate for the fulfillment of his mission. For both long range and current planning, he must know the extent to which his presently available resources should be applied to research and development. For current planning and operations, he must know what the Intelligence agencies require from currently exploitable COMINT sources, the order of priority of their requirements, the extent to which one priority takes precedence over another, and the proportion in which the available resources should be allocated to cover the basic, recurrent requirements of the individual agencies.

d. A Priority List presented to the Director, NSA, for his basic guidance in planning and allocating resources for current and long range operations should indicate a recognition on the part of its authors of the nature of the raw material which his organization is responsible for exploiting. Its requirements should be set forth in terms readily applicable to the exploitation of that material. The Director should not be asked to divine the hidden meaning underlying the wording and order of the items. Nor should he find it necessary to ask the Intelligence agencies to "interpret" a List for whose obscurity they are responsible in the first instance. In practice, such a method results in a variety of interpretations, with consequent inefficiency and confusion, at every level at which a "consumer" representative can affect the product of NSA operational personnel.

e. Priority Lists furnished for the guidance of current production should not follow the exact order of priority of the List which is designed to provide the Director with basic guidance. They should be directly and exclusively related to COMINT sources which are presently exploitable. They should be arranged, as should the Master List, in an order of priority which distinguishes between long range, recurrent, and FLASH requirements.

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APPENDIX "B"

PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR, NSA, TO USCIB RE THE USCIB MASTER LIST
OF INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS

The USCIB Master List of Intelligence Objectives and Requirements was given to the Director, NSA, to provide basic guidance in planning and allocating resources for current and long range operations to the extent to which those resources can be effectively employed. The List was forwarded with a covering letter in which the Director is requested to advise the Board concerning the extent to which US COMINT resources can be applied effectively to fulfill the USCIB Intelligence Requirements in the order listed.

Item 1. under USCIB Intelligence Objective No. 1 states: "USSR war plans and direct operational orders to the armed forces or to any component of the armed forces to attack the continental United States...and directives to representatives abroad or to domestic government offices relative to such an attack". Stated in COMINT terms, USCIB's first priority, for the fulfillment of which it is willing to devote whatever COMINT resources may be necessary, is the solution and processing, on a current basis and in volume, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Thus far, the List is readily usable for its stated purpose.

It is possible to estimate the maximum extent to which US COMINT resources can be effectively applied to presently unexploitable Russian problems, although it cannot be guaranteed that any of those problems will be solved or that their solution will result in the fulfillment of Priority No. 1.

Thereafter, however, the List is not usable as a basic guide for COMINT plans and operations.

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Fulfillment of the Requirements appearing in the eleven items listed under Objective No. 1. would necessitate [REDACTED]

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The appearance, within the first quarter of the List, of items requiring coverage of almost all foreign communications makes the List ineffective as a guide for determining the allocation of intercept facilities.

The List mixes, without any reference to their distinction, long range, recurrent, and FLASH requirements; and requirements for which COMINT is (i) the only or the best sources, (ii) a likely source, (iii) an unlikely or uneconomic source, and (iv) a poor source.

The Director, NSA, is asked, therefore, to plan the allocation of US COMINT resources according to an order of priority which is not based upon COMINT but upon all the sources from which the required Intelligence might be obtained. Because of that confusion of sources and of the time factor, the List cannot be used in an assessment of the extent to which COMINT resources can be applied effectively to fulfill the Intelligence Requirements in the order listed.

It is USCIB's intent to use the List as the basis for the preparation of "detailed information requirements" bearing "the same priority as the corresponding Intelligence Requirement". That means that USCIB not only wishes the Director to allocate his resources in accordance with an order of priority which is not based on COMINT but also intends that current operations of NSA production personnel should be based on the same order of priority. The application to COMINT production of an order of priority which is not based upon COMINT would result in a seriously inefficient and uneconomic use of COMINT as a source of Intelligence.

It is requested that USCIB withdraw the Master List and replace it with a List which is based on a recognition of the capabilities and limitations of COMINT as a source of Intelligence. Detailed information requirements furnished for the guidance of NSA operational personnel should not follow the priority order of that Master List but should be related directly to presently exploitable COMINT sources and should be arranged in an order of priority which distinguishes between long range, recurrent, and FLASH requirements.